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Abstract  
 
This thesis analyses the impact of legal and media 
representations of war crime trials on master narratives of the war and 
identity in Croatia and Serbia. Our research is situated on the 
interception of scientific fields of transitional justice, media studies and 
studies on nationalism. We explore the relationship between official 
narratives of the war, legal narratives of war crime trials and the way that 
the media conveys both the narratives and reports on these trials. The 
research addresses issues concerning war crime trials, collective 
memories and (re)construction of national identity, national narratives 
and the war in the former Yugoslavia. 
Taking Brooks and Gewritz’s methodological approach, we used 
Critical Discourse Analysis to analyse law not as set of rules and policies, 
but as a source of narratives. Furthermore, law is given a dimension of 
“cultural discourse through which social narratives are structured and 
suppressed”. Assuming that the media in contemporary societies have 
huge influence on shaping knowledge about history and shared historical 
narratives, this research analyses local media reports on domestic war 
crimes trials. This research explores how media represent and report 
about historical narratives established by local courts in Serbia and 
Croatia. Subsequently, those representations are compared to 
background, non-legal elements, i.e. historical facts found in judgments 
rendered at the ICTY. We approached the problematique by analysing 
trial transcripts and media reports about domestic war crimes trials held 
in Serbia and Croatia (Ovčara-Vukovar hospital in Serbia and Medak 
pocket case in Croatia). 
We argue that transitional justice, instead of triggering truth 
seeking and truth telling processes that would lead to reconciliation, 
multiplied mutually exclusive historical narratives that determined 
national collective identities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis analyses the impact of legal and media 
representations of war crime trials on master narratives of the war and 
identity in Croatia and Serbia. Our research is situated on the 
interception of scientific fields of transitional justice, media studies and 
studies on nationalism. We explore the relationship between official 
narratives of the war, legal narratives of war crime trials and the way 
that the media conveys both the narratives and reports on these trials. 
The research addresses issues concerning war crime trials, collective 
memories and (re)construction of national identity, national narratives 
and the war in the former Yugoslavia.  
Main research questions we explore are following:  
 What kinds of legal and media representations about 
war crime trials are created in Croatia and Serbia? 
 How, and if, these representations influence master-
narratives about the war in the former Yugoslavia?  
 How, and if, narratives shaping national identity are 
changed after the war crime trials? 
In both personal and collective memories wars often occupy 
central position. There are multiple interpretations of the ‘truth’ about 
wars and break up of Yugoslavia and this thesis does not try to deal 
directly with establishing of the facts about the war events. Instead, it 
analyses representations of past conflict through prism of public 
portrayal and reporting on war crime trials. Changes in political and 
social contexts in post Yugoslav countries provoked changes in the 
very relationship to the past, causing constant need for creation of new 
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official memory policies or correction of the master-narrative. We 
question whether collective memory and master historical narratives 
are contingent on legal and media representations of war crime trials. 
War crime trials generate partial narratives as they deal only with 
historical facts directly connected to establishing the question of 
individual guilt. Therefore, those representations of the past events are 
fragmented and require processes of selection and interpretation in 
order to be transformed into public or media narrative.  
This dissertation analyses master narratives of war and identity 
in Croatia and Serbia and traces the process of creation of political 
myths that constitute national identity. We used example of ICTY 
charisma to develop the concept of political myth making in post 
Yugoslavian era. Main topic of the dissertation is the analysis of two 
case studies: Ovčara and Medak pocket war crime trials and the impact 
of resulting legal and media representations on narratives of war and 
identity. We concentrate on national trials, held before local courts in 
Serbia and Croatia. We do not directly analyse trials organised by the 
ICTY or ICJ even though they do contribute to large extent in creation 
of narratives about the war. Nevertheless, in both case studies we 
observed how similar ICTY trials influenced the development of 
narratives on war and identity represented around domestic trials. 
National courts are chosen in order to explore states’ ability in dealing 
with the past through war crime trials, made without explicit 
conditionality dictate by the EU and international community, as it was 
the case with the cooperation with the ICTY.   
At this point it is necessary to outline the reasons for case 
selection of Croatia and Serbia. We wanted to do a comparative study 
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in order to capture the key element in identity making process – the 
‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy. Moreover, Croatia and Serbia have 
statehood as nation states and independent institutions of judiciary. 
Even though national narratives are not necessarily linked to sovereign 
states as understood by international law, i.e. as states having right and 
power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation, 
Croatia and Serbia are certainly different from the case of Kosovo or 
Republika Srpska when it comes to national courts for war crime trials. 
Both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which consists of two 
entities – Republika Srpska and Federation of BIH, are de facto 
international protectorates and have hybrid courts or tribunals, 
composed of international and domestic justice actors.  
Trial for war crimes committed at Ovčara, agricultural estate 
near Vukovar, was the first one before the newly formed Special Court 
for War Crimes in Serbia.1 Although already during the 90s there were 
some trials for war crimes2, it was the first trial for war crimes 
respecting high judicial standards. As it coincided almost 
simultaneously with the ICTY’s ‘Vukovar hospital’ case, it reached 
major political significance as a test of Serbian judiciary. Moreover, 
even though only paramilitary unit members were accused, the trial 
reached noteworthy media salience. The matter of nature of conflict, 
number of victims, naming of November 18th as Vukovar’s 
fall/liberation, responsibility and political consequences emerged 
together with the master narrative of Vukovar’s victim. On the other 
hand, Medak pocket case was referred to Croatia by the ICTY and 
                                                                
1 Special court is term used in public space for War Crimes Council of the Belgrade 
District Court 
2 Those were mostly show-trials resulting in acquittals of the accused. 
 4 
 
caused major political crisis and protests. In contrast to Vukovar’s 
victim narrative, this trial deals with hero narratives, but shares the 
weight of ‘democracy test’ for Croatian judiciary.  
In order to give more information about the current state of art 
of existing analysis of impact of war crimes trials and other transitional 
justice mechanisms on historical narratives, this research starts with the 
critical survey of the existing secondary literature, theoretical literature 
and relevant methodology. 
 
CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
On February 28th 2013 The Appeal Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
acquitted former Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army 
Colonel General Momčilo Perišić. This decision of the Appeal Chamber 
was the latest in a series of highly controversial judgments of this 
international body. Since 2012, the ICTY reversed its first instance 
judgments on the Croatian Operation Storm, acquitting Generals 
Gotovina and Markač and found the former Prime Minister of Kosovo 
Ramush Haradinaj not guilty in re-trial process.  
As the closure of this ad hoc tribunal is rapidly approaching, a 
debate whether an international tribunal can fulfil its broader mandate 
of “contributing to a restoration and maintenance of peace”3 and 
consequently to promotion of reconciliation is put back in focus of 
                                                                
3 Mandate and Crimes under ICTY jurisdiction, accessed on: 
http://www.icty.org/sid/320 
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political elites, scholars and local societies. Refik Hodžić rightly noticed 
that the people of the former Yugoslavia were never seen as ICTY’s 
primary constituency (Hodžić, 2013).  
ICTY’s judgments were aimed at developing and refining 
international humanitarian law and at the same time they tried to stay 
apolitical and impartial. Public discourse about the ICTY in Yugoslav 
successor states was extremely negative4. Nevertheless, many of the 
more and more narrowly interpreted legal criteria that motivated 
above mentioned verdicts triggered even more conflicting reactions in 
the region. ICTY is after all, just another UN institution, external to 
needs and expectations of the people of the Yugoslav successor states. 
In addition, Tribunal’s strategies aiming at maintenance of lasting 
peace or establishment of credibility within the region were never truly 
explained.  
Hence, more than twenty years after the break up of 
Yugoslavia, process of dealing with the past that could lead to 
reconciliation was never truly unfolded. Reconciliation understood as 
regain of trust of citizens in each other and in the state itself is not 
possible without recognizing the truth of what happened during the 
war. It is illusory to think that an international tribunal whose lengthy 
and complicated trials are sharply opposing atrocities and violence 
perpetrated could restore basic trust of citizens in members of other 
warring party or even in their own state institutions.  
Some scholars propose that impartial national courts 
established by the state willing to deal seriously with war crimes can 
                                                                
4 For example, OSCE, Belgrade center for human rights, Documenta (just to name a few) 
regularly publish wider public's attitudes towards the ICTY. Comprehensive results 
available on: www.bgcentar.org.rs   
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lead to reconciliation. This thesis is analysing the impact local courts 
have on creation of historical narratives, political myths and collective 
memory about the war. Are local court really catalysts of 
reconciliation? Or they have quite opposite effect in strengthening 
national ideologies? The ICTY provided full compliance of both Serbia 
and Croatia, but the cooperation was made possible only via judicial 
intervention performed by the international community, mainly the 
EU. Compliance with the ICTY was managed with great democratic 
deficit as political elites acted upon conditionality dictate. How can we 
then explain state behaviour and strategies for dealing with the past 
presented at local courts for war crimes? Domestic trials for war crimes 
offer a very challenging framework from which we can directly observe 
evolution and changing of states’ institutions attitude towards war 
crimes and historical narratives. Moreover, this research analyses a 
development over time in media narratives. How and why those 
changes occur and what might be possible ways to tackle this problem 
in the larger context of global justice? There is continuous development 
in the way legal heritage is discussed and remembered. According to 
Osiel, trials are significant if they comprise the potential to trigger a 
public debate about past wrongdoings and society’s wounds (Osiel, 
1997). Hence, what is the influence of a legal narrative on the creation 
of political myths and remembrance of war? Are they selectively 
remembered in order to confirm official dominant public discourse 
about the war? How and why do media change their reporting policy 
and strategies about the representation of war crimes trials? This thesis 
seeks to address these questions by analysing historical narratives from 
legal documents and media reports in Croatia and Serbia.  
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1.1. THE NOTION OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  
 
The beginning of the research in the field of transitional justice 
is closely related to the study of democratic transition. Transitions 
literature, developed after authoritarian regimes, notably in Latin 
America and Southern Europe, were overturned in favour of 
democracies. Transitional justice mechanisms were not mentioned in 
democratic consolidation theory, as many countries simply chose to 
ignore their past. Nevertheless, among necessary elements for 
democratic transition Linz and Stepan included the rule of law, 
political and civil society. One of the most difficult questions to be 
answered by a country in transition from authoritarianism or armed 
conflict to a democracy based on the rule of the law is how the society 
shall deal with the atrocities and injustices of the past. The culture of 
impunity, questions of accountability and responsibility, lack of the 
respect for securing human rights tend to persist during the process of 
transition. Former Yugoslavia faced double transition: from 
communism to democracy regime and from violent conflict to peaceful 
societies. Both legal and political developments of measures concerning 
human rights gave as result notion of transitional justice. Ruti Teitel 
argues that precisely this “turn to legalism, however contingent, is 
emblematic of the liberal state, with transitional justice reconstructing 
the political identity on a juridical basis by deploying the discourse of 
rights and responsibilities.” (Teitel, 2000: 225) 
In the UN report “The rule of law in conflict and post-conflict 
societies” transitional justice is described as “the full range of processes 
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and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms 
with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”5. Transitional 
justice may include either judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with 
differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and 
individual prosecutions. Its mechanisms consist of criminal justice 
oriented policies such as trials for war crimes or lack of trials. In 
addition transitional justice mechanisms are addressed to institutional 
reform (vetting and lustration), reparations and truth telling (truth 
commissions).  
A milestone document that defines state obligations in case of 
great breaches of human rights is the judgment in the Velásquez 
Rodrigues vs Honduras case brought before the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights. It clearly defines the objectives of transition justice 
asserting that “the State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to 
prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to 
carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its 
jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate 
punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation”.  
During democratic transition, legal systems of the state(s) are 
in constant change and even operational at the same time. Such 
heterogeneity of law and pluralism of legal systems largely 
undermined one of the main transition justice goals – dealing with the 
past. Lack of continuity from one criminal code to another is just too 
incompressible and vague, especially for the victims’ understanding of 
                                                                
5 Report of the Secretary General Kofi Annan, The rule of law in conflict and post-conflict 
societies, United nations Security Council, 2004 
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justice as just and fair. In this research we analyse some legal aspect 
that change over time and whose perception mass media and civil 
society often misuse or do not explain properly. Development of legal 
system can be also triggered by international law norms included into 
domestic legal order. For example, crimes committed under command 
responsibility or crimes against humanity did not exist per se in 
domestic legal system in Croatia or Serbia, but new interpretation of 
then existing legal norms managed to include them into trials. Thus, 
international law is used as a connecting tool for reconciling new and 
old identities of the same state, but its implementation can be hijacked 
by the lack of independence of judges, especially in immediate 
aftermath of the conflict. On the other hand, judiciary can be far more 
willing to prosecute individuals responsible for grave breaches of 
humanitarian law, and therefore set the precedent for the political 
power. 
 
1.1.1. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CROATIA AND SERBIA 
 
In all the successor countries of the former Yugoslavia so far, 
apart from seldom attempts of truth commissions and lustration, the 
focus of transitional justice has been on prosecution of war crimes. 
Transition towards stable democracy and strengthening of the rule of 
law in all post-Yugoslav states was not possible without justice and 
accountability for the committed crimes.   
Thus, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by United Nations Security Council 
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resolution 8276. This resolution was passed on 25 May 1993 in the face 
of the serious violations of international humanitarian law committed 
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, and as a response 
to the threat to international peace and security posed by those serious 
violations.  
Among the aims of the ICTY, as reported in its Statute, appear 
statements such as:  
Bringing a sense of justice to war-torn places; 
Re-establishing the rule of law; 
Providing a sound foundation for lasting peace; 
Bringing response to victims and providing an outlet to end 
cycles of violence and revenge; 
Demonstration that culpability is individual and not the 
responsibility of entire groups; and 
In a didactic mode, explanations about what caused the 
violations, and illustrate particular patterns of violation7. 
The task of the ICTY is to understand the development of 
international criminal justice within a political context and not to 
detach justice from politics. The fact is that there can never be a 
complete separation between law and policy. No matter what theory of 
law or political philosophy is professed, the inextricable bounds linking 
law and politics must be recognised. Transitional justice, although 
situated at the niche of human rights, represents its political 
development in many of its manifestations.  
                                                                
6 Full text of UNSC Resolution 827: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/306/28/IMG/N9330628.pdf?Open
Element 
7 Statute of the ICTY: http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index-t.htm 
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In the case of ICTY, the link between the law and the politics is 
unusually close and transparent. It was only in 1995 that the states 
created after the dissolution of Yugoslavia had an obligation to accept 
cooperation with the ICTY. Article IX of the “General framework 
agreement” (also known as Dayton agreement) requires full 
cooperation with all organizations involved in implementation of the 
peace settlement, including the ICTY8.  
Consequently, the EU made this an important condition of its 
accession policy vis-à-vis the Western Balkan countries concerned, 
making the start of negotiations contingent on full cooperation with the 
ICTY. Academic literature analyzing transitional justice in the former 
Yugoslavia mostly deals with the ICTY and its impact on international 
relations perspective as well as on domestic politics and society. One of 
the most influential studies dealing with the state compliance with 
international tribunals is Victor Peskin’s work International Justice in 
Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State 
Cooperation. Peskin argues that international tribunals, acting outside 
the influence of domestic political forces, contribute greatly to the 
legitimacy of judicial processes held before such an international court. 
Moreover, international legal institutions are not just codifying new 
case law of international humanitarian law, but most importantly hold 
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable for their involvement in 
atrocities. However, Peskin rightly notes that international tribunals 
such as the ICTY and the ICTR are largely dependant on states that 
suppose to “facilitate investigations, indictments and prosecutions of 
                                                                
8 Full text of Dayton Peace Agreement: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/306/28/IMG/N9330628.pdf?Open
Element 
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members of its own national, ethnic or political group.” (Peskin, 2008) 
Cooperation depends first of all on the willingness and the capacity of 
local government taking into account costs and benefits confronted 
with nationalist and modernist political currents reluctant to comply. 
Likewise, international tribunals rely on third parties helping the 
cooperation (“surrogate enforcers”), as for example the European 
Union in the case of the former Yugoslavia.  
Peskin underlines the tribunals’ independence as essential 
element to fulfil a broader mission of collecting an accurate historical 
record of past atrocities, aiming to contribute to reconciliation process 
in conflict affected areas. Even though, especially prior to establishment 
of special chamber for war crimes in the region, domestic judicial 
system suffers influences from the legislative and executive branches of 
government,  this research focuses on domestic trials for war crimes for 
several reasons. The impact of international criminal tribunals on 
memory studies, reconciliation processes, commemoration practices, 
rule of law and similar has already been widely researched area. In 
addition, we precisely try to follow war crimes trials that did not start 
because of the external factors such as financial conditionality or EU 
membership conditionality. However, we are aware of the fact that 
nowadays domestic legal practices were put in action largely thanks to 
the international tribunals: in matters of judicial support, evidence 
transfer, investigation material just to name a few. Still, in his work 
Peskin does not explain reasons for domestic elites’ potential 
compliance as he interprets them as rational decision-makers. Similarly, 
the work of Jelena Subotić labels domestic actors with pre-established 
and fixed identities and preferences.  Subotić did an in-depth 
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comparative study on how Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia 
respond to transitional justice norms imposed by The Hague 
conditionality.  Instead of focusing on the internationalization aspect of 
transitional justice, she concentrates on issues of institutional design 
and optimal conditions for reaching the idealised goals of transitional 
justice. Subotić explains how the ICTY did not reach its objectives 
profoundly as the states did comply with international norms and 
standards, but nevertheless rejected the profound social transformation 
these norms require. Moreover, she claims that transitional justice was 
“hijacked by domestic political actors who use it as an international 
and domestic strategy to achieve very specific local goals – turf 
protection, domestic power, delegitimation of political enemies, and 
perpetuation of nationalist historical narratives, as well as obtaining 
international rewards – objectives all very far removed from 
international justice policy ideals” (Subotić, 2009). The weakness of this 
research lays certainly in the fact that the author labels each of the 
countries from her case studies as “norm resisters” (Serbia), 
“instrumental adopters” (Croatia) and “true believers” (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) without taking into account the heterogeneity of political 
groups in question, policies towards the tribunal and regime change 
(Subotić, 2009). Subotić also admits that her model cannot be 
implemented at the domestic level, as coercion and conditionality are 
difficult to measure due to the absence of direct international 
involvement. Our research showed that at the domestic level cost-
benefit reasoning and attribution of fixed identities to states is 
particularly misleading, especially as there are large gaps between state 
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behaviour at the international level, i.e. towards the ICTY, and at the 
domestic level before the local courts.  
 Croatian foreign policy and its attitude towards war crimes 
can be divided into two periods: first one includes period from 1990 to 
1999 when Franjo Tudjman was on power and the second one is from 
2000 until present. Main obstacles to Croatia’s earlier membership were 
issues of transitional justice in general and long-delayed cooperation 
with the ICTY. When HDZ was on power, they developed a rhetorical 
strategy of equating “the tribunal’s indictment against Croatia’s war 
heroes with attacks on the dignity and legitimacy of the so-called 
Homeland war” (Peskin, 2010). Homeland war was one of the main 
elements of the official narrative about the political identity of the new 
Croatian state. For Croatian nationalists it was difficult to accept that 
one day, in an enlarged EU, there would be no heavily guarded border 
with Serbia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tudjman criticism of the EU was 
also based on its alleged failure to support Croatia during the most 
difficult times of the conflict – in particular prior to the destruction of 
Vukovar, in November 1991. Changes of the Croatian foreign policy 
came after the death of Tudjman. By 2000, the majority of Croatian 
electorate opposed the significant influence that Herzegovinan Croats, 
among whom extreme nationalists, suspected of being linked with 
organized crime, had over policy-making in Croatia during the time of 
Franjo Tudjman. The external factors played an important and largely 
constructive role in supporting the anti-extremist forces in Croatian 
politics. 
Croatia finally started Stabilization and Association Process in 
1999 which included both full cooperation with the ICTY and regional 
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reconciliation among the political conditions. In November 2000, SAA 
was launched in Zagreb and it was signed in 2001. The lack of 
cooperation with the ICTY halted the process of EU accession once 
again, and it was only in 2003 that Croatia realized that one possible 
road to Brussels leads via the capitals of the neighbouring countries 
primarily Belgrade and Sarajevo. Anyway, last obstacle was removed 
in December 2005 after the arrest of General Gotovina, accused before 
ICTY for war crimes. 
Political changes in the Western Balkans following the end of 
Tudjman’s and Milošević’s regime in Croatia and Serbia respectively, 
opened a realistic perspective for all countries of the region to move 
closer to membership of the EU. The initial flurry of action and 
commitment to war crimes prosecution and corruption after 5 October 
2000 ended with the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran 
Djindjić in March 2003. Djindjić was assassinated in a joint action of 
various groups belonging to the underworld network of organized 
crime and parts of the Serbian police Unit for Special Operation 
(Jedinica za Specijalne Operacije). This case demonstrated that the link 
between state structures that were loyal to the former president, 
Slobodan Milošević, and the criminal underworld are still strong in 
Serbia.  
Serbia’s history of reluctance to cooperate with the ICTY since 
2000 had been in large part due to the machinations of first elected 
president in post-Milosević era, Vojislav Koštunica. Koštunica has 
never been pro ICTY and his increasingly nationalist stance highlighted 
his real opinions on the war, crimes and international justice. 
Suspicious surrounding the security sector and its involvement in 
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shielding war criminals Mladić and Karadžić, while at large, increased 
because of revelations that Mladić was in receipt of a military pension 
up until 2002, and that members of the MUP were involved in assuring 
his protection at least until 20059. In practical terms, real cooperation 
with the ICTY was rendered almost impossible, because the different 
segments of the Serbian government and its security services were 
seemingly working in diametrically opposite directions. 
After the death of Djindjić different governments made some 
feeble attempts to deal with the war crimes issue, with every attempt 
being severely undermined or criticised by large and vocal parties such 
as the SRS. Mechanisms of transitional justice, such as laws on war 
crimes, investigations, tribunals and commissions, were never fully 
developed or had no real political support. Denial of Serbian 
involvement and responsibility has remained almost constant among 
the civil society. ICTY was largely perceived by the Serbian public as an 
instrument of political blackmail on the part of Europe. As more, EU 
conditionality has always been strict and the Serbian government has 
been put under constant pressure in order to fulfil its promise to 
deliver Mladić. Latest developments showed that the price to pay for 
shielding notorious war criminals from justice proved to be too high for 
the Serbs. General perception is changing slowly, but constantly, 
especially after the arrest of the remaining fugitives. 
For the ICTY to fulfil its broader mandate of contributing to 
peace and reconciliation it had to ensure that its “investigative and 
judicial work … [is] known and understood by the people in the 
                                                                
9 it is significant that during the period of Mladić’s protection, the Minister of Defense 
was actual Serbian president Boris Tadic 
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region.” (McDonald, 1998) Unfortunately, during the first six years of 
the ICTY’s work, the lack of resonance within the affected communities 
due to the lack of any kind of community outreach programs, resulted 
in broad misconceptions and understanding of the Tribunal’s work. 
The legal professionals either took public relations for granted or as not 
being their concern; they were also mainly interested in the 
development of International Humanitarian Law; that is in ‘the rules of 
the game’ instead of ‘the actual content of the game’. Even ten years 
after creation of ICTY over 60% of the population in former Yugoslav 
Republics did not know what laws govern war crimes and 66% had not 
received any information about the kind of crimes for which one can be 
indicted (Cibelli, Kristen and Guberek, 2000).  
One of the main tasks of the media is to attempt to paint 
comprehensive narratives about the past atrocities, to tell stories that 
include everybody, regardless of his or her ethnicity or current 
residency. It is obvious that print media, radio and television may 
either aid the process of truth seeking and reconciliation, or be a major 
obstacle on that path. 
In the Balkan’s region there are multiple versions of the truth 
that build new national narrative traditions. The detainees’ “shows and 
performances” in courtrooms are creating postmodern myths in ex-
Yugoslav society. Those myths have been created together with the 
myths of rebirth of nationalism and their impact is huge although their 
appearance on the political scene is quite recent (Ramet, 2007). 
It may seem to be a paradox, although one that can easily be 
explained, that in the times of Milošević and Tudjman, the Tribunal 
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had more support in Serbia and Croatia than it has now10. This had 
nothing to do with the opposition parties accepting the necessity of 
facing the bloody past and assigning personal responsibility in order to 
avoid being saddled with collective guilt, but because the Tribunal was 
seen exclusively as an instrument of political pressure which could be 
wielded to overthrow the regime. 
Nevertheless, criminal justice intervention had, as former ICTY 
Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour stated, “a weapon in the arsenal of 
peace”11. They realized it only after they had exhausted all other 
weapons in the traditional peace building armoury: diplomacy, conflict 
management, bilateral and multilateral negotiations and pressure, 
political and economical sanctions and more or less credible threats.  
Social reactions to past war crimes and human rights abuses 
are today becoming more oriented towards establishing truth and 
punishing perpetrators. At present, more than 15 years after the end of 
the war there is very little consensus among the former republics on 
official narratives about what actually happened. In the successor states 
of Yugoslavia national identities came to be defined dialectically, in 
relation to one another. In terms of responsibility of war crimes, issue 
raised was the existence of double standards for “ours” and “theirs”. 
Accused compatriots though still enjoy the status of public heroes. It is 
necessary to outline that failing to raise a voice about the committed 
crime is as if the crime never happened. Therefore, the work of 
Tribunal is to be legal, political and moral catalyst. In case of the 
successor states of the former Yugoslavia traumatic legacies of the past 
                                                                
10 Report by SENSE News Agency, 21 April 2002 
11 Mirko Klarin, Tribunal Update, No. 141, September 1999 
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have to be dealt with in order to build a stable future; that special 
attention should go to the needs and rights of people including in 
victims in particular; and that only a comprehensive approach will 
rebuild trust among citizens and between citizens and the state. 
One of the frequently stated goals of prosecuting individuals 
for violations of international humanitarian law through the ICTY is to 
lift the burden of collective guilt from the nations in whose names 
violations were carried out, by tying the violations to specific 
individuals who bear criminal responsibility. Still, clear distinction 
between collective responsibility and collective guilt should be made. 
Every nation in conflict is bearing collective responsibility for the acts 
its individuals committed in helping or not preventing them of doing it, 
while no nation can be named criminal nation12. All the criminals are 
individuals or are taking part of the criminal group or organization.  
This raises two important political questions. Firstly, do legal 
institutions in general offer an appropriate arena for the resolution of 
issues relating to national identity and guilt? Secondly, is the way in 
which the ICTY functions effectively decoupling national identities 
from the notion of collective responsibility? 
The reply to this question may be searched by looking towards 
another International Tribunal. At the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), a permanent court of United Nations, only states are eligible to 
                                                                
12 “Zločinačkih naroda i nikada, baš nikada, ne može cijeli jedan narod biti odgovoran i 
kriv za ono što su počinili pojedini njegovi pripadnici, ili organizirane skupine – ma kako 
velike i brojne bile. Postoje individualni zločinci, postoje i zločinačke skupine i 
organizacije, ali – kažem još jednom – zločinačkih naroda nema”. (“There are no criminal 
nations and never, absolutely never, an entire nation can be responsible for acts of some 
of its nationals or organized groups – no matter how large they were. There are 
individual criminals, there are criminal groups and organizations, but – I’ will repeat- 
there are no criminal nations”) Croatian President Mesić’s speach on 8th February 2007 
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appear before the latter in contentious cases. The issues of sentences 
between ex-Yugoslav republics, seems though not to contribute to the 
sense of collective responsibility. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia represented for the first time 
that a court had adjudicated whether a sovereign state could be held 
responsible for genocide in almost sixty years since the convention on 
the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide was 
unanimously approved by the General Assembly of the UN. The 
widely commented sentence that basically acquitted Serbia of genocide 
turned the attention back to a group of individuals, mostly members of 
paramilitary units.  
Apart from preventing war-time leaders from continuing their 
political careers, the ICTY trials play a crucial role in establishing truth. 
They are essential for initiating the process of truth-telling and 
acknowledgment by rendering denial impossible. In that sense, the 
ICTY does represent an important source for writing history and for 
collective memory. The truth established by the ICTY in its verdicts 
against indicted individuals is a court-established truth, which is not 
questionable by some other court, or challengeable by historical, 
political or moral tests. 
In addition to the ICTY trials, domestic trials are a very 
important step towards the rehabilitation of renegade states, which can 
thus prove their willingness to establish the rule of law. In this context 
all states on the territory of former Yugoslavia have demonstrated a 
willingness to try war crimes. So called ‘completion strategy’ or the 
transfer of intermediate or lower rank indicted persons from the ICTY 
to competent national jurisdictions, is where the international 
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community expects the former warring parties to demonstrate their 
membership of the group of democratic countries and their ‘capability’ 
of acceding to the EU (Aucoin&Babbitt, 2006). In order for the ICTY to 
refer proceedings it must be sufficiently assured of the domestic 
judiciary’s capability of conducting the proceedings fairly and adhere 
to internationally accepted standards.  
In general, national courts have a greater impact on the society 
and its values and benefits than international tribunals. Through 
national proceedings, societies more directly face their own problems 
and mistakes and learn from them. It has been argued that for example, 
national proceedings had a much stronger psychological and moral 
impact on population and contributed more to the denazification of 
Germany than Nuremberg and other international trials (Šimonović, 
2004).  
At present, the ICTY is applying the back referral which is 
aimed at enhancing “the essential involvement of national 
governments in bringing reconciliation, justice and the rule of law in 
the region”13. Domestic institutions are carrying out the restoration of 
the rule of law in the region, since UN Security Council resolutions 
1503 and 1534 project the end of Tribunal’s investigations in 2004, the 
closing-down of trials in 2008/2009, and the completion of the appeal 
processes by 2010. 
                                                                
13 Assessment and Report of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Provided to the Security Council Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of 
Security Council Resolution 1534 (2004), UN Doc. S/2005/343, 25 May 2005, para. 12. 
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According to Rule 11bis of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence14, so far 8 cases have been transferred to domestic courts, for a 
total of 13 accused. Ovčara trial was the first case that ICTY referred to 
Serbian justice system. 
War Crime Council of the Special Department of the District 
Court in Belgrade was created on October 1st 2003. It has jurisdiction 
over crimes against humanity and international law established in 
Criminal code of Republic of Serbia, as well as for grave breaches of 
international humanitarian law, committed on the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia from 1991.  If ICTY referrers the case to Serbian 
Special Court for War Crimes, the prosecutor applies domestic law 
during the criminal proceeding.  
As opposed to the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor which 
acts as a governmental institution, and not as a part of the judicial 
system, the War Crimes Trial Chamber of the Belgrade District Court 
performs its judicial duty in war crimes trials professionally and 
impartially. However, as provided by the law, judges are unable to 
amend and correct the indictments, which constitute a serious danger 
that some of the court’s rulings, as may happen in the Scorpions case, 
will be contradictory to the already-established truth in the cases tried 
before the ICTY. 
In Croatia, no special chamber has been established and war 
crimes trials are mainly held before district courts. Four investigative 
units are formed within district courts of Zagreb, Rijeka, Osijek and 
Split that are specialized for prosecution of alleged war criminals. 
                                                                
14 
http://test1.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_Rev43_
en.pdf  
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During the last few years, legislation related to war crimes trials as well 
as procedures and trial proceedings has improved, mainly due to the 
EU accession process. Still, ethnically biased prosecutions and 
convictions in absentia are prevalent. Those proceedings involved 
approximately 75 percent Serbs, many of them returnees, and 17 
percent Croats15. The trial of General Mirko Norac before the Regional 
Court in Rijeka for war crimes against Serbian civilians in Gospić and 
the renewed trial of officers of the military police for the war crime 
against prisoners of war at the military prison Lora indicate a break 
with the practice prevailing in Croatia to exclusively indict and try 
Serbs. In the course of the trial, Serbian victims testified for the first 
time. This has contributed to recognition of this trial by the victims. 
This participation by Serbian victims resulted from cooperation of the 
Public Prosecutor’s Offices from Croatia and Serbia. 
One of the main obstacles for the beginning of trials is certainly 
the prohibition in the Serbian and Croatian Constitutions to extradite 
their citizens. This limitation was not relevant for transfer of the 
accused to the ICTY in The Hague, but creates problems if the trials are 
held in the country where the crime had been committed. In general, 
trials held in the country of the accused are rarely successful, as the 
witnesses are often unwilling to travel to the country of the former 
enemy. One of the most radical propositions was to abolish right of 
dual citizenship.  
Regional cooperation between Serbia and Croatia started 
officially on October 13th 2006 by Agreement for prosecution war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, signed by Office of the 
                                                                
15 OSCE Mission to Croatia 2005. Background Report: Domestic War Crime Trials 2004 
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War Crimes Prosecutor from Serbia and State Bar Association of 
Croatia. This agreement allows transfer of the war crimes trials in the 
country of the accused, which is not necessarily the country where the 
crime has been committed.  
We already said that war crimes trials offer proper human 
rights response, but there is no broader strategy in implementing other 
transitional justice mechanisms such as truth-seeking, reparations and 
institutional reform. The main problem Yugoslav successor states are 
facing is the decisive switch from retributive to restorative justice. 
Restorative justice, as the final stage of transition, should involve all 
layers and structures in society. 
Public opinion in Croatia is still divided, even almost 15 years 
after the end of the war. Political discussion about past two wars 
(World War II and 1991-1995 war in Croatia and Bosnia) is 
manipulated and polarized about questions of domestic criminals and 
war heroes. The process of dealing with the past means changing a 
narrow and myopic historical narrative which refuses to criticize fellow 
citizens.  
The situation in Serbia is not much different. Diffused public 
opinion about the past war is that Serbia was not responsible for the 
break-up of Yugoslavia and that only paramilitary units were involved 
in fights. On one side some claim that it is a myth that the war in 
Yugoslavia was a civil war; others that it is a myth that it was a war of 
aggression. Indeed, dealing with the past means facing the role of 
proper nation in war dynamics. 
Throughout the region no public debate about the past has 
been undertaken. This fact has a great impact on everyday life and 
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provokes constant “delay of grieving” and discrimination of the 
victims. In the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, there is still 
not a single official body that would systematically try to establish the 
fact about war crimes and other gross human rights violations.  
National legal instruments are not enough in order to achieve 
truth telling and truth seeking. There is an obvious need for a regional 
level public agreement about the mechanisms for establishing and 
telling the facts about the past.  
The regional dimension of the wars on the territories of former 
Yugoslavia and the subsequently established borders add a specific 
challenge to dealing with the past processes: on the one hand, certain 
very concrete and pressing issues, such as identifying missing persons, 
war crimes prosecution and witness protection, can only be addressed 
by taking a regional approach. 
Since the end of 2005, representatives of the civil society for ex 
Yugoslav region, guided by Humanitarian Law Centre from Belgrade, 
Documenta from Zagreb and Research and Documentation Centre 
from Sarajevo, are working on a regional approach for establishing the 
truth. Regional approach and cooperation (RECOM) should give more 
chance to deal with the past than the national level perspective. 
RECOM certainly will not be able to operate without full support from 
the states, which are still not ready to give secret documents about the 
past.  
The author of this text is strongly convinced that only by 
explaining the past from all the possible points of view; we can hope to 
mark the decisive step towards the reconciliation. In our search for the 
role in future reconciliation and integration processes, we must 
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consider numerous international cases in the past (Nuremberg, Tokyo, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone etc.). To this horizontal timeline has to be joint 
also vertical one which investigates cited impact and mirco-marco 
linkages between individual identities, group behaviour and 
institutional structures.  
The problem of reconciliation is one of the most important in 
post-conflict societies, and is made possible only by systematic, 
persistent, long-lasting confrontation with past in order to create a 
democratic environment.  
 
1.2. DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 
 
In the past twenty five years dramatic changes occurred on the 
political scene in Western Balkans region. The outbreak of 1991-1995 
war in Yugoslavia was a result of ethnic nationalistic ambitions aiming 
at destroying the multiethnic federation. During the conflict 
approximately 150000 people had died, 250000 were injured while 2.5 
million persons became refugees or IDPs after being expelled from 
their homes. 
The Balkan wars of the 1990s were fought among several 
untied ethnic nationalistic fronts each seeking statehood and 
nationhood and each contesting borders, myths and identities of rival 
groups. Even though all the peoples of Yugoslavia have seen 
themselves as victims, they equally treasured right to national 
entitlement – for example in Serbia this was expressed with  the 
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concept ‘Heavenly Serbia’16, while in Croatia that idea was described as 
‘thousand years old dream’. The wars in Croatia and Bosnia were one 
of first wars in history to be broadcasted live and to be fully covered by 
media. For the people in the areas of conflict it was a living hell, while 
for the growing international public the logical explanation of this 
reality show war-game had to be oversimplified. Therefore the 
caricature of the Yugoslavia’s tragedy was described as a war of 
ethnicities or religions, a ‘cultural’ rather than ‘ideological’ war17. The 
reasons for the disintegration of Yugoslavia were certainly complex 
and could not be attributed to one single argument. Academic debates 
were concentrated around diversity of cultures and traditions, 
economic causes, political changes in global scene caused by the end of 
the Cold war, ever growing nationalism, strong leaders’ personality, 
structures of institutions, ideologies and even ancient ethnic hatred 
(Jović, 2009).   
Samuel Huntington in his book “The clash of civilizations” 
claimed that, after the Cold War, important distinctions among peoples 
were not ideological, political or economic, but cultural. Furthermore, 
Huntington argues that people and nations in primis attempting to 
answer the question: Who we are? The answer to the core question 
“who is who?” is given by two opposite versions: myth and anti-myth, 
i.e. from the “enemy” nations or from within. Myths of chosen people 
and martyrdom, as Kolstø described them, have been put on collective 
                                                                
16Notion Heavenly Serbia derives from the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje, in which a 
messenger from Saint Elias offered Prince Lazar a "heavenly kingdom" in accepting 
Serbian defeat 
17 For an overview of the theories of the break-up of Yugoslavia, see Dejan Jović, 
Yugoslavia: A State that Withered Away (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2009), 13-33   
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level, in the greatest tradition of the communist collective identity 
legacy from the past. This research analyses panic and mourning rituals 
originating as consequence of post war mythmaking dynamics. Panic, 
understood as fear of the “Other”, is made legitimate thanks to the sui 
generis myth of chosen people. As the similarity of cultural fabric of ex 
Yugoslav republic is so high, the only way of creating “exceptionality” 
of determinate nation is by putting it in relation with the other. Thus, 
an important factor of myth making is constant competition between 
“us” and “them” that converged though in the general self-
consideration of all three nations – once war parties – as martyr 
peoples. Victimisation of the group is product of martyrdom myth and 
has self-mourning as consequence. Therefore, incentive for the 
mourning rituals on the collective level is still high and strictly 
dialectically addressed to the other “enemy” nation.  
Considering the influence of culture in civil wars, we certainly 
cannot put aside economic problems and ideologies. Gagnon claimed 
that the wars of the 1990s in Yugoslavia were part of a “broad strategy 
in which images of threatening enemies and violence were used by 
conservative elites in Croatia and Serbia: not in order to mobilize 
people, but rather as a way to demobilize those who were pushing for 
changes in the structures of economic and political power” (Gagnon, 
2004). Consequently, ethnic-nationalism was a strategic policy aiming 
to silence, marginalise and demobilise any opponent and, in extremis, 
violence changed the very meaning of identifying as Serb or Croat 
equalising “ethnic identity and political position” (Gagnon, 2004).  
 When explaining transitions in post-communist countries, 
factors like national question and stateness need to be added to 
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complex transformation from socialist one party system to democracy 
and from plan economy to market economy (Offe, 1991). After 1974 
Constitution, SFRY’s future disintegration was institutionally made 
possible by dividing the state, communist party, and economy along 
republic borders. The collapse of Yugoslavia encloses also economic 
decay, political illegitimacy of communist system, structural factors 
and the failure to develop a common historical narrative. Shared 
historical narrative, involving shared myths, shared heroes, shared 
challenges, shared experiences and shared resentments is what ties a 
community together. It is moreover a precondition for nationhood. For 
a multiethnic state to be stable over the long term, it is necessary that 
the historical narratives of the constituent peoples be purged of mutual 
resentment, mutual recrimination and mutual blame. 
The failure of the socialist state of  Yugoslavia was marked by 
ethnic mobilization but was it state which set the system on a trajectory 
in which ethnic mobilization became a logical choice for ambitious 
leaders, or was it ethnic mobilization which played the most critical 
role in breaking up the state? The assumption this research is based on 
is that it is actually the state that created new, post-war nations. 
Ambitious leaders saw their chance in fragile political structure and 
therefore reinforced nationalistic propaganda. The vast autonomy of 
the six republics, extending to the development autonomous 
educational and media systems, made its contribution to the 
dissolution of the country.  
The differences in perceptions of both more remote and more 
proximate history also help to account for the receptivity of the 
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population to certain propaganda themes, indeed to different 
propaganda themes.  
It was wide-spread belief that the economic struggles were 
caused by other nationality groups. The clash between “us” and 
“them” was strongly underlined, and each group had a tendency to see 
one’s own country or nation or group as the victim of a conspiracy 
organized by other nation or group. Gellner argued that the national 
sentiment that relies on the relation and the comparison with the others 
would be politically more effective if nationalists had as fine a 
sensibility to the wrongs committed by their nation as they have to 
those committed against it18. 
Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks remember the past differently and 
although there are differences of historical memory within each group, 
one can speak of there being a dominant but evolving historical 
narrative among each of these national groups. This diversity of 
historical memory created resources which may be tapped by 
ambitious leaders.  
More than 150 years ago, John Stuart Mill warned that when 
members of different nationality groups in a multiethnic state read 
different newspapers and books and maintain alternative sources of 
information, democracy becomes difficult to establish or maintain. 
Nation itself could be interpreted as a product of communication and 
collective self-interpretation. Of course, as Jean Paul Sartre argued in 
his work, people operate within concrete historical contests, with given 
resources, opportunities and challenges. Indeed, not all Serbs 
                                                                
18 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Cornell University Press, 1983 
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supported Milošević, not all Croats supported Tudjman, and not all 
Bosniaks supported Izetbegovic. 
When the nation has a clear dominant historical narrative, then 
collective self-interpretation could be expected to have certain 
consequences for the political behaviour. Despite the fact that 
‘nationalist question’ was largely present in the period of interwar 
Yugoslavia, master historical narrative could not be constructed due to 
“Serbian Unitarianism and Croatian independentism” (Banac, 1984). 
Unfortunately, Yugoslavism began as an idea people thought that if 
they did not already have a common historical narrative they could 
develop one.  
Nationalism can be considered as a theory of political 
legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundary should not pass across 
political one. Nationalism is therefore primarily a political principle, 
where political and the national unit should be congruent. Throughout 
the history, whenever nationalism has taken root, it has tended to 
prevail with ease over other modern ideologies. 
A nation’s historical narrative is refined gradually in response 
to dramatic events and as a result also of changes in school curricula, 
editorial policies and other factors. History textbooks in Serbia, Croatia 
and Bosnia became largely different, with the widespread characteristic 
aiming to minimize the common history. A number of historical facts 
necessary for understanding logical consequences leading to one 
mutual state were just left out, while periods of past conflicts were 
underlined and explained to details19.  
                                                                
19 Maria Todorova, Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory, NYU Press, 2004 
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For example, regimes of Slobodan Milošević and Franjo 
Tudjman were particularly interested in discrediting the anti-
nationalism propounded by the socialist regime and therefore quickly 
set about demonizing Tito as a “totalitarian Bolshevik”. 
Serbian schoolbooks in Milošević time began to equate the 
Partisans and the collaborationist Četniks as equally “anti-fascist” 
while Croatian schoolbooks portrayed the Croatian collaborators as 
“heroes and defenders of national capitalism”, representing the NDH20 
as a “victim” and demonizing the Partisans.  
Croatian textbooks minimized World War II Ustaša crimes 
while magnifying the number of victims of communist repression and 
crimes committed against Croats by the World War II Serb guerilla 
Četniks. The apologist tendency reached its “natural” culmination in 
the adoption for Croatian elementary schools of history textbooks in 
which the NDH was represented as a “state of high culture” and in 
which the world “genocide” did not even appear.  
Nationalistic tendencies in Serbia were explicitly revealed in 
1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art 
(SANU) signed by number of academics and culturally influential 
persons21. Resentment centred on the federal system which the authors 
of the memorandum claimed had been devised to strip Serbia of its 
legitimate jurisdiction over Montenegro and much of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Moreover, there was also resentment in connection with 
the autonomous province of Kosovo. 
                                                                
20 Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Independent State of Croatia) was a World War II puppet 
state of Nazi Germany organized on a part of Axis-occupied Yugoslavia. 
21 Full text of Memorandum is available on: 
http://sr.wikisource.org/wiki/Memorandum_SANU 
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On the “other side” should be outlined the movement of 1967-
1971 called “Croatian Spring” when Croats sought to expand their 
political, economic and cultural autonomy. It was an era of Croatian 
secessionism in which Ustaša-type ideas were revived.  
As we already mentioned, nations in Western Balkans were the 
product of new-formed states. Thus, the primary theme in the way the 
Yugoslav meltdown played out in Bosnia was the concept of state. 
Milošević was seeking to establish a “Greater Serbia”, Tudjman was 
excited at the prospect of restoring the borders of the Banovina, and 
Izetbegović wanted to preserve the Bosnian republic within its existing 
borders22. 
The identities in post-Yugoslav countries can be understand as 
a balanced game of inner centripetal forces such as ethnicity, religion, 
myths and language; and external centrifugal ones aiming to keep 
those nations together. 
Culturally very close, but seeking the way out of fifty years old 
Yugoslavian dream, new countries developed to perfection “obsession 
for details”. Differences that were previously easily overcame gained 
new meanings and suppressed common past.  
Only after the end war new identities were formed on the basis 
of cultural factors, while the conflict itself started as a consequence of 
much broader set of issues: economic decay, unsustainable political 
                                                                
22 Greater Serbia borders were proposed by Vojislav Šešelj’s Serbian Radical Party in the 
late 1980s and the 1990s. They extend to the Benkovac-Karlovac-Pakrac-Baranja line in 
the north in present-day Croatia and to Vardar Macedonia in the south in the present day 
Republic of Macedonia. 
Banovina Hrvatska was founded inside the Kingdom of Yugoslavia according to the 
political agreement between president of Yugoslav Government Dragiša Cvetković and 
the leader of HSS (Croatian Peasant Party) Vlatko Maček. Its territory was much wider 
than actual Croatian state. 
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system and convincement in the historical determinism. Culture is thus 
a consequence and not the cause of nation as a state product.  
Nations are held together largely by force and by emotion. In 
the midst of the crisis of the 1980s, millions loved the united Yugoslavia 
and thought it would survive. When the federation began to crumble in 
the 1980s, the country was defended by emotions alone and by the 
fragile lost generation alone23.  
During the 1990s, although the name was appropriated by the 
Milošević regime in today’s states of Serbia and Montenegro, vestiges 
of the former Yugoslavia began to disappear. A million-strong group 
known not long ago as “Yugoslavs by nationality” has vanished. As 
early as 1992 occurred the revival of the primordial identities at the 
expense of the Yugoslav identity. Some of the “Yugoslavs by 
nationality” were forced to change nationality and others became 
disillusioned and undetermined about who they are, while many 
discovered the traditional religious and ethnic identities and became 
neophytes.  
Religion became very important for the identity mutations in 
Western Balkans, as it is thanks to the church and state, that one ethnic 
community becomes a nation. Peter Berger has written that “upsurges 
of religion” in the modern era are, in most cases, political movements 
“that use religion as a convenient legitimacy for political agendas based 
on non-religious interests”. 24 
                                                                
23 Lost generation is a term referred to people born from 1950s and 1980s that experienced 
war, interrupted their education and were not able to adapt to the corruption, 
unemployment and growing tabloid culture  
24 Peter Berger, National Interest, 1996 
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New myths about the notorious war criminals as heroes were 
paradoxically strengthened after their appearance before the ICTY. 
Most probably this image will change once the transitional justice 
process is completed and national courts for war crimes start massive 
and unbiased trials. In general, national courts have a greater impact on 
the society and its values and benefits than international tribunals. 
Through national proceedings, societies more directly face their own 
problems and mistakes and learn from them. It has been argued that 
for example, national proceedings had a much stronger psychological 
and moral impact on population and contributed more to the 
denazification of the Germany than Nuremberg and other international 
trials25.  
Twenty years after the break up of Yugoslavia, relationships 
between political ideologies and narratives about the past in Serbia26 
and Croatia are still contested and vague. Once the common socialist 
narrative banning everything that could question the then proclaimed 
ideology of brotherhood and unity was discarded, the new successor 
countries had to challenge and re-invent their own national traditions. 
Recent history in Serbia and Croatia is more of each 
nationality’s collective emotional memory rather than common factual 
history. Mutually exclusive “truths” about war and the atrocities 
committed quickly developed, and were used by political elites and 
                                                                
25 Ivan Šimonović, Dealing with the Legacy of Past War Crimes and Human Rights Abuses, 
2004 
26 At the beginning of domestic trials for war crimes Serbia was still part of Serbia and 
Montenegro. We will use name Serbia throughout the research in order to facilitate the 
reading.  
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mass media in the creation of new national narratives, reinforcing at 
the same time the fragmentation of post-war societies. 
This research analyses the impact transitional justice 
mechanisms have on historical narratives and the creation of collective 
memory about the war. As the “existing empirical knowledge about the 
impacts of transitional justice is still limited” (Freeman, 2006) its 
influence on local societies is measured through its impact on political 
ideologies and historical narratives triggered by war crime trials. So far, 
in Serbia and Croatia, the main transitional justice tool has been the 
prosecution of war crimes. The rationale behind such choice was that 
transition towards a stable democracy and strengthening of the rule of 
law in all post-Yugoslav states was not possible without justice and 
accountability for the committed crimes. 
Assuming that in contemporary societies media have 
considerable power in informing public knowledge about history and 
shared historical narrative, we analyse local media reports on domestic 
war crimes trials. Scholars like Peskin, Subotic, Akhavan, Orentlicher 
and others dealt with the impact that the international criminal 
tribunals had on the post-Yugoslav region and its transition towards 
democracy. Judicial intervention and compliance with international 
law, crucial for the trials before the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, are not the main focus when it comes to war 
crimes trials in domestic, local courts. This dissertation explores 
different representations in the media of historical narratives 
established by local courts in Serbia in the Ovčara trial, and 
subsequently compares them to background, non-legal elements, i.e. 
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historical context, command structure, description of the events or 
historical facts found in judgements rendered at the ICTY.  
How can we then explain state behaviour and strategies for 
dealing with the past presented at local courts for war crimes? Unlike 
the conditionality strategy applied for the state’s cooperation with the 
ICTY, trials for war crimes at local level are not associated with 
imminent push factors such as the EU membership perspective. 
Therefore, various theories created around the impact of international 
tribunals or local political elites just cannot stand in this situation. This 
research analyses changes over time in media narratives. How and why 
those changes occur and what might be possible ways to tackle this 
problem in the larger context of global justice cascade? There is 
continuous development in the way legal heritage is discussed and 
remembered. According to Osiel, trials are significant if they comprise 
the potential to trigger a public debate about past wrongdoings and 
society’s wounds (Osiel, 1997). Hence, what is the influence of a legal 
narrative on the creation of political ideologies and remembrance of 
war? 
Political ideologies in Croatia and Serbia rely greatly on 
mutually contested historical master narratives about the nature of the 
wars from the 1990s. Nevertheless, judicial processes do not deal with 
the causes of war itself but with jus ad bellum aspects. Therefore legal 
documents describe only the context of war and represent historical 
material that is easily manipulated. In addition, the very understanding 
of the tribunals’ legacies is not necessarily fixed, but may change over 
time as the domestic perceptions of the past and the domestic politics 
of the present change.  
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1.3. NARRATIVE OF IDENTITY – MAIN CONCEPTS 
 
The debate over identities overrated ethnicity, religion, 
nationality and so-called identity politics in general, thus was 
concentrated only to one dimension of the general problem.  In the 
Balkan’s region there are multiple truth versions of recent war 
dynamics, which are building new narrative traditions of nations in 
question. The detainees’ ‘shows and performances’ in courtrooms of 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) are 
creating postmodern myths in ex-Yugoslav society. Those myths have 
been conceived together with the myths of rebirth of nationalism and 
their impact is huge although their appearance on the political scene is 
quite recent27.   
Ex-Yugoslavia’s successor states’ nationhood is mostly 
symbolic, however, as for the past two decades the newly formed states 
worked continuously on nation making, identity analysis should focus 
on identification of the official historical narrative and political myths, 
imposed and maintained by the state. In the comparative perspective, 
this research considers the assessment of the new products 
compatibility with each other and with the democratization process 
and transitional justice implementation in the Balkans.  
Ex-Yugoslav republics, now independent states, have passed 
through painful process of identity change influenced by various 
factors. The theoretical approach that the author is following is based 
                                                                
27 Sabrina P. Ramet, The Dissolution of Yugoslavia: Competing Narratives of Resentment and 
Blame, 2007 
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on constructivism. The notion of change in international relations 
theory is closely linked with the importance that is attached to the 
structure of the international system. Traditional realist writers 
emphasized the adaptation of state behaviour to the structure of the 
international system. Structure was determined by the states’ relative 
positioning in relation to other states based on military capabilities, 
economic resources and geostrategic position. The ‘bureaucrat’, by 
adapting its actions to the actual facts, was perceived as being ideal to 
cope with the requirements of international affairs. 
 Forty years after Carr introduced the notion of the bureaucrat, 
Kenneth Waltz challenged the idea of structure being only determined 
by the state level and the arrangements of its elements28. For Waltz, 
structure is determined by the ordering principle of the international 
system, anarchy. The self-help system, with which states are 
confronted, is causally determined by anarchy. In this conception of 
structure, change is beyond reach. Waltz’ approach, based on the 
immutability of structure, provoked criticism that was particularly 
aimed at the static nature of structure. 
The constructivist approach that became popular in 
international relations in the 1980s pointed to the reciprocity of 
structure and states that are acting under it. According to Alexander 
Wendt, the system of self-help is only one of various possible structures 
under anarchy29. The reason for the existence of a self-help system is 
not causally determined by anarchy. Rather, it has developed out of 
interaction and is reinforced by interaction – identities and interests of 
                                                                
28 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War, New York, 1959 
29 Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics, 
in International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992 
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states arise only in relation to others. Interaction is based on 
intersubjective meaning, thus constituting the structure. Actors’ 
identities play a key role in the process of achieving intersubjective 
meaning. Most important and unlike structural realism, Wendt 
considers identities and interests as acquired by the states through 
interaction, thus being socially constructed and not exogenously given.  
By changing actors’ identities, change of socially constructed 
realties is possible. Or, as Wendt puts it, “identities may be hard to 
change, but they are not carved in stone” (Wendt, 1999). Wendt 
distinguishes between two different concepts of agent identity: firstly, 
social identities, which are constructed through interaction at the 
international level. Secondly, he introduces the notion of ‘corporate 
identity’, which is comprised of a set of interests and can be found at 
the domestic level. This ‘corporate identity’ is regarded as being 
existent prior to the interaction with other actors. It is given 
exogenously.  
Another theorist of constructivism, Martha Finnemore, has 
been influential in examining the way in which international 
organizations are involved in these processes of the social construction 
of actor's perceptions of their interests. This concept has been 
particularly important for the Western Balkans since the consolidation 
of cooperation with ICTY in 2003 and the beginning of EU integration 
process. In National Interests in International Society, Finnemore attempts 
to "develop a systemic approach to understanding state interests and 
state behaviour by investigating an international structure, not of 
power, but of meaning and social value"(Finnemore, 2006). 
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Historical aspect deserves certainly special place in this study. 
The study of identity construction is not an end in itself. National 
formation accompanied by identity mutations in the aftermath of the 
Croatia and Bosnia war will certainly become a ‘new history’ of lands 
and peoples under consideration.  
Fragile national elements present in Western Balkan countries 
enter in Wuthnow’s category of “communities of discourse” rather 
than in nation-states one (Wuthnow, 1990). Wuthnow's analysis 
demonstrates that ideological movements are best viewed as a 
combination of intellectual innovations and their realization in the 
production of cultural products. And, because the latter requires both 
resources and groups motivated to produce them, the success of new 
intellectual movements is always mediated by material and political 
conditions: "the shaping of ideology is thus historically contingent" 
(Wuthnow, 1990: 558).  
Thus, previously utilized ethno-confessional labels for the 
Balkan groups have become outdated. Real social problems, such as 
poverty and class injustice merged into faith and ethnicities questions. 
This authentic search for the proper identity is now available only in 
the remaining sources, i.e. ethnicity, religion, myth and new forms of 
nationhood.  
Already towards the end of the 80s ‘national communism’ or 
better ‘Titoism’ was changing decisively to ethnic nationalism under 
the guise of anticommunism, democratization, transition, even peace 
building and reconciliation. In consequence, followers of Marx had 
successfully transformed themselves into ethnic nationalist. The old 
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utopian union of all workers seems to dilate into new slogan: “Peoples 
of all Balkans, identify yourselves!”30 
The following pages try to reconstruct identity and 
mythmaking of the past twenty years.  
To understand the impact of change in historical, mass media 
and political narrative has on identities we must locate the notion of 
national identity within larger debate about ‘grand narratives’ of 
nationalism. At the beginning of the 1980s in the field of studies of 
nationalism a number of theories emerged. Dominant theories of the 
nation focus mainly on political economy and history, and the national 
cultural element in the domain of high culture, notably „invented 
traditions“  (Edensor, 2002).  
How and why the world became divided into nations, what are 
the different aspects in identity formation, how is it related to the 
politics, and why nationalism became the dominant ideology of 
modern times are just some of the questions developed by Ernest 
Gellner (1983), Benedict Anderson (1983), Anthony Smith (1986), Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983).  
Primordialists’ approach is founded on the idea that the 
nations derive from pre-existing ‘ethnies’, which is ethnic communities 
or groups. Smith underlines that a nation is subjective in nature; 
therefore any social group could lead to being described as nation. He 
assigns six characteristic to a nation: name, myth of common ancestry, 
shared historical memories, elements of common culture, homeland, 
and solidarity for significant sectors of the population. Smith 
acknowledges that the selection of national symbols often causes 
                                                                
30The Marx and Engels’ slogan was: Proletarier aller Länder, vereinigt euch! 
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disagreement between different groups in power. This concept is 
particularly important for our research as we deal precisely with the 
notion of change in narratives over time. John Hutchinson defines 
cultural nationalism, lead by “historical scholars and artists” as agents 
of “moral regeneration” (Hutchinson, 1992). They are seen as “moral 
innovators”, carriers of primordial myths, traditions and ancient 
heritage who send their message via mass media. Moreover, nations 
are “continually evolving in time, and it is to history that its members 
must return to discover the triumphs and tragedies that have formed 
them” (in Edensor 2002). Main critique against primordialist theory is 
precisely continuity over time, as history itself is characterised by 
discontinuity and political struggle. In addition, one person can possess 
multiple identities, which goes counter to primordialist concept of 
identity.  
Modernists assume that the nation’s origins are modern, 
developed in mass societies. Nation as such should therefore be 
regarded as invented or imagined community.  Gellner gives major role 
in shaping national identities to the state, but ignores local cultures and 
traditional elements. For John Breuilly, nationalism must be thought in 
connection with the state, as it is the state to create the nationalist 
agenda. Paul Brass also underlines the role of political elites in creation 
of national identity and new forms of culture and symbols. As 
established identity and symbols are codified, it is the role of mass 
media to propagate also the culture ‘from below’. This research tries to 
track the interaction between the popular and high cultural and 
symbolic elements of the identity, through the channel of mass media.  
Hobsbawm and Ranger, on the other hand, focus on ‘invented 
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tradition’, constructed to give an illusion of primordiality and 
continuity between past and present. The past is constructed in such 
way to incentivise social cohesion, legitimise authority and common 
culture. ‘Invented tradition’ consists of a “set of practices, normally 
governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic 
nature” (Hobsbawm&Ranger, 1992). Nevertheless, symbols ought to be 
flexible in order to adjust to changing narratives and ideologies they 
are following. Anderson speaks about the nation as an “imagined 
community”, interlinked by “deep, horizontal comradeship” 
(Anderson, 2006). According to Anderson it is the rise of print media 
that enabled the idea of the nation to spread. He mentions everyday life 
as the framework for the imagined identities.  
In the 1990s the understanding of national identity defined by 
high culture, elements of spectacular and historical was not satisfactory 
anymore. Postmodernism introduced new approaches to national 
identity formation, analysing it not from the point of view of ‘grand 
theories’ but rather as an on-going process based on everyday 
practices. Liisa Mallki’s work on historical memory suggests that “the 
construction of a national past is a construction of history of a 
particular kind” (Mallki, 1995). Narratives, called ‘mythico-histories’ 
are repeated on a daily basis and produce meanings influencing 
people’s behaviour. Most important study on popular and everyday 
practices in creation of national identity is Michael Billig’s work Banal 
Nationalism. By taking ‘bottom-up’ approach to study of the 
nationalism, Billig analyses how the nation is reproduced in everyday, 
‘banal’ dimension.  In order to reproduce daily, nations need to have “a 
whole complex of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and 
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practices” (Billig, 1995). Billig’s main thesis is that there is continuous 
‘flagging’ and accentuation of the notion of nationhood, which 
“provides a continual background for political discourse, for cultural 
products and even the structuring of newspapers” (Billig, 1995). In his 
book National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life, Tim 
Edensor suggests that, besides traditional cultural forms and practices, 
“new images and activities are drawn from popular culture” (Edensor, 
2002). Following Billig’s work, Edensor asserts that “national identity is 
grounded n the everyday, in the mundane details of social interaction, 
habits, routines and practical knowledge” (Edensor, 2002).  
Everyday practices, present time and small scale changes are 
rarely included in nationalism theories. For example, Nairin describes 
the “Janus face” of the nationalism from both perspective of looking 
forwards and backwards, while Bhabha analyses the phenomenon of 
“double time” of the part and the future. In our research we 
encountered numerous examples of calls for “dealing with the past” in 
order to build sustainable future, but, not surprisingly though, the 
present was somehow missed out from majority of public discourses or 
media reports (Bhabha, 1990). Besides notion of time, the space plays 
great part in symbolic nation building. Although “national identities 
can mean different things to different people” (Radcliffe&Westwood, 
1996), definition of national territory draws important boundaries to 
support Benedict Anderson’s theoretical framework. Spatial 
determinant transforms discursive elements of narration into material 
and imagined, embedded in collective and individual subjects. 
Moreover, Stuart Hall (1997) considered the nation as a “symbolic 
formation”. The power of symbols and political myths is explained 
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more in detail in the following chapters. Nevertheless, nation should 
not operate only at abstract level, namely “formal nationalism” as 
Eriksen (2010) calls it, but must take into account local, everyday, 
“informal nationalism”.  In his book The Formation of Croatian 
National Identity, Alex Bellamy  tries to reconcile official national 
identity narratives coming from ‘high culture’ and everyday social 
practices by dividing construction of national identity in three 
constituents: 1) big stories deriving from ‘above’, i.e. political elites, 
mass media, history textbooks, 2) legitimization undertaken by political 
and intellectual elites in order to contextualise the discourse and 
mobilise the people, 3) social practice embedded in individual 
subjectivity (Bellamy, 2003).  Our research starts indeed from the big 
stories and follows changes in paradigm in the discourse of legal 
documents and their representation by the elite and the media. Even 
when we follow social practices and rituals such as commemorations, it 
has only purpose of elite speeches collection.  The author nevertheless 
considers those kinds of social practices phenomena that are extremely 
important for the overall analysis, but the limit of the workload simply 
impeded us to concentrate on that side of the identity formation 
process. Instead, we focus on historical narrative – most important for 
the nation building – and how did it change after trials for war crimes?  
Katherine Verdery argues that national identity formation can be 
followed through a set of questions related to identity creation. Namely 
she analyses what the notion of identity consists of, and how do people 
organise and become national, what are the symbols of the nation, 
relationship between the nation and other social operators (Verdery, 
1995).  
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Our study of the national identity practices in Croatia and 
Serbia is above all comparative in nature, therefore narratives and 
discourses about war crimes trials are analysed from the “us” vs 
“them” perspective. Fredrik Barth (1969) claimed that identity is 
constructed through contrast to other ethnic groups and it is expressed 
by the difference from the other. Enderson argued that “identity is 
continually reproduced in unreflexive fashion” and, in the same 
manner, the boundary between two groups is continually maintained 
and reproduced. Everyday practices, thus, turn our understanding of 
“‘the’ economy, government, countryside [into] our economy, 
government, countryside” (Enderson, 2002: 11). At the same time, by 
setting the boundaries from “them”, narratives about the “other” are 
always narratives about “us”. This research is analysing 
representations of the war crimes trials in Croatia and Serbia, the 
creation of “our” identity as opposite to the “other” side, but also the 
feedback each side has about “other”’s representation about 
“ourselves”. We can speak about two dimensional representations: one 
created about the “other” and the “other”’s representation of “us” 
reflected back to “our” public space. Those discourses depend on each 
other, especially when, like in our research cases, the other, the 
“enemy” was the formerly part of “ourselves”. When two groups are 
confronted against each other, elements of individuality are lost, and 
each individual is reduced to be just a mere member of the group. This 
phenomenon, labelled “logic of generic attribution” by Arne Johan 
Vetlesen (2006), is particularly important for this research, especially in 
the debate over individual guilt and collective responsibility and legal 
and extra-legal interpretations of historical facts.  Such situation, Kolsto 
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argues, “requires considerable preparatory ideological work” (Kolsto, 
2009). Ideology work involves creation of the political myths, whereas 
historical past is misused and the representation of the “other” is based 
on stereotypes. We are, however, interested in character of a change in 
identity. Common “collective” identity as expression of shared cultural 
practices is subject to change upon change of frames in historical 
discourses. How and why certain events trigger change whereas others 
do not affect at all the notion of “collective” identity? Is the boundary 
defining differences between “us” and “them” also subject to a change?  
This research conducts an analysis of the new collective 
identities in Croatia and Serbia, created after the break up of 
Yugoslavia, by confronting the field of the “imagined”, i.e. group self-
perceptions and misperceptions, political myths against the  of the 
“real”, i.e. legal proceedings in war crimes trials and their media 
representation.  We are focusing quite strictly on political myths, 
related to the founding of the state and in particular myths of the 
nation. Following the work of Emilio Gentile who argued that 
emergence of national states created a “religion of politics”, we analyse 
those “systems of beliefs, myths, rituals and symbols that interpret and 
define the meaning of human existence” (Gentile, 2009: 18). Those 
myths are therefore important components of new national ideologies 
and many of them are recently constructed. Myths and politics are 
inherently intertwined. We analyse specific narratives containing links 
between political myths and national identity, because politics itself 
cannot be imagined without the use of myths: the myth about the 
chosen people, the myth about the brave nation, the myth about the 
bright future, the myth about Homeland war, the myth about 
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martyrdom, just to mention a few31. The specific matter of our research 
is the legitimisation of national identity and nation as such through 
means of historical narratives that rely greatly on historical and 
political myths. Such myths are complementary to everyday practices, 
as they do not reveal any mystical truth, but on the other hand “tell us 
a lot about the societies in which they were created and the way those 
societies operated” (Lévi-Strauss, 1981:639). 
 
1.4. LAW AND LITERATURE 
 
The theoretical framework for this research is Hegel’s work on 
the direct relationship of historical narrative to law. Use is made of 
Hegel’s idea of the State as divided into three parts: 1) immediate 
actuality of the state as a self-dependent organism, or constitutional 
law; 2) relations among states in international Law; and 3) world 
history. History represents the world’s court of judgment; it is the 
“necessary development, out of the concepts of mind’s freedom alone, 
of the moments of reason and so of the self-consciousness and freedom 
of mind” (Hegel, 1967).   
Taking Brooks and Gewirtz’s methodological approach, law is 
analysed not as set of rules and policies, but as a source of “stories, 
explanations, performances, linguistic exchanges – as narratives and 
rhetoric” (Brooks&Gewirtz, 1998.: 1). Furthermore, law is given a 
dimension of “cultural discourse through which social narratives are 
structured and suppressed” (Brooks&Gewirtz, 1998: 1). Thus, attention 
is given more to the actual facts than legal rules of procedure, and to 
                                                                
31 More on myths can be found in Holy 1996, Popovic 1998 
 50 
 
the way language is used as much as the idea expressed. While shaping 
reality through language, law uses distinctive linguistic methods, forms 
and expressions and requires strategies of interpretation. On trial, 
historical narrative is constantly questioned and challenged, so that 
“reality” is always divided into various versions of truth. The 
popularity of the law and narrative approach can be understood as 
“loss of faith in the idea of objective truth and the widespread embrace 
of ideas about the social construction of reality. Narrative, in other 
words, is seen as the social construction of reality” (Brooks&Gewirtz, 
1998: 12). To sum up, law “brings together story, form, and power” 
(Brooks&Gewirtz, 1998: 1).  
 
1.4.1. SELECTION OF MEMORY MATERIAL 
 
Legal narratives might be the main source of the memory of 
war, but they are subsequently shaped by media representations and 
interpretations. Selection in news production and its interpretative 
structure of the courts’ activities, may lead to biased reports inherited 
from the period of dissolution of Yugoslavia. Edited information 
reflects certain relations of power: it differs in news reports made by 
media supporting the official attitude of the state and its proposed 
main national ideology, or in relatively independent media. Both 
Croatia and Serbia are estimated as “partially free” and connected with 
the state elites in a non-transparent way. Therefore, relations of power 
and influence of party politics are very important factors that certainly 
have important effects on the creation of ideologies. In Serbia media 
ownership is unknown in 18 out of 30 media analysed by The Anti-
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corruption agency32 and state institutions have a clear economic 
influence on the work of media through different funding schemes. 
Croatia, on the other hand, has adopted very rigid legal norms in the 
past and thus suffers from a lack of pluralism.  
In order to describe which topics in media coverage are 
important to the public we rely on agenda setting theory. This theory 
claims that the press and the media do not reflect reality, but filter and 
shape it. Shaw and McCombs theorised the influence of the media as 
not telling audiences what to think but what to think about. 
Furthermore, the media influence public policies by “establishing an 
information agenda ensuring information selectivity, limiting the view 
of the public of social and political realities, and giving an advantage 
and attracting attention to some issues and diverting it from 
others”(Windhauser, 1977; Grady, 1982). Media articles are performing 
ideological work on the past as they are interpreting the past following 
present perspectives, usually omitting the historical meaning of past 
arguments and viewpoints. In addition, media are translating legal 
documents into everyday language and therefore modifying and 
reconstructing the discourse content.  
Reports on war crime trials are not simply dialectically 
opposite on the axis Serbian-Croatian media. The difference in 
reporting of state owned, independent or media heavily supporting 
certain political parties spreads over the geographical borders of the 
two countries. In addition, there is an important change in tone while 
reporting on war crime trials held before the ICTY or at the local level. 
                                                                
32http://www.antikorupcija-
savet.gov.rs/Storage/Global/Documents/mediji/IZVESTAJ%20O%20MEDIJIMA,%20P
RECISCENA%20VERZIJA.pdf 
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Therefore, this research is based on a more nuanced analysis, while 
bearing in mind external trials held internationally before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
domestic trials preformed simultaneously in Serbia and Croatia. While 
the ICTY indicted only high rank officials from military and political 
elites, domestic courts dealt with direct perpetrators. This research 
shows that the differences in legal proceedings have an impact on the 
way accountability and reckoning of crimes is represented within the 
interpretative framework that deals with the selection, omission, and 
preference of certain media material, i.e. the “news frame” (Gamson 
1991).  
Moreover, in some cases held at local level, indictments 
themselves represent a choice of narrative to follow, notably when 
excluding middle-ranking officials from a list of alleged perpetrators. 
Thus, even though war crimes have been proved before the ICTY 
beyond any reasonable doubt, responsibility can be operated through a 
comprehensive legal mastering of the past.  
While historically war crimes were dealt with by executions or 
summary trials set up by victors after conflict or simply remained 
unpunished, they are now considered just like other crimes that 
demand a proper trial and due process. As there is “a misguided 
impulse to capture ineffable human suffering within the confines of the 
judicial process” (Akhavan, 2001), criminal trials for systematic 
violations of human rights rarely produce agreement. Mark Osiel 
stated that legal proceedings are actually founded on civil dissensus, 
given the discrepancy between widespread and organised political 
violence and individual guilt as the only mode of accusing perpetrators 
 53 
 
for the crimes committed. War crime trials are defendant oriented with 
victims as tools in the pursuit of justice and therefore very rarely can 
victims reach the needed level of satisfaction with proceedings and 
judgements. 
Legal processes before tribunals often neglect historical 
trajectories, and larger social and cultural forces, while focusing on 
proving individual guilt. One of the consequences of the described 
dissensus is precisely the process of attribution of collective guilt that 
relates post-war trauma and nationalist ideologies and creates greater 
social distances between ex-warring parties. 
The transition towards stable democracy and strengthening of 
the rule of law in all post-Yugoslav states was deemed possible only if 
backed by transitional justice mechanisms and accountability for crimes 
committed. Accountability cannot be understood and reduced only to 
trial and punishment, nor is it permissive of blanket amnesties. While 
war crimes remained barbaric acts, criminal justice mechanisms are 
constantly developing. Trials concentrate on defining the facts that can 
lead to eventual accountability of the accused for very specific crimes; 
they do not describe the historical causes of war itself.  
 
1.4.2. LAW AND HISTORY 
 
What is the impact of legal narratives on historical records in 
post-conflict societies in Serbia and Croatia? According to the 
“expressive theory of law”, law’s meaning can have significant 
consequences in shaping social norms. Legal actions, from the 
Durkheimian point of view, are particular rituals per se, they also 
 54 
 
mean, symbolise or express the conscience collective. Thus, the legal 
impacts greatly affect the creation of collective memory after mass 
atrocities, as they involve highly effective rituals. Legal material 
directly influences collective memory, but in a very selective way. 
Judicial truth is often quite different from the official historical 
narrative. The notion of truth is related to the presentation of evidence 
in ritual practices and public discourse. Unlike the proceedings before 
the ICTY, in both Serbia and Croatia, there is no live coverage from the 
local courtrooms, which further narrows and shapes legal narratives, 
once they are transmitted by the media to the general public. This 
research analyses the specific use and/or misuse of certain key words 
carrying ideological connotations. Simultaneously, we emphasised 
strategies of “forgetfulness” and omission of parts of the narrative that 
could undermine some of the most widespread national ideologies.  
Halbwachs pointed out that our understanding of the past is 
influenced by present-day interests. Media representations are in fact 
“reading” history backwards and reflect at the same time power 
relations within society. Thus, to sum up, there is a two level game 
going on: legal and political on one side, and doctrinal and 
historiographical on the other.  
Many scholars argued that history should not be written in 
courts. Mark Osiel noted that the law is likely to discredit itself when it 
presumes to impose any answer to an interpretative question about the 
past. In addition, justice is “compromised because history occupies a 
central place in nationalist myth-making” (Wilson, 2005). Even more, in 
the region of the former Yugoslavia, wars in Croatia and Bosnia are 
deeply embedded in official narratives, up to the point of “civil 
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religion” in Croatia in particular (Jović, 2009). Hannah Arendt argued 
that questions of great importance for the entire society, related 
primarily to the causes of conflicts, will be neglected. The aim of this 
research is not to judge whether “correct” historical accounts of past 
events are described in trials for war crimes, but how those findings are 
represented in the media and consequently socially constructed. 
War crimes’ trials before domestic courts are important 
indicators of the politicization of history set up during the nation-
building project. For example, show trials, trials in absentia or those 
directed against members of paramilitary forces serve to manufacture 
the legitimacy of the state and to lift up the collective responsibility for 
the past crimes. Accordingly, criminal trials against direct perpetrators 
of no interest for state institutions such as the army or police contribute 
to “removing from collective memory those larger social mechanisms 
that involve broader segments of the population in the establishment 
and execution of dictatorial regimes and their atrocities” (Edmunds, 
2009). 
Most transitional justice literature assumes that the movement 
for setting up judicial institutions dealing with past atrocities is 
internal, in the interest of the states willing to fulfil the transition 
towards democracy. The region of the former Yugoslavia is rather 
specific, as the first fair trials were triggered at the ICTY, an ad hoc 
tribunal founded by the UN Security Council. State collaboration with 
the tribunal was highly conditioned by different factors such as 
economic aid and European Union membership. This research deals 
with domestic trials for war crimes as they bare much less “judicial 
interventions” and make internal state strategies for dealing with the 
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past more visible. At the beginning of the work of the Special court for 
war crimes in Belgrade Bruno Vekarić, the deputy war crimes 
prosecutor, outlined that “societies need to deal with the past not to 
appease the international community but because of them”. 
Nevertheless, Peskin challenges the Kantian version of international 
law founded in an idealized vision of human rights norms by 
explaining how international tribunals can cause domestic political 
crises and state instability.  
Both Serbia and Croatia encountered serious problems in 
enabling fair trials for war crimes before domestic courts. The major 
problem was, and still is, the low domestic demand for normative 
change and the high degree of politicization of the judiciary. For 
example, the Serbian public largely refused to believe that Serbs had 
committed war crimes, and they blamed other nations and ethnic 
groups for starting the war. Some of the participants in recent wars, i.e. 
political elites, the church, elite intelligentsia, and the military, stayed 
in power after the transition and actively blocked transitional justice 
projects because of their own responsibility in creating, spreading and 
imposing old regime propaganda. Croatia institutionalized its official 
historical narrative about the Homeland War when in 2000 the Croatian 
Parliament approved a “Declaration on the Homeland War” as “just 
and legitimate defence” in order to “defend its internationally 
recognized borders against Greater Serbia’s aggression”.  
Even when the institutional challenge such as local judicial 
capacity was met, judgments were put back on trial as in the case of 
“Ovčara” by the Serbian Supreme Court and none of the indictees was 
found guilty as in the “Lora” case by the Split district court. Moreover, 
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trials were organized almost uniquely against direct perpetrators, 
leaving a so-called “impunity gap” between high ranking officials 
brought before the international tribunal and the lowest ranked alleged 
criminals. Thus, the state has a decisive role in “historicizing only 
certain segment of culture and state structure, while presenting it as 
general and authentic”. 
 
Introductory chapter presents and contextualises the research 
topic within the broader context of the field of national identity and 
transitional justice. We position the study of national identity within 
constructivist theory and try to operationalise the research question by 
relating it to the complex field of transitional justice.  
This research was conducted mainly with aim to analyse 
domestic factors of transitional justice that shape, change or develops 
national identities. Our premise, based on outline of contemporary 
state of art of transitional justice, is that great bulk of research was 
concentrated on external factors’ impact on domestic transitional justice 
processes. We aimed to get rid of the necessary conditionality 
requirements that influence the behaviour of state actors.  
Our research takes theoretical inputs from the study of law as 
literature and analyses legal and media documents as sets of narratives. 
We concentrate on historical, background discourse present in legal 
and media documents and try to connect the resulting story with the 
national identity building process.  
The empirical part deals with the case of Serbia and Croatia 
and a summary of current transitional justice practices in both 
countries concludes this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1. ARGUMENT OF THE THESIS 
 
This research analyses identity changes triggered by legal 
discourses, namely domestic trials for war crimes, media discourses 
and representation of those trials and political discourses related to the 
past events. By way new historical narratives associated to war crimes 
trials are shaped, changed and challenged we draw conclusions of 
impact they have on national identity creation. National identity 
matters when it comes to any policy making and it is closely related to 
consideration about historical discourses of the nation. New wars erase 
images of old wars, but in our memory images of wars merge together 
and are easily manageable material.  
Most scholars dealing with the transitional justice and its effect 
on local societies deal with war crime trials before the ICTY. The accent 
is put on compliance of local political elites with the ICTY 
conditionality or the impact the Tribunal has on local population. 
General model of previous researches focuses on international actors 
leaving domestic agents inactive or as mere recipients of the 
international policy. Rare researches have been made looking “from 
below” (Banjeglav, Obradović, Clark): the way local community is 
affected with the historical narrative formed around war crime trials. 
This thesis shifts attention from the ICTY and concentrates on domestic 
courts and consequently on domestic political dynamics in order to 
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give an internal picture of the impact of transitional justice on historical 
narratives and media representations. Nevertheless, we do use the 
ICTY’s influence on national identity as “control variable”, but we 
concentrate specifically on the notion of charisma and representations 
of two former political leaders. Moreover, we present the master 
narratives about the past events in both Serbia and Croatia and the way 
they are challenged or changed on the institutional level. Finally, two 
relevant case studies have been chosen in order to describe the 
problematique. We analyse following trials: in Serbia we deal with 
“Ovčara” case, while in Croatia we monitored trials for “Medak 
pocket” and case. Much has been said about coercion, reluctance and 
unwillingness of political elites to cooperate with the ICTY or to 
implement other forms of transitional justice mechanisms. Therefore 
this research tries to shed light on judicial processes that are far away 
from the international justice scene, that are motivated internally. We 
also explore what kinds of strategies the local media employed in order 
to represent the crimes and historical discourses created around those 
trials. This research uses comparative perspective for various reasons: 
we explore representations from both sides, but we are even more 
interested in mirror pictures one nation creates about the other and 
whether those strategies go beyond the simple scope of trial reporting. 
One should be very careful when looking at our sets of case studies: the 
two/two logic is not employed in order to equalize the guilt or 
responsibility of two ex warring parties, namely Serbia and Croatia, or 
to relativize the severity of the crimes committed in each one of them. 
The traditional positivist historiography considered historical events to 
be naturally explained as real, truthful stories where historians should 
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only “uncover or extract from evidence” the objective elements. 
Consequently, this found truth would be immediately and intuitively 
acquired by the reader, thus “narrative is regarded as a neutral 
‘container’ of historical fact” (White 1992, 37). On the contrary, this 
research is absolutely not a quest for the truth about the past war 
atrocities: we are aware of multiple truths, even multiple “histories” 
and the fact that judicial truth and establishing the fact is just the 
material to be analysed in depth by historians. Instead, we are trying to 
analyse representations of the truth, changes in collective memory seen 
through the writing of the media about the past events. 
Time frame of this study is practically based on the last decade, 
the only one that managed to set fair trials at the domestic level. We do 
mention some of the earlier ICTY indictments, motions or judgments 
related the case studies (“Ovčara” and “Medak pocket”), but we 
abstain from commenting and including show trials held before 
national courts especially in the 1990s. Our examination of this first 
decade of the successful, or rather non unsuccessful, legal processes is 
strictly related to political elites and mass media attitudes. However, 
the “bottom up” approach of “small people’s” stories and testimonies 
will certainly serve in the future as a corrector of the past. Some authors 
already researched their attitudes related mainly to the ICTY 
judgments (Banjeglav, Clark, Nettelfield), and future comparison of 
this research with the “small people’s” stories linked to domestic trials 
would be very challenging.   
 During this research, we covered legal documents related to 
trials for war crimes before national courts: indictments, hearings, 
preliminary investigations, testimonies, judgments as primary sources, 
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and norms of national and international law, treaties, Criminal Codes, 
Constitutions, customary law provisions as secondary source data. In 
addition, this research analysed articles from daily and weekly 
newspapers from both Croatia and Serbia related to trials before the 
ICTY or domestic courts, political speeches or regular journalistic 
comments. The analysis also covered parliamentary debates regarding 
war crime trials, conference proceedings, NGO reports from trial 
monitoring and other publications.  
 The unifying element of this vast body of empirical data is the 
notion of discourse. When using term discourse we concentrate more 
on the structure of the material, how certain concepts were brought 
into public sphere, what are the strategies of pointing out selected 
aspects in media reports, how is the very form of legal document 
influencing its interpretation from the wider public, which forms of 
discourse are easy to manipulate meaning with etc. 
Besides notion discourse we use the notion of narrative. 
Representations of truth or history, just to name couple of them, are 
interpretative in nature. For White, historical argumentation is 
constructed and framed by paradigm choice and choice of ideological 
perspective (White, 1985). Such definition suits well our data of 
‘twisted’ truths and ‘reality’ representations: legal documents as 
extremely selective compared to the real events and also ‘packed’ in 
legalistic discourse, media reports coloured by their own publishing 
guidelines and ideological positioning, and to a lesser extent political 
discourses aiming at establishing the most convenient historical 
narrative suitable for the current national identity determination. 
Narration developed from the literary studies but it is widely spread in 
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many interdisciplinary researches, comprising history, legal and media 
studies. Studies of nationalism understand narration as linking element 
of a group, as it serves both internal aspects of national identity 
formation, namely homogenizing, unifying and determinative 
elements, and external aspects aiming to define self-determination, 
identify the borders and define the “others”. Wodak defines one 
nation’s historical narrative as “presenting a history of a community 
imagining itself as nation, not strictly as a linguistic text-type with 
particular structural features, but as a somewhat wider, more abstract 
category.” (Wodak, 2009)  
 
2.2. METHODOLOGY FRAMEWORK – CRITICAL DISCOURSE 
ANALYSIS 
 
When analyzing discourses of historical, legal and political 
narratives we use critical discourse analysis (CDA) that relates 
discourse with other forms of social practices. Relations of power, in 
the very focus of CDA are inevitably linked to ideologies, especially 
when it comes to creation of historical narratives. Therefore, we use 
Van Dijk’s definition of ideology as a “hierarchically organized set of 
norms and values that defines fundamental goals of groups and their 
members.” (Van Dijk, 1991:139). Ideology serves to legitimize the 
power relations in the society and it dictates the underlying tone of 
media reporting, political discourses and also shapes historical 
narration. When analyzing the impact legal, historical and media 
narratives have on national identities, we follow Cillia, Reisigl and 
Wodak’s assumption that “national identities – conceived as specific 
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forms of social identities – are discursively, by means of language and 
other semiotic systems, produced, reproduced, transformed and 
destructed.” (De Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak, 1999).  
Foucault’s definition of discourse being “practices that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 2002) is 
taken as the basis. Foucault conceptualises discourse analysis as “the 
understanding of rules and regularities in the creation/dispersal of 
objects, subjects, styles, concepts and strategic fields” (Foucault, 2002). 
For Foucault, the main subject of discursive analysis is not the same as 
that of linguistic analysis, i.e. the rules in accordance with which a 
particular statement has been made and rules in accordance with which 
other similar statements could be made; instead, he is concerned with 
“how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?” 
(Foucault 2002). Foucault’s works showed that discourse has a direct 
impact on social relations and power structures in society. 
Nevertheless, for the use of this research, his theory is very difficult to 
operationalise as it often seems too broad to apply to specific contexts. 
In this research we use a narrower definition of discourse developed by 
critical discourse analysis theory, as our main focus is on the 
relationship between content and situational context in which observed 
documents are made. We observe the media’s “discursive strategies” 
(Van Dijk 2009), i.e. their conscious or unconscious linguistic strategies 
used to establish, reproduce, transform or deconstruct the content of 
historical narrative present in trials for war crimes.  
Critical discourse analysis is based upon the assumption that 
language is dialectically interconnected with other elements of social 
life. Legal heritage and memory are socially situated and developed 
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from the interaction of law and its language with the society itself. 
Discourse analysis effectively shows how each discourse is produced, 
distributed and interpreted in a particular conjuncture. We take into 
account Norman Fairclough’s dialectic paradigm that understands 
discourse as both “socially constituted and socially constitutive” 
(Fairclough, 2003). The dissemination of media to wide parts of society 
enhances the constitutive effects of its shared discourses playing a 
significant role in the construction of social reality. Discourse is 
articulated within contextual structure, power and ideology in order to 
generate knowledge and belief. We follow the critical view of ideology 
as “representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to 
contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of 
power, domination and exploitation” (Faiclough, 2003). This view 
contrasts various descriptive understandings of ideology as positions, 
attitudes, beliefs, perspectives etc. of social groups without reference to 
relations of power and domination between such groups. Ideological 
representations constructed in the media after trial transcripts and legal 
documents are not used as an objective historical information reflecting 
“reality” but rather as a source for the analysis of ideological debates 
and constructing social reality in public spheres in Croatia and Serbia.  
To analyse the representations (media discourse) of legal 
narratives (trials for war crimes) and the way they influence national 
identity we benefit from the interdisciplinary approach of CDA 
because of the special attention it gives to the role of ideology and 
power relations in the production of meaning. CDA determines whole 
context behind the discourse – it does not limit to just linguistic 
analysis, but describes the relationship between mass media, 
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production and reproduction of political myths as founding elements 
of national ideology and power structures in control. In other words, 
sole language analysis can be considered to be incomplete as it neglects 
important aspect of social practices and their two-ways relationship.   
This research uses discourse-historical approach, i.e. it focuses 
on historical dimension of the legal and media discourse and uses it in 
order to analyse its impact on national identities. During the empirical 
research we extracted historical elements from the legal and media 
discourse; and gathered the “background situation” of the crimes tried 
before domestic courts. The way information related to historical 
circumstances, political decisions and other extra legal elements of 
trials is represented in the media reveals patterns of remembering 
strategies and selection of memory material imposed from above. This 
research follows the diachronic change of historical narratives and 
elements constituting national identity – by catching the shift of frames 
from the issue of indictment, via eventual regime change in course of 
the trial up to the final verdict and eventual social consequences of 
such judgement. Discourse can play an important role in constructing 
the national identity, but also in transforming, perpetuating or 
destructing it (De Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak, 1999). Comparative 
character of this research enables us to follow different types of 
strategies used in different situations and countries, triggered by the 
same historical event, but interpreted differently.  
Primary sources analysed in this research range from judicial 
documents, media reporting and political discourses and they all have 
different “types” of discourse. For example, legal discourse contains 
many important constrains due to the very nature of its purpose: it is 
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selective and shapes the reasoning behind a very precise indictment or 
judgment, reducing other elements of the discourse to minimum. 
Media reporting is also framed by different editorial politics and has 
distinct strategies in covering war crimes trials. We cannot limit this 
research to a priori pointing out ethno-nationalistic discourses in the 
media or labelling each newspaper with fixed identity because the 
voice of the mass media is pluralistic in nature and changes over time 
even in the same editing house.  
CDA reveals to be a very useful methodological tool especially 
in explaining the representation of the “other” in relation to “us”. 
Linguistic strategies employed in media discourse before and after the 
trial or during some important events that eventually changed the 
course of trial assert the position of “other” in relation to “us.” The way 
the “other” is represented in the public discourse is one of the main foci 
of interest of the CDA, consequently nationalism, inclusion/exclusion, 
racism and other forms of discrimination are broadly explained 
through this method.  
Moreover, every discourse is in some way attached to an 
already expressed and historically positioned discourse. Foucault 
claimed that a discourse can be understood only in relation to past 
discourses. This thesis contradicts basic characteristic of media 
reporting – actuality. Nevertheless, in our case, many media reports of 
local war crime trials draw relation with the trials already performed 
before the ICTY. Therefore, we can observe the change in tone, the 
nature of “communication” between the old and the new discourse and 
future perspectives. This thesis tries to reconstruct the elements related 
to national identity from legal and historical narratives and their 
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representations in the media. Media reports on key elements such as 
the issue of indictment, hearings of the accused, important testimonies 
and judgment are analysed and compared. 
We analyse the role of print media in the establishment of 
political memory of past wrongdoings. The media help substantively in 
the (re)creation of historical narratives about the past war and they 
stand in line with ideological discourses. Media influence also the 
creation of collective memory, even though “there is still no default 
understanding of memory that includes journalism as one of its vital 
and critical agents” (Zelizer, 2008). Zelizer points out that journalism’s 
work on the past is often understood as in line with the main historical 
discourse than with collective memory. Nevertheless, “just what part of 
the past and what kind of future are brought into play depends on 
what editors and journalists believe legitimately belongs within the 
public domain, on journalistic conventions, and of course on personal 
ideologies.” (Lang and Lang, 1989). The media’s work on memory is 
selective and strategic: “once journalists begin to make decisions about 
which stories play in which medium and using which tools for relay, 
they find themselves squarely in the realm of memory’s work (Zelizer, 
2008). In addition, historical discourse offered by the media contributes 
in spreading a sense of shared history, as one of the main elements 
necessary to forge a collective identity and sense of shared identity.  
Moreover, interests of political elites are expressed in proposed 
ways of dealing with the past, in determining responsibility, silencing 
or insisting on the discourse about the nature of war and in punishing 
the perpetrators. This research analyses media reports in Serbia and 
Croatia and concentrates on representations of historical and judicial 
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material. Gellner argued that the national sentiment that relies on the 
relation and the comparison with others would be politically more 
effective if nationalists had as fine a sensibility to the wrongs 
committed by their nation as they have to those committed against it 
(Gellner, 1983). On the other hand, Michal Billig’s work on banal 
nationalism shows how our national identity and homeland constitutes 
the very core of everyday mass media content (Billig, 2009). This 
research tries to look at possible changes over time in media 
representations and perceptions of war crimes’ trials, especially 
regarding those committed by one’s own nationals. 
 
2.2.1. ANALYSING NEWSPAPERS AND LEGAL DOCUMENTS 
 
As already stressed before, CDA explains the way language is 
used, i.e. by linking linguistic analysis with social analysis: it focuses on 
social context in which it is being used and the consequences of such use. 
This element is particularly important for our research as we deal with 
extensive sets of data from various social contexts. Therefore, some 
linguistic tropes are not equally used at tribunal during trial for war 
crimes, in newspapers reporting on precisely same event or in political 
speeches during commemoration of cited war episode. Hence language 
use performs its own form of identity. When analyzing newspapers one 
has to be aware of the influence propaganda of the person or group 
holding political power has over journalism, but at the same time mass 
media manage to keep the distance and propagate their own editorial 
politics.  
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Specific importance of situational positioning of narratives to 
be analysed in this research needs broader interpretation of meanings 
than content analysis. Simple content analysis ignores textual absences 
that might be caused by oblivion or strategy of denial, which plays a 
significant role in ideological reconstruction of past events. In addition, 
we assume something which is not written because of our social 
knowledge (Cameron, 2001). To certain extent we can “assume that 
very aspect of textual content is the result of a ‘choice’” (Richardson, 
2007). Fairclough distinguishes three elements of discursive event: text, 
discursive practice and social practice. In textual dimension text 
content is analysed, then the production and reception of the text is 
explored (discursive practice) and finally, wider social perspective is 
observed (social practice).  
While analyzing content we perform lexical analysis of the text. 
This is done on two levels: 1) structural, i.e. by explaining how the 
propositions are structured, what words are used and how and 2) 
sequential, which explains how the text is organized, whether events 
are presented in chronological order or with special rhetoric style.  
First part of the analysis concentrate on choice of the words 
and how actors are represented in discourse named and referenced to. 
In our case studies from the point of view of national identity it is 
crucial to label “us” and “them” with adequate adjectives or titles. For 
example, in Ovčara trial for crimes committed by Serbian forces in 
Vukovar, vast majority of Croatian newspapers labelled victims as 
“Croatians” while Serbian counterparts used mostly “prisoners of 
war”. Reisigl and Wodak name these choices “referential strategies” 
and they dictate purpose of the narrative presented in the media 
 70 
 
discourse (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Teun van Dijk explained those 
strategies following so called “ideological square” where the author 
“emphasize Our good things, emphasize Their bad things, de-
emphasize Our bad things and de-emphasize Their good things” (Van 
Dijk, 1999).  
Further linguistic analysis leads to the choice of predication 
strategies which assign “qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, 
actions and social phenomena” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). One of the 
most common strategies is sentence construction which emphasizes 
agents/subject of action or transits the importance to other role 
important for the purpose of reporting by concentrating for example on 
the object of action, process itself or circumstances associated with the 
action. Examples of this strategy are the following: 1) ‘Enemy army 
killed our soldiers’, 2) ‘The soldiers were killed’. Sentence construction 
can be altered also by the choice of modal verbs to be used in text. We 
distinguish between truth modality and obligation modality, for 
example whether something can be done, or will be done. Some texts 
require certain degree of social knowledge in order to understand them 
properly; this taken-for-granted claim is called presupposition. In our 
case studies it is a very common strategy, especially because 
thematically big sets of articles rely on each other. Finally, strategy of 
using rhetorical tropes serves to indicate specific meaning of the words.  
Next step in CDA is to find out what are the discursive 
practices used by journalists. Discursive practices reveal the attitude of 
the author of the text towards an already existing narrative. For 
example, the way legal document is represented in media shows the 
discourse practice used by newspaper.  Texts appearing in mass media 
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are necessarily selective, but how does the author of the text select the 
material? And why does he omit or add on the original source? 
Discourse is situated within certain social reality and the way it is set 
up “relates systematically and predictably to contextual 
circumstances”. (Fowler, 1991) Here inevitably comes the question of 
objectivity of reporting. What is objective reporting? Is it the one where 
the journalist is silenced and just quotes speeches and reports directly 
primary sources? Neutral reporting does not mean the objective 
reporting. What is more, news reporting is certainly led by values like 
frequency, unambiguity, composition, references to certain people or 
nations. Even when the author uses quotations we must consider 
whether it is direct quotation, strategic or indirect one33. Newspaper 
articles are always put in relation to social context – this strategy is 
called intertextuality.  
Finally, we place the observed discourse in relation to social 
practices. In our case studies we must consider political practices such 
as regime changes, official commemorations or apologies, changes in 
those practices, structural changes in political and legal institutions. 
Moreover ideological practices are important element related to 
shaping of national identity. 
 
2.2.2. FRAME ANALYSIS 
 
For the use of this research, it is desirable to concentrate on the 
media’s “discursive strategies” (Van Dijk 2009), i.e. their conscious or 
                                                                
33 Strategic quotation takes only parts of full quote and put them in “strategic” posticions, 
whereas indirect one gives us the summary of full quote.  
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unconscious linguistic strategies used to establish, reproduce, 
transform or deconstruct the content of historical narrative present in 
trials for war crimes. These strategies theoretically fall into a category 
of framing, where all texts, regardless of how clear or abstruse they 
may be, are comprised of packages of integrated idea elements held 
together by some unifying central concept (Gamson & Lasch, 1983). The 
“social setting frames and structures the language used” (Richardson, 
2007) and links articulated idea into packages of meanings. Frames put 
certain perspective on what is being reported and stimulate the 
audience to adopt frames and the proposed view of reality. Therefore, 
some ideas are omitted or emphasized, i.e. frames “can construct 
reality, impact interpretations, and influence the audience responses 
toward a particular event after the event enters the public agenda.” 
(Dimitrova and Stromback, 2005). According to Gamson every frame 
has its opposite competing frame. Usually the audience sharing 
ideological view of one newspaper chose a frame proposed by this 
particular source. Moreover, new concepts are accepted more easily if 
they are presented in frame similar to the already known one, which 
shows frames’ persuasive nature and social function (Payne, 2001). 
Selection is a process that affects frames as well, in media studies it is 
treated as active and conscious. Frames are put in hierarchy, following 
analogy of metanarratives as grand ideas crucial for identity formation 
as they are common to all the members of a group. Result is 
conceptualization of three main masterframes: the ethno-nationalist 
frame, the liberal-individualist citizenship frame and the harmony with 
nature frame. Our research moves within the borders of ethno-
nationalist frame, as it draws on already existing cultural codes related 
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to national identity building (Gamson&Modigliani, 1989) Media 
discourses are dominated by three groups of frames: namely, conflict, 
human interest, and economic consequences frames (e.g. de Vreese, 
2002; Price et al. 1997: 484). For group conflicts main focus is 
reproduction of collective identities and their positioning in relation to 
the “other”. Articles used in our case studies very often mention 
nationality of the actors, even when it is not relevant for the 
comprehension of the narrative. Therefore, frames about conflict 
contain linguistic strategies underlying collectivity such as the use of 
deictic forms, often put in first person plural and sometimes in third, or 
synecdoche. Moreover, national identity issues described under ethno-
nationalist masterframe “always require an element of collective 
memory” and therefore associate past events with the present one. 
Thus, events collected to war crime trials, for which the indictees are 
not directly accused are recalled in media narratives. In this research 
which deals with representation of historical narratives, frame analysis 
is of great help for the analysis of discursive practices and 
understanding of the background information related to a larger 
metanarrative. Detailed historical narratives alone are rarely published 
in the media and do not appear before the domestic courts as detailed 
as before the ICTY. Therefore, structure, content and change of frames 
in media narratives about past events can bring this research closer to 
analyzing the dynamics of the impact representations of war crime 
trials have on national identity.  
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2.2.3. DATA SET 
 
For the purpose of this research we analysed different sets of 
data. Our primary sources can be divided into three groups: 1) trial 
transcripts and reports from the organizations monitoring those trials, 
2) legal document such as laws, provisions etc. and 3) printed media 
articles.  
Most of the trial transcripts were obtained during my 
fieldwork research in Humanitarian Law Centre form Belgrade, Serbia. 
This human-rights non-governmental organization collected all the 
transcripts available on request directly at the Office of the War Crimes 
Prosecutor or War Crimes Chamber.  Moreover, HLC carries out 
activities of research and documentation, justice and institutional 
reform and public information and outreach, so working in their 
archives enabled me to do an extensive research of their audio-visual 
material in order to better understand the context of the war crime 
trials held at local level. In addition, I have used their reports from trial 
monitoring. The part of the research conducted in Croatia was done 
with the help of NGO Documenta, centre for dealing with the past, 
which provided me with their publications regarding war crimes trials 
monitoring and other research material. Although I was not conducting 
official interviews as part of my research, I have received valuable 
comments and research insights from the employees from both 
organizations.  
For the purpose of this research I have consulted a myriad of 
legal or other official documents: international humanitarian law 
practices as well as provisions of the international customary law, 
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Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, Statute of the 
ICC, domestic Criminal Codes from 1990s to present days, Croatian 
and Serbian Constitution, and Parliamentary declarations.  
This research analysed print media reports from 2001 onwards. 
Main part of the research was done during the course of war crime 
trials and sporadically for important dates such as military operation 
commemorations. For data on Serbia I used Ebart digital media archive 
that has data since 2003, which was a fortunate coincidence as main 
bulk of this research was done for that period. Therefore I included 
virtually every newspaper document written about the cases I was 
exploring. Later, I have individualized important dates and selected 
news in Croatian newspapers. This research was done in National and 
University Library, in media archive section. I have chosen to follow 
national newspapers like Vjesnik (until it ceased to be published in 
April 2012) , Jutarnji list and Večernji list and sporadically Slobodna 
Dalmacija, Glas Slavonije and Vukovarske novine.  
Brief description of Serbian and Croatian newspapers’ editorial 
policies and ideological affiliation is following. Politika is the oldest 
newspapers in Balkans, close to almost every regime and its policy is 
determined to large extent by the government. Pro-European, 
progressive newspaper Danas has a rather small number of copies 
compared to other Serbian newspaper, but it is the only one with clear 
socialist and progressive agenda. During the ‘90s it was a pillar of 
resistance against Milošević regime. Večernje novosti is nationalistic, 
but not completely tabloid newspapers like Kurir. More moderate 
newspaper is Blic. Croatian Vjesnik was state-owned daily newspaper 
of moderate conservative ideology. Večernji list have more nationalistic 
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and popular agenda with elements of tabloid reporting. Jutarnji was 
more left-wing oriented, but is turning towards popular and tabloid 
style of reporting. Finally, we included local newspapers mostly 
because of the voices of the victims and their organizations. Their 
editorial policies are rather moderate.  
 
CHAPTER 3  
MASTER NARRATIVE ABOUT THE WAR IN CROATIA AND 
SERBIA – AN INSTITUTIONAL VIEW 
 
Trials for war crimes touch upon historical circumstances 
leading to outburst of violence and consequently, upon a constituent 
element of national identity – historical narrative. Even though 
judiciary branch of government is independent pillar of every 
democratic regime, legal narrative found in trial transcripts contains 
parts of historical master narrative about the war, which is approved 
by the political elites. Representations of the trials in mass media are, 
on their account, subject to metaframe that shapes media narrative. For 
example, in our case studies, which fit under masterframe of 
nationalism, representations are part of the discourse inevitably 
connected to ideology. We are interested in one constituting part of the 
nationalism ideology – political myths. Those myths, together with 
collective memory about past events are constituent part of national 
identities.  
In this chapter we give an overview of the master narratives 
about the war, political myths surrounding those narratives and the 
actual product of the state in relation to cited narratives – 
parliamentary declarations which insitutionalise them.  
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3.1. CROATIAN AND SERBIAN MASTER NARRATIVE ABOUT THE 
WAR 
 
The Myth about the Homeland War was constructed by the 
first Croatian President – and also professional historian – Franjo 
Tudjman. With this myth, he wished to emphasize the just and 
defensive character of the 1991-1995 war. Tudjman took a professional 
approach to the construction of this myth, because in the 1950s he was 
a highly-ranked federal military historian of communist Yugoslavia, 
and he specialized in studies of just, defensive wars, such as anti-
colonial or partisan wars. According to Tudjman, the mass people‘s 
democratic movement – which unified all Croats – had won in Croatia 
in 1990, even though his party secured only a narrow victory over the 
reformed communists, and it is a question whether such a war would 
have broken out if the communists had won. Moreover, Tudjman 
argued that, following a democratic victory  – which was also a 
plebiscite for Croatian national independence – an attack was made on 
Croatia by the Yugo-communist and – “greater Serbian” Army, which 
consisted of parts of the former JNA that operated under conservative 
pro-Russian and “greater Serbian” generals, as well as various Serbian 
extreme nationalistic paramilitary troops. Tudjman introduced the term 
branitelji (meaning “defenders”) as an official title sanctioned by law for 
soldiers-participants in this war. The name in itself suggests that the 
Croats were leading a defensive war on their own territory even 
though the Croatian Army carried out numerous operations on 
territories where Serbs were the majority population, as well as in 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it is also reminiscent of the word 
domobrani (meaning home guards or home defenders), officially the 
Croatian Home Guard, which was the Croatian army in the NDH 
(Independent State of Croatia) and earlier Croatian regimes, and the 
radical nationalists found this appealing.  
Tudjman simplified and ideologised history and ignored the 
wider historical context, complexity and causes of the Yugoslav crisis 
throughout the last two decades of socialism. He fogged the complexity 
of the situation and possible options for a solution during the critical 
pre-war year, particularly the responsibility of ethnic/religious parties 
for the state of chaos, as well as the responsibility of extremists in his 
own party and various “greater Croatian” and neo-Ustasha tendencies 
which he himself had encouraged and later used in the war and 
towards consolidation the government. However, Tudjman‘s idea 
about the “Homeland” war (or patriotic/fatherland and defensive/just 
war) as an all-encompassing people‘s resistance to the aggression, 
uniting all patriotic forces of the same ethnic group against “the 
others”, was one that appealed to all ethnic nationalist leaders of 
factions involved in the 1991-1995 war. Each faction had adopted it and 
applied it to its individual case, while perceiving itself as the just 
defender and the enemy(ies) as the aggressor(s).  
The architect of the “Homeland War” concept, Franjo Tudjman, 
was a former communist general and military historian. The Croatian 
Homeland War is a translation and term borrowed from the Russian 
“Patriotic War” concept, which was invented as a philosophy, war 
strategy and patriotic mobilization instrument at the time of 
Napoleon‘s invasion of Russia in 1812. The “Patriotic War” 
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(Отечественная война) places primary emphasis on justice, i.e. the 
defensive character of war, on the existence of an invasion or 
aggression from, and on the concept of the homeland or, literally, the 
“fatherland” (отечество in Russian, although the words родина and 
страна are also used for the same concept). In the World War II the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia called on the people to rise against the 
external aggressor (Germans, Italians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, etc.) in 
defence of their homeland (Croats for Croatia, Serbs for Serbia, 
Montenegrins for Montenegro, and so forth). The Partisan Army also 
recruited a number of officers from the former Royal Army, as well as 
Chetniks and members of the Croatian Home Guard. Naturally, they 
also introduced the “dual command system” with political commissars, 
members of the Party who taught Marxism to the soldiers, and they 
kept an eye on all non-members, particularly those in command 
structures. In the beginning of the war, Franjo Tudjman invited 
professional officers and generals – Croats who deserted the JNA – into 
the new army formed by the independent Croatia. They patriotically 
accepted the invitation in defence of their homeland. On 13 October 
2000, the Croatian State Parliament at the time adopted the Declaration 
on the Homeland War. The purpose of this document was to sanction 
the Homeland War to prevent the possibility of it being dealt with by 
the left-wing, which after the Tudjman era had a chance of winning the 
elections and coming into power (the centre-left coalition was later in 
power from 2000 to 2003). In other words, the Myth about the 
Homeland War was an instrument for the continuity and legitimacy of 
Tudjman‘s Croathood. Most active in sustaining and consolidating the 
Myth about the Homeland War in Croatia today are Tudjman‘s ruling 
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HDZ party, the Catholic Church and associations of war veterans, or as 
they are officially called – defenders from the Homeland War. At the 
same time, Croatian historians are debating whether the war in 
question was a “homeland/defensive war that was also a civil war” 
(Neven Budak) or primarily an “aggression against Croatia”, on which 
Ivo Banac insists. 
Today only Belgrade views the 1991-1995 war as a “civil war in 
Yugoslavia”, just like it views the other wars of that decade as the 
“Yugoslav wars of the nineties”. This was seen for example even in a 
legal document such as indictment for “Ovčara” case. Even though the 
Prosecutor could have left the nature of the conflict to be 
undetermined, like it is the case at the ICTY, he opted for the “civil 
war” description, which is internal war option. The ICTY took a lot of 
effort to write an extensive background narrative, but was satisfied 
with the simple “armed conflict” definition, because it could use 
Geneva Conventions either way according to the customary 
international law. For other post Yugoslav state the war was a 
homeland, patriotic and liberation war waged by a specific ethnic 
nation against the greater Serbian aggression that was planned and 
orchestrated in Belgrade. Milošević’s regime in Serbia was the only 
governing party trying to prove continuity with the former Yugoslavia 
and Communist Party, thus description of the war as civil one was the 
only option in order to present the others as betrayers willing to break 
up the SFRY.  Bieber rightly pointed out that although nationalism in 
Serbia was expressed aggressively, it was nevertheless perceived as a 
self-defensive project. (Bieber, 2005) Therefore the war was presented 
as preventative, the one that is always seen as only defensive. (Jovic, 
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2012) Consequently, even Serbia could benefit from using self-
victimisation. Other strategies that motivated national mobilization in 
Serbia and set up the framework for new national myths were recalling 
of the World War II narrative about Ustasha versus Chetniks’ 
movement, the cult of Jasenovac concentration camp as the Serbian 
Golgotha and not only a war crimes scene. According to Bakić and 
Pudar victimization is created as a historical “pathetic and self-pitying 
perception of Serbian historical destiny inconstant confrontation with 
the worlds’ greatest powers. Victimisation, along with the 
monopolization of the victim status, is the most frequently used 
discourse strategy.” (Bakić&Pudar, 2009) Myths of chosen people and 
martyrdom, as Kolstø described them, have been put on collective 
level, in the greatest tradition of the communist collective identity 
legacy from the past. Panic, understood as fear of the “Other”, is made 
legitimate thanks to the sui generis myth of chosen people. As the 
similarity of cultural fabric of ex Yugoslav republic is so high, the only 
way of creating “exceptionality” of determinate nation is by putting it 
in relation with the other. Thus, an important factor of myth making is 
constant competition between “us” and “them” that converged though 
in the general self-consideration of all three nations – once war parties – 
as martyr peoples. Victimisation of the group is product of martyrium 
myth and has self-mourning as consequence. Therefore, incentive for 
the mourning rituals on the collective level is still high and strictly 
dialectically addressed to the other “enemy” nation.  
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3.2. INSTITUTIONALISED NARRATIVES ABOUT THE WAR  
 
Political elites express continuously their visions of history 
during political rallies, commemoration practices, electoral campaigns, 
but official versions of the past events can also be found in numerous 
documents produced by the government. In this chapter we analyse 
some of the documents related to 1991-1995 wars that were triggered 
by the ICTY judgments, changes in polices of facing the past or by the 
local political interests.  The focus of this analysis are thus, once again, 
representations of the war events and not the real facts.  
Some of the statements found during the course of our analysis 
politically instrumensalise history or contradict verdicts of highest 
international legal bodies like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or 
the ICTY. Dejan Jović accurately notes that the international tribunals 
“are […] seen as the main threat to the process of writing history by 
Ourselves.” (Jović, 2012).  
 
3.2.1. CROATIA 
 
The Croatian Parliament issued a number of declarations and 
legal acts about the Homeland war since the state proclaimed its 
independence in 1991. Direct addressing of the past events is found in 
Declaration on Homeland War, Declaration on Operation Storm and 
Declaration on Judgment of the ICTY for war crimes on “Ovčara” and 
on cooperation of the Republic of Croatia with the ICTY (herein after 
Declaration on “Ovčara” trial).  
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Declaration on Homeland War was issued on October 13th 2000 
in order to safeguard “the values of Homeland war” before the 
inevitable cooperation with the ICTY. Hence, it is regarded as 
foundation of the Croatian history where all the basic “truths” about 
the war that secured existence of the modern country are listed. In 
preamble unanimous acceptance of the “core values of the Homeland 
War” is considered to be “accepted by entire Croatian nation and all 
citizens of Republic of Croatia”. Therefore, it leaves no room for the 
contested narratives nevertheless present in the public space. 
(Banjeglav, 2012) At the beginning the independence of Croatia is 
described as “hundred years’ old desires” and then the declaration 
asserts that “Republic of Croatia lead just and legitimate, defensive and 
libratory, and not aggressive and invasive war against any party, in 
which it was defending its territory from Greater Serbia’s aggression 
inside the limits of internationally recognised borders”. This statement 
was challenged by number of indictments from the ICTY where high 
ranked Croatian military and political officials were accused of taking 
part in co called Joint Criminal Enterprise. Still, that allegation was 
discharged in the Appeals Judgement against generals Gotovina and 
Markač when they were acquitted, but the role of Croatia in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina war remains questionable as the Trial Chambers in case 
Prlić et al. did found the existence of the JCE. The Appeals Trial is still 
on going in that case.  
Motion to create Declaration on Operation Storm was 
presented in the Parliament after the arrest of general Gotovina in 
December 2005 and on 30 June 2006 the Declaration was adopted. This 
declaration did not have as much influence as the one about the 
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Homeland war, but it is interesting for this analysis for couple of 
reasons. First it assumes to become “part of Croatian useful past” that 
Snježana Koren defines as “compulsory meaning of the essential 
founding element of national narrative” that defines the strategy of 
selection of memory material. (Koren, 2011). Finally, this declaration 
asserts the power of political myths when it praises the operation Storm 
for having “destroyed myth […] of strength, courage and invincibility 
of Serbian Army.” 
The last declaration we analysed gives reaction of the 
Parliament to the ICTY judgement in “Vukovar three” case. Even 
though Croatia ratified all the necessary treaties and cooperated well 
with The Hague tribunal, after the relatively mild sentences the 
Parliament reacted calling the judgement “unacceptable” and 
“unsustainable from legal and moral aspect”. At the beginning 
Republic of Croatia is mentioned as “the winner in imposed Homeland 
war”. Yet, the “winner” identity is not the only one Croatia claimed to 
have in the Homeland war. It is the only country in the Yugoslav wars 
that has both the winner and the victim identity.  
In the narrative about the Homeland war, town of Vukovar 
hold a central place of Croatian victimhood. Vukovar is marked as a 
special symbolic place of Croatian suffering in the war. In 1999 
Croatian Parliament proclaimed November 18th to be Day of memory 
of victim of Vukovar. The very title and the deliberate use of singular 
personify the sacral place which was sacrificed so Croatia could have a 
better future.   
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3.2.2. SERBIA 
 
In Serbia, narrative about the war concentrated on preventive 
element, thus imposed and not wanted. Therefore, the state policy 
toward dealing with the past was concentrated towards forgetting and 
denying. For example, the very presence of the Serbian Army in Bosnia 
was denied for a long time, blaming only Bosniak Serb Army of 
Republic of Srpska for its involvement in the war. The consequence of 
such narrative is the absence of declarations or documents praising 
military operations, as it is the case of Croatia.  
Nevertheless, after Milošević’s regime was overthrown and 
state control over media was lift off, multiple voices about the past war 
crimes started to spread in Serbian public sphere. Srebrenica genocide 
could not simply be ignored anymore. The NGO gathered around topic 
of dealing with the past started campaigning for broader discussions 
about the past atrocities committed in the name of Serbian state. In 2005 
broadcasting of a tape showing the execution of six young Bosnian 
Muslims from Srebrenica by a Serb paramilitary unit called 
“Scorpions” did a snowball effect. It was the first time the NGOs asked 
the parliament to adopt a resolution acknowledging Srebrenica 
genocide. Another appeal to the parliament was done after the decision 
of the ICJ in the case Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide where Bosnia and 
Herzegovina filled a complaint against then Serbia and Montenegro. In 
2007 the ICJ cleared Serbia from direct responsibility and involvement 
in the Srebrenica genocide, but it ruled that Serbia had breached the 
genocide convention by failing to prevent the genocide and to bring 
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perpetrators to justice. Finally in 2010 Serbian parliament adopted 
Declaration on Srebrenica after many MPs confrontation. Nevertheless, 
the Parliament failed to call Srebrenica genocide; instead it “severely 
condemned crime committed against Bosniak population in Srebrenica 
on July 1995”. Discussions made during the debate on declaration 
resulted in confronting genocide in Srebrenica to the war crimes 
committed against Serbs in the nearby municipality of Bratunac. This 
relativisation of guilt, made Srebrenca events look like a consequence of 
the atrocities perpetrated by the Bosnian Army units in Bratunac. 
Consequently, the Serbian political elite and public opinion were 
deeply divided regarding this issue. While the Serbian President, Boris 
Tadić, attended the tenth anniversary commemoration of the 
Srebrenica massacre on 11 July 2005, the leaders of the second most 
important party, Serbian Radical Party attended the commemoration in 
Bratunac.  
In addition, adoption of the Declaration on Srebrenica 
increased requests of condemning crimes committed against members 
of Serbian nation and citizens of Serbia. Therefore, on 14 October 2010 
Serbian Parliament adopted another declaration, this time addressed to 
Serbian nation. This declaration “invited parliaments of other countries, 
and primarily countries from the territory of the former Yugoslavia, to 
condemn those crimes (against Serbs) and give full support to their 
states’ institutions and international institutions in processing 
perpetrators and to […] pay respect to Serbian victims.” Once again, 
the concept of “crime” in Srebrenica, against potential “myriad” of 
crimes committed against Serbian nation contributes only to relativise 
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the atrocities done by the Yugoslav People’s Army, as Serbian forces 
were called during the war.  
At the regional level, in Serbia’s north province of Vojvodina, 
two declarations were issued. One concerned cooperation with the 
ICTY, and the other one again “condemns crimes against members of 
Serbian nation on the territory of the former Yugoslavia”.  This 
Declaration was initiated by the Serbian Progressive Party, originating 
from Serbian Radical Party, after the acquittal of two Croatian generals 
Gotovina and Markač at the ICTY for crimes committed during the 
Storm operation. Even though, all the MPs were in favour of the 
declaration, it had to be amended in order to contain the clause of 
“expressing grief to victims, members of all the other nations, and 
condemns crimes committed against them”.  
 
3.2.3. APOLOGIES AND REGIONAL COOPERATION 
 
Transitional justice theories have also proved that 
acknowledging the suffering of victims is a pre-requisite for 
consolidation of societies and reconciliation among ethnicities and 
states. Commemorations, memorialisation initiatives, apologies and 
reparations provide space for such acknowledgement of the victims’ 
suffering and restoration of their dignity.  
Apologies made by members of political elite could have 
cathartic effect, but could also offend victims of done only pro forma. 
Social anthropology has already proved that memorialisation practices, 
and commemorations of war events in particular, organized by 
political elites, are used, first of all, to legitimize the ruling ideology 
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and building of a state/national/ethnic identity. From the perspective 
of the state, the goals of public commemorations and memorials are 
more often, in the words of Benedict Anderson, related to nation-
building and defining an “imagined community” (Anderson 1983). The 
goal of those in power, therefore, may not be to commemorate victims 
and contribute to public dialogue about the past, but to assert 
particular identities in the public sphere that articulate narratives of 
political legitimisation, and these narratives may even be harmful for 
victims.  
It was already in 2007 that incumbent Serbian President Boris 
Tadić asked, while participating to a talk-show, an apology from all the 
citizens of Croatia and to members of Croatian nation for misdeeds and 
crimes committed in the last war. Formal apology was made in 
November 2010 together with Croatian President Ivo Josipović during 
visits to two crime scenes: Paulin Dvor where 18 Serbian and on 
Hungarian civilian were killed and to Ovčara and Vukovar, site of the 
worst war crime committed during the Homeland war.  
 
CHAPTER 4 
ICTY AND CHARISMA 
 
From (and owing to) the international tribunals for war crimes 
in Nuremberg and Tokyo after WWII to the tribunals for Rwanda and 
former Yugoslavia after the wars in the 1990s, the ideas of international 
justice and worldwide protection of human rights have made 
significant progress. National sovereignty is no longer a shield for the 
worst violators of human rights and perpetrators of crimes against 
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humanity. For that matter, the ICTY has introduced an important 
historic precedent by bringing before an international criminal court 
and accusing of crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity a head 
of state while he was virtually still in office. To be sure, even though 
some most powerful states in our times still resist authorizing a 
permanent international criminal court of justice under auspices of the 
United Nations (UN), it is hopefully only a matter of time when all UN 
members will undersign a charter founding and authorizing such a 
world court. The history-making role of the ICTY is undisputable; it is 
an invaluable and noble effort in service of civilization and humanity, 
and encouraging to all people who hope that what some scholars call a 
“global human rights revolution” will continue making progress as it 
has visibly done since WWII. However, a distinction needs to be made 
between this success of the ICTY perceived from a global vantage point 
and its specific impact on the most troubled European region of the ex-
lands of former Yugoslavia. In other words, the ICTY has been a global 
success but regional controversy. Regarding this regional impact, the 
ICTY‘s achievements have been relatively less successful and 
encouraging, pregnant with a certain number of mistakes and 
accompanied by unintended outcomes which did not always assist and 
serve the chief objective of justice for all, regional stability, 
democratization and Europeanization.  
More specifically speaking about the ICTY from this general 
vantage point and regardless of some of its particular hotly disputed 
decisions and ambiguous impact of its trials on the stability and politics 
of the troubled region in its post-war period, the important role of this 
international institution as a confirmation of the historic progress of the 
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ideas of human rights and international justice is undisputable, 
praiseworthy and encouraging. Consequently, one author of this new 
literature dealing with the Hague Tribunal points out at least that those 
studies also acknowledge that ―judged by more realistic standards, 
international law is seen to play a modest yet important role in post-
war transitions (and even in the most complicated cases such as for 
example, Bosnia and Herzegovina, not to mention the relatively most 
successful case of Croatia), the underappreciated court has in fact made 
a substantial contribution to the transition to democracy. And last but 
not least, this ICTY‘s experience remains important and new 
contribution and supplement for the study and practice of international 
conflict management.  
130 However, it is now in order to critically examine some specific 
problems, particularities and cases regarding the impact of the ICTY on 
the post-war situation in the region under consideration, as well as the 
influence of its trials and verdicts on local politics and, in particular, on 
nationalistic mythmaking. According to several most recent analyses, 
albeit general public interest in the role of the UN’s ICTY has 
somewhat subsided, scholarly interest has increased, and new 
ambitious publications appear dealing with what the Tribunals have 
hitherto done.34 Some of these recent studies do not hesitate to voice 
criticism about some aspects of ICTY‘s mission, such as, generally 
speaking, that much of the early rhetoric about the transformative 
                                                                
34 See for example, Rachel Kerr. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: an exercise in law, politics, and diplomacy. Oxford ; New York : Oxford 
University Press, 2004; Isabelle Delpla & Magali Bessone (eds.) Peines de guerre. La justice 
pénale internationale et l’ex-Yougoslavie. Paris: Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales 
(EHESS), 2010; Lara J. Nettelfield. Courting democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina : the Hague 
Tribunal’s impact in a postwar state. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
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potential of international criminal law helped foster unrealistic 
expectations that institutions like the ICTY could not meet (Nettelfield, 
2010). Often scholars and journalists blame the Tribunal for alleged 
mistakes outside its authority such as arrests and extradition of 
suspects for war crimes and crimes of genocide. It is the states, 
including the regional governments and the leading states in Western 
Europe and the USA, that are principally responsible for this aspect of 
the Tribunal‘s overall endeavour.  
Yet, at this point it is fair to note that the Tribunal per se does 
not bear responsibility for several perhaps most unfortunate 
developments. First of all, it is true that international justice has not 
been applied to the three principal political culprits, namely the local 
ethnic nationalist leaders, Milošević, Tudjman and Izetbegović, who 
created and managed the movements that dragged the peoples who 
lived in peace and the mutually beneficial common state for half a 
century into a fratricidal war and later presided over corrupt 
nationalistic regimes. The widely believed principal instigator of the 
conflict in the Balkans, Serbia‘s Slobodan Milošević, suddenly passed 
away in his Hague cell in 2006 amidst the trial for crimes of genocide 
and crimes against humanity. Tudjman and Izetbegović, both ill men of 
advanced age, had died before the prosecution was prepared to bring 
them before the court because the states obliged to provide requested 
evidence and other relevant information for the court did not 
cooperate. Milošević’s and Tudjman‘s closest aides in charge of the 
dirtiest jobs and gravest crimes of ethnic cleansing, political 
assassinations and legitimizing the results of genocide such as Željko 
Ražnatović Arkan (Serb paramilitary leader who was assassinated in a 
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mafia showdown), Nikola Koljević (Bosnian Serb political leader who 
committed suicide) and Gojko Šušak (Croatian defence minister and 
presumably the worst Croat war criminal who died of cancer) all died 
before coming to The Hague to face justice. The only top political 
leaders of the ethnic parties involved in war sentenced by the ICTY are 
Momčilo Krajišnik (20 years) and Biljana Plavšić (11 years, released 
after 9). The two leaders of the Bosnian Serb republic created through 
ethnic cleansing were found guilty of crimes such as genocide and 
crimes against humanity. Unfortunately, their imprisonment did not 
create a sense of victory of justice in the region particularly for Bosnian 
Muslims. Both were among the chief masterminds and top managers of 
genocide but received relatively soft sentences. Plavšić‘s case was 
particularly painful for the victims, all Bosnian Muslims, and human 
rights activists in the region. In prison she enjoyed a much higher living 
standard than 80% of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
when she came out she received hero welcomes and obtained 
privileges and a high reputation in the Serb Republic and in Serbia. 
This case is an insult to the victims but, unfortunately, is not the only 
such example.  
In short: ICTY was an unlucky court because without 
sentencing the chief political leaders and masterminds of genocide it 
failed to significantly encourage the faith in a better future and just 
international order. It also failed to contribute to myth busting and 
writing an objective and complete history of the Yugoslav conflict. 
ICTY has produced only some fragments of this history, insufficient for 
grasping a truthful and clear picture and understanding of what really 
happened. Thereby, ICTY‘s function of retributive justice has did not 
 93 
 
provide much comfort to the victims‘ families, for example, in the case 
of the Vukovar crimes, Srebrenica massacre, etc, which they frequently 
demonstrate in public.  
Furthermore, Veljko Kadijević, the old-guard communist 
general former supreme commander of the SFRY Army who ordered 
the use of the Army in the beginning of the war, specifically ordered 
the bombings of civilian targets in cities such as Vukovar and 
Dubrovnik and sided with Milošević, has not been prosecuted and 
ICTY never explained to the public why. He lives in Russia and ICTY 
never published an indictment against him although he is still alive.  
However, although ICTY is not largely and directly responsible 
for the non-prosecution of those persons, the fact is that those men are 
among the principal culprits most to blame for the Yugoslav 
catastrophe. And they have not been sentenced by this tribunal or any 
other court. It makes the ICTY‘s credibility fragile and leaves a lasting 
bitterness and disappointment among millions of victims and all 
people who fight worldwide for human rights and international justice. 
And whatever the court has achieved, the fact is that justice did not 
triumph over the worst among the worst criminals (e.g. Milošević, 
Šušak, Mladić, Hadžić). In addition, it is very sad that the principal 
victim-state of this war, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina and its 
majority Muslim population, has not received sufficient support from 
the international community necessary for becoming a viable state, for 
rebuilding and prospering after the war. This fact saddens and often 
enrages not only millions of Bosnians but also hundreds of millions of 
Muslims worldwide, which is definitely not good thing for the West. 
Actually, as noted earlier, the West would have done wisely (as a great 
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political investment) if it had thoroughly rebuilt and modernized 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as the notable and truly exceptional example 
of a secular European predominantly Muslim society (at least it used to 
be such and in major urban areas such as Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica 
also showed tendencies to renew the old socialist-era de facto western 
lifestyle).  
Let us now turn to several specific ICTY cases and their implications. 
These selected are not the most important but only some exemplary 
cases chosen randomly due to big media coverage and heated political 
debates. For example, the following:  
at Medački džep near Gospić, Croatia, and,  
execution without trial of the two hundred wounded and sick Croat 
prisoners of war captured at the city hospital at Vukovar, Croatia.  
The two cases concern the key founding post-war national 
myths, namely the Croatian official perspective on the 1991-1995 war 
versus the Serbian. The Croatian view calls it the Homeland War 
(Domovinski rat) presented as just self-defence of a sovereign western-
oriented nation against foreign aggression from the East. The Croatian 
official state ideology teaches that the war was masterminded and 
directed from Serbia by Greater Serbian nationalists allied with 
remnants of the old guard Communist militarists. This contradicts the 
Serbian view of a “pre-emptive action” by Serb minorities in Croatia 
and Bosnia (in Bosnia‘s part called Serb Republic it‘s the “Patriotic 
War” myth) remembering genocide against them in WWII, which along 
with Albanian nationalism against the Serb minority in Kosovo, caused 
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a “spontaneous civil war” within the SFRY (Popov, 2000). According to 
the Serbian view, the war was caused in the first place by Croatia‘s 
secession and the reasonable fear of Croatia‘s Serb minority of the 
repetition of the WWII Croat genocide against Serbs in Croatia. The 
Croatian view is closer to the truth but does not admit to the role of 
Croatian nationalist extremism of the late 1980s interacting with Serb 
nationalism thus jointly provoking war. The Serb perspective is not 
incorrect about the role of Croatian nationalism but remains silent 
concerning a ten-year-long upsurge of a massive Serb nationalist 
movement spreading from Serbia across the former Yugoslavia that 
precipitated the war and provoked nationalistic extremists from other 
groups.  
Generally speaking, in these two largest states that came out of 
the former Yugoslavia, namely in Croatia and Serbia (and whose 
mutual conflict basically destroyed the common state) although the 
tribunal‘s proceedings and verdicts would temporarily destabilize 
those countries and also unintentionally give a political cause for 
offensives of the far right in domestic politics; however, the Tribunal‘s 
key success – looking at all completed cases -- is in making it difficult 
for the ethnic nationalist regimes to consolidate ideologically, feel 
secure and exercise power by means of a mass indoctrination of the 
people based on ethnic hatred and myth. In other words, the Tribunal 
prevented them from writing mutually-exclusive conflicting histories 
about the same issues and from continuing memory battles in autarkic 
ideological states isolated from the international community. In other 
words, the ICTY not only encouraged democratic opposition, human 
rights activism and civil societies in the two countries but also to some 
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extent frustrated attempts of ethnic nationalists‘ politics to keep the 
people in a state of mobilization for a “perpetual war” while mentally 
confined within the two conflicting “regimes of truth”, imposed by two 
governments that interpret the common history according to the ruling 
elites‘ present-day interest and fantasies about the past and sustain the 
new national founding myths that legitimize their rule.  
Croatia‘s long-ruling right wing nationalist regime (HDZ) 
found itself in a relatively more difficult position vis a vis cooperation 
with the ICTY than Serbia. Croatia wants to join the EU and therefore 
cooperates with the ICTY. However, in Serbia, which builds a special 
relationship with Russia and where traditional Serbian anti-westernism 
is a component of the prevalent nationalist ideology, cooperation with 
the ICTY is considered unpatriotic. Little has changed for that matter 
since the fall of Milošević: Serbia-ICTY have remained distrustful. 
Croatia imagined by the Croats as belonging “naturally” to the EU was 
not only about the national strategy leading to EU admission. It is also 
part of the nationalist mythology according to which Croatia must 
“return” to the West where it culturally belongs as a Roman Catholic 
country and former Habsburg domain. However, pressures from the 
West mounted on both countries insofar as both needed to break out of 
international isolation, and the prosecution of war crimes according to 
international law was one of the preconditions that the international 
community demands from former Yugoslav countries in order to 
advance their international status and ambitions (Peskin&Boduszynski, 
2003). This accelerated the already mounting frustration in Croatia, 
especially at the end of the authoritarian nationalist Tudjman regime in 
1999. A public opinion poll published in a national newspaper (Jutarnji 
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list, 28 August 1999) demonstrated that an overwhelming majority of 
the population primarily held the government and the ruling party 
responsible for the country‘s isolation and particularly bitter relations 
with the ICTY caused by Zagreb‘s refusal to send to The Hague war 
crimes suspects such as, notably, the generals Ante Gotovina and 
Mirko Norac. In the beginning of 2000, the opposition bloc of the six 
parties of the left and left-centrist orientation won the parliamentarian 
and then also the presidential elections. From then on, it was clear that 
the new top officials of Croatia would follow a policy line different 
from that of the HDZ under Tudjman‘s regime (1990-1999), as far as 
war crimes were concerned. The new president Stipe Mesić was one of 
the strongest supporters of unconditional cooperation with the ICTY. 
Almost immediately after the new government and the president took 
office, the HDZ-controlled media started to publish comments 
describing the new policies of cooperation with the ICTY as a 
humiliation of the Croatian nation (Slobodna Dalmacija, 22 February 
2000). For the supporters of this point of view, especially for several 
war veterans‘organizations, the equation was very simple: any move 
towards the investigation of war crimes allegedly committed by the 
Croat forces was an open insult to the integrity of the Domovinski rat, 
which was considered of sacred national value and a symbol of 
sovereignty. A massive right-wing movement came into motion ignited 
by the HDZ party, some Catholic Church circles and a group of 
militant generals/war veterans. President Mesić succeeded in 
maintaining order and later sent the generals into retirement. 
Afterward, General Gotovina was arrested abroad and extradited to 
The Hague (the trial is still in process). Mesić had earlier sent into early 
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retirement the accused General Mirko Norac. The Hague Tribunal 
indicted him for the 1993 summary executions of Serb civilians near the 
town of Gospić (this pre-war waiter in an obscure provincial town 
personally shot in the head an elderly woman and ordered the shooting 
of other Serb villagers captured from the area from which Serb rebels 
earlier shelled Gospić). Under the 2000-03 left-wing collation 
administration, the Croatian political right mobilized in defence of 
Norac. The accused war criminal was elected to a honourable title of 
the vojvoda (duke) of a traditional game Alka at the historic city of Sinj 
in Dalmatia. The movement grew so strong that the Zagreb 
government tried to appease opposition by asking the ICTY to return 
Norac for a trial in Croatia. The ICTY agreed and Norac was sentenced 
in Zagreb to 12 years in prison. Protests followed, and the nationalist 
HDZ party was returned to power, but under pro-EU leader Ivo 
Sanader. However, the accused Norac went to prison, and Croatia has 
significantly improved its record of cooperation with the ICTY. To be 
sure, the political right was furious when in 2004 the ICTY sentenced 
the Bosnian-Croat general, Tihomir Blaškić, to 45 years in prison for 
war crimes against Muslims in Bosnia. Yet, due to the subsequent 
discovery of the Bosnian Army‘s relevant confidential documents, the 
ICTY reduced Blaškić‘s sentence to 7 years and he was eventually 
released in 2006. The Croatian right was somewhat appeased, but 
critics of the ICTY in the region (and worldwide) exploited this to argue 
that the ICTY is both an incompetent and “political” court (the 
argument voiced by the accused Slobodan Milošević, as well as, when 
finally captured, his Bosnian accomplice in genocide, Radovan 
Karadžić).  
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The Croatian liberal and left-wing opposition was especially 
hurt (and right-wing nationalists unintentionally encouraged and 
acquired resources for political agitation) by the 2007 ICTY ruling in the 
case regarding the war crimes committed by the Serb military 
commanders, Mrkšić and Šljivancanin, in 1991, following the battle of 
Vukovar. The Vukovar battle is one of major battles of the 1991-95 war. 
In addition, the city of Vukovar has since become a martyr-city in new 
Croatian patriotic mythology because of its two-month-long siege by 
the JNA and Serb paramilitaries that razed it to the ground, its heroic 
defence by outnumbered defenders and a massive refugee tragedy 
after the fall of the city. On  November 20th 1991, after the city fell and 
the refugee tragedy was shown on TV, the JNA and Serb paramilitaries 
captured between 200-300 wounded Croat defenders from the city 
hospital, transferred them to the city‘s suburb called Ovčara, and 
tortured and executed them without trial. Not only combatants, but 
civilians, journalists and others were among the victims of this crime. 
In 1995, the ICTY released an indictment for the war crimes at Ovčara 
against the supreme commanding general, Mrkšić, and the head of 
military intelligence, major Šljivančanin (both were officers of the 
Yugoslav Army, paid by the government in Belgrade). The first 
directed the siege and destruction of the city and approved the 
executions and expulsion of the Croat refugees, whereas the other led 
the summary investigation of the captives, decided which among them 
were to be executed, and then supervised the execution and hiding of 
the mass graves. In 2003, Šljivančanin was arrested in Belgrade where 
he lived freely eight years after the indictment, and extradited to The 
Hague. According to the ICTY verdict of September 27th 2007, Mrkšić 
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received a 20 year prison sentence, Šljivančanin received a 5 year 
sentence, and the third suspect by the name of Radić was released due 
to a lack of evidence. The 5-year sentence, in particular for one of 
directly responsible persons organizing and commanding the mass 
execution, caused media uproar and victims’ families protests in 
Croatia. Anti-EU sentiments grew and both Croatian left and right-
wing parties united in condemnation of the ICTY. Regarding the 
impact on national myths, the ICTY verdict challenged the Croatian 
view of the 1995-1995 war as purely defensive and added credibility to 
the Serbian nationalistic theory of a chaotic civil war for which all 
groups involved are evenly guilty as if there was no ten years-long 
unfolding of the Serbian nationalistic movement leading to war 
recognized by most scholars as the prime mover of the crisis with such 
catastrophic outcome (Ramet, 1996, etc.).  
Further proceedings at the ICTY, considering appeal and including 
additional evidence, eventually resulted in overruling the 2007 verdict 
so that in May 2009 the accused Šljivančanin received a new sentence to 
17 years in prison. The appealing judge, according to a Croatian 
leading daily newspaper, called the earlier verdict “unreasonable” and 
“evidently erroneous”.35 However, this verdict came following the 2008 
arrest of Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian Serb leader and principal 
mastermind of the 1992-1995 war and genocide in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This seemed as some kind of “appeasement” for Croatia 
which, in a final analysis, again encouraged the right-wing critics of the 
ICTY (in Serbia and Croatia alike) as a “political court”. Thus, Miroslav 
                                                                
35 Jutarnji list, 5 May 2009. http://www.jutarnji.hr/sljivancaninu-kazna-povecana-na-17-
godina/204386/ 
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Tudjman, the son of the late president, as a presidential candidate at 
the 2009 elections in Croatia, said in a speech that the Hague Tribunal, 
according to all sentences hitherto passed ―punishes defenders and 
awards aggressors while confusing and obscuring historical truth.36 
Yet, the electoral results, with Tudjman‘s poor performance and 
triumph of a left-wing candidate who campaigned for further 
cooperation with the ICTY, have shown that Croatian democracy has 
advanced and EU-orientation prevailed despite of all the ICTY‘s 
mistakes. Meanwhile, in order to revitalize the official patriotic 
perspective on the Homeland War, the Croatian Parliament debated 
the possible inauguration of a national order of heroes-defenders of the 
homeland among war veterans that have not been indicted by the ICTY 
but sacrificed their lives on the battlefield, such as, notably, the 
commander of the defense of Vukovar, Colonel Blago Zadro.37  
In Serbia, relatively less cooperative with the West than 
Croatia, anti-westernism is still vibrant. The recent canonization of anti-
western zealot Justin by the Serbian Orthodox Church is another 
impetus to conservative nationalists and popular response to the pro-
western rhetoric of the Tadić presidency. The popular negative view 
regarding the ICTY prevails as ever in all social strata except for small 
human rights advocate groups and NGOs in major urban centres. For 
example, the 2009 increase of the sentence to Šljivančanin caused an 
eruption of protests in various segments of the political spectrum, and 
a popular daily newspaper entitled it “The New Rape of Serbia by The 
                                                                
36 At 21 December 2009 http://predsjednicki-izbori.com/tag/haaski-sud/ 
37 Dnevnik.hr http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/tko-su-heroji-domovinskog-rata-
2.html  
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Hague”.38 Likewise, street rallies often take place across Serbia in 
support of the accused Hague prisoners on trial, namely, the Bosnian 
genocide mastermind Karadzić and the notorious Šešelj who was head 
of the wartime Serb paramilitaries and is still the president of the 
influential Radical Party. All this mentioned, maintains ICTY‘s 
credibility in the region fragile. Serbia‘s debt to the ICTY is still 
relatively the largest. After all, it was the up to recently inaccessible 
Mladić who, among other crimes he had committed, ordered the most 
single gravest crime in the wars of the 1990s – the massacre at 
Srebrenica, about which the National Assembly of Serbia has recently 
released a declaration condemning the crime but without mentioning 
the word genocide and the fact that Mladić was on the payroll of the 
Serbian government. All things considered, the earlier thesis stated in 
this text – that the ICTY willy-nilly helps the consolidation of the 
Serbian nationalist myths, holds water. Thereby, the ICTY has hitherto 
little contributed to the pending task of writing an impartial and 
accurate history of the period under consideration. 
  
4.1. ICTY AND CONSTRUCTION OF CHARISMA 
 
 Following Gardner and Avolio’s theatrical approach in 
explaining charisma, we analyse causes and consequences of post-
Yugoslav society’s need for extreme characters. Impression 
management present in dramaturgical and interactive perspective of 
charisma matrix delineates clear steps that enabled myth making 
                                                                
38 Reakcije povodom presude Zalbenog veća MKS Veselinu Šljivancaninu 
http://www.pescanik.net/content/view/3110/103/ 
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around political leaders. The research explores myths created in and 
around International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). This special mis-en-scène is not chosen by chance since it stages 
the last act of many charismatic leaders’ careers. The detainees’ “shows 
and performances” in courtrooms represent some new postmodern 
myths in ex-Yugoslav society. Those myths have appeared together 
with the myths of rebirth of nationalism and their impact is huge 
although their appearance on the political scene is quite recent (Ramet, 
2007). The “swan song” of once active national and military leaders, 
later ICTY detainees, is incentivizing new forms of nationalism 
practiced by young generations that never experienced the war.   
Since the beginning of live media coverage related to the ICTY, 
the Tribunal prompted strong reactions ii Yugoslav successor states. It 
may seem a paradox, although one that can easily be explained, that in 
the times of Milošević and Tudjman, the Tribunal had more support in 
Serbia and Croatia than it has now.39 This had nothing to do with the 
opposition parties accepting the necessity of facing the bloody past and 
assigning personal responsibility in order to avoid being saddled with 
collective guilt, but because the Tribunal was seen exclusively as an 
instrument of political pressure which could be wielded to overthrow 
the regime. Once a great part of the old political establishment was 
transferred to the ICTY, the Tribunal regained again its unpopularity. 
Public survey results depicted the ICTY as yet another institution 
aiming to obstruct Serbian, Croatian or Bosniak nationhood.40  
                                                                
39 Report by SENSE News Agency, 21 April 2002 
40 For example, OSCE regularly conducts surveys in relation to the general public’s 
attitude towards the ICTY. http://www.naslovi.net/2012-02-29/e-novine/mladic-i-
karadzic-heroji-u-srbiji/3228509 
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This chapter describes the myth making mechanisms from the 
viewpoint of relations between the charismatic leader and their 
followers. Special attention is given to the socially constructed support 
that evolved into new martyrdom and chosen people’s myths. 
Nevertheless, those myths could not be preserved in their original form 
after leaving Tribunal’s courtrooms, and hence they mutated in the 
speeches of non-charismatic leaders who inherited a drained political 
scene. This “new age tragedy” breaks up with portentous war rhetoric 
and concentrates on much more concrete framework, in this case – 
difficulties of a country in transition.  
The sociological elements of legal rituals, and especially 
criminal trials, were first described by Emile Durkheim as exogenous to 
the consciousness of individuals, and thus belonging to the collective 
consciousness of the social system. Crime and punishment allow and 
require the ceremonial affirmation of the social norms upon which any 
society is founded. For Durkheim the essence of the ritualistic 
experience lays in the power of an event to function as the nation’s 
integrative cultural force, creating collective emotional awareness and a 
feeling of togetherness. When it comes to the trials held before the 
ICTY, the situation becomes much more complex. We cannot expect to 
attend an act of catharsis of the entire society while watching 
individuals accused for war crimes on trial. Collective consciousness of 
social norms interferes largely with detainees’ charismatic behaviour 
and changes therefore conventionally accepted customs and beliefs. 
Throughout the abovementioned dramaturgical processes, an 
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interactive progression of joint identity construction between both 
leaders and followers takes place. 
William Gardner and Bruce Avolio’s model of the charismatic 
relationship between leader/actor and follower/audience is dynamic, 
reciprocal and iterative. Leaders’ charisma is the result of impression 
management process performed theatrically in acts of framing, 
scripting, staging and performing to which followers react by creating 
situated, collective identities. Framing involves communications that 
shape the general perspective of the audience. Benford and Hunt 
described scripting as “development of a set of directions that define 
the scene, identify actors and outline expected behaviour” 
(Benford&Hunt, 1992). Staging “refers to appropriating, managing, and 
directing materials, audiences and performing regions” 
(Benford&Hunt, 1992). Special attention is given to the development 
and manipulation of symbols, settings and even physical appearances. 
In the final – performing phase, the charismatic leader implements 
previously developed strategies such as exemplification, self-
promotion, ingratiation, intimidation and supplication, in order to 
present his vision for the future.  
ICTY’s trials have acquired ideological dimension due to the 
charismatic relationship between accused and audience in front of their 
TV receivers. The Hague Tribunal is the scene where nationalistic 
leaders depart from accounts of historical events and enter postmodern 
soap-operas with widespread live coverage. We will analyse two most 
relevant cases for myth making analysis: Milošević and Šešelj trials. 
This choice is made because of the extremely marked theatrical 
atmosphere in the courtroom deriving from the charismatic leaders’ 
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self-representation. Particularly relevant are the continual changes of 
definition of the individual and the social understanding of the past. 
Reinventing past events and trying to offer another version of recent 
history provides material to construct mythical beginning for the 
society’s founding events. The final aim of the new truth offered by the 
leader is to prove that he was unfairly accused, but is willing to carry 
the burden of whole nation as a martyr par excellence. Victimisation of 
the group is product of martyrium myth and has self-mourning as 
consequence. Therefore, the incentive for the mourning rituals on the 
collective level is still high and dialectically addressed to the other 
“enemy” nation. Consequently, once followers accept the leader’s 
vision and values, the nation itself becomes the object of indictment. 
Finally, second a posteriori generated myth is that of “chosen people”.  
The next chapter analyses first phase in new political myth making 
initiated by Slobodan Milošević and Vojislav Šešelj. We deal with 
definition of leader as social actor and try to estimate his behaviour 
from the viewpoint of a dynamic charisma matrix. 
Gardner and Avolio’s charismatic relationship model triggers 
with leader identification process, which applied to our case has to be 
modified to certain extent. Recall that both Milošević and Šešelj were 
affirmed as charismatic leaders long before coming to the ICTY 
detention unit. We follow the definition given by House which states 
that a leader is not charismatic unless described by followers as such 
(House et al., 1991). Therefore, the actual question would be: how did 
Milošević and Šešelj manage to preserve their leadership charisma once 
brought before the face of international justice?  
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Three factors are crucial for the leader identification: leader 
identity, high self-esteem and high self-monitoring. The leader has his 
own personal identity that is socially constructed over time and 
“situated identity”, constructed in a specific situation at determined 
point of time (Schlenker, 1985). For example, Milošević was firstly seen 
as a grey bureaucrat pushed by Ivan Stambolić, and later on developed 
his charismatic identity to become most powerful Yugoslav politician 
after Tito. When he was sure to be transferred to the Scheveningen 
detention unit, former Serbian president started working on a self-
victimization in order to acquire situated identity of martyr. Milošević’s 
arrest on April 1st 2001 was a grand opening of his ‘ICTY tragedy’ filled 
with absurd surreal elements. The special police unit action that lasted 
for several hours was a cheap show intended to provoke catharsis 
among the audience. This live coverage did not have functional but 
symbolic relevance, as it tried to “clean” the society from its difficult 
past.  
On the other side, Slobodan Milošević constructed his situated 
identity as a part of worldwide conspiracy against the Serbian people. 
He represented himself as a chosen martyr of a chosen people, who 
should not bother to prove not being guilty, but should announce a 
general “j’accuse” against the international community. Milošević’s 
defence was based on justifying his ruinous politics as an expression of 
“people’s will” and “state interests”. In his opening statement he 
stressed that “…this show which is supposed to take place under the 
guise of a trial is actually a crime against a sovereign state, against the 
Serb people, against me.” (Armatta, 2010) Therefore he sought to 
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transform the trial into discussion about the responsibility for the war 
and dissolution of Yugoslavia.  
Vojislav Šešelj prepared with much attention his “heroic 
departure” to The Hague Tribunal. During a massive rally organized 
by Serbian Radical Party (SRS) held on February 23 2003, Šešelj stated 
to be “convinced” to defeat the ICTY.41 The difference in attitudes 
between Milošević and Šešelj was quite evident: Šešelj spoke out loudly 
what Milošević thought silently. Therefore, he did not opt for martyr 
image management, but chose caricatured image of Serbian knight 
ready to fight for “honourable cross and golden freedom”.42 Šešelj 
could avoid the indictment of the ICTY by laying the blame to the State 
Security Agency (Državna Bezbednost), Milošević, Martić and 
Karadžić, but remained locked in his nationalistic hero role. 
Nevertheless, he changed his behaviour when the ICTY Trial Chamber 
wanted to assign him a defence counsel. The newly situated identity, 
“set up” in order to obtain the right of self-representation, was much 
more similar to a Milošević one.  
The image of martyr was proposed on two different levels: 
physical and mental. As mentioned before, mental one is a result of 
presumed aggression and complot international community exercised 
against charismatic leaders. Physical level was expressed by “stoic” 
sufferance necessary for fulfilments of indictees’ requests. Milošević 
refused to follow the medical cure assigned doctors gave him, and 
when he died in detention unit from heart attack on 11 March 2006, 
there was a large debate surrounding his presumably provoked death. 
                                                                
41 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3fMSKdqCnS8 
42 Citation from Ivan Mazuranic’s epic poem ‘Smrt Smail-age Cengica’. Relates to heroic 
resistance and values any knight is ready to die for 
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Šešelj started a hunger strike as a sign of protest for not being accepted 
as litigant in person. Gandhi’s methods proved to be successful for 
Šešelj, although image of empty spoon had a completely different 
symbolical function for Šešelj when he threatened to use it to kill 
Croats.43 
Bass suggests that charismatic leaders possess high levels of 
self-esteem that helps them sustain a confident image in public even in 
hard times. During the Dayton Peace Agreement negotiations, Balkan 
warlords felt so untouchable in their new role as “peace makers” and 
“pillars of the peace process” that they filed to bargain for guarantees 
for immunity against any future proceeding at the Tribunal, in 
exchange for their signatures. (Klarin, 2005) Years before being 
arrested, the leader of SRS was making telephone calls to the ICTY in 
front of journalists expressing the “wish” to be indicted and sent 
among “Serbian heroes in The Hague casemate”.44  
The final step in the leader identification process is a leader’s 
self-promotion, which has to be monitored and limited since he has to 
represent ideally “one of us”. According to Anderson, self-monitoring 
represents the ability to pick up cues from followers regarding their 
needs and aspirations and to implement them into leader’s message. 
Even though the ICTY has the task to prosecute individuals responsible 
for war crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and 
national interest of every successor country is to condemn crimes, the 
                                                                
43 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5g8YifGqiA; Some twenty years ago, Šešelj 
became notorious in media for having allegedly boasted of “tearing out the eyes of Croats 
with rusty spoons”. 
44 Dejan Anastasijevic, ‘Fatalna privlacnost “antisrpskog kazamata”’, Vreme, number 943, 
January 29, 2009 
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Serbian nation still lives in the state of denial vis-à-vis Serbia’s 
responsibility in war. Such atmosphere in the society, where the 
majority normally hates the ICTY45, was a fertile ground for myth 
making. Proverbial proud defiance, stubbornness and self-presentation 
were traditionally believed to be characteristics of a “model Serbian”. 
Consequently, collective identity was built on the same principles 
putting Serbia alone against major Western states – a detail that 
deserved the classification of “chosen people”. Among their followers, 
both Milošević and Šešelj were considered representatives of chosen 
people, modern actors in Heavenly Serbia’s saga.46 New element of 
their “situated identities” is sufferance, resulting from the exogenous 
“bad treatment”, but also because of the betrayal on the national level.   
The next step we need to explain in this tragic myth making is 
leaders’ motivation. House argues that an exceptionally high need for 
power explains why charismatic leaders develop the persuasive skills 
to influence others and to gain satisfaction from leading. In our case it 
is difficult to assert that Milošević and Šešelj were convinced in the first 
place that they would ever leave the detention unit, and even if they 
would, it is quite unlikely that they were thinking about regaining 
power in Serbia upon their release. Therefore, the drive for power is, in 
our opinion, not a relevant motivational element. Another proposed 
variable is McClelland’s “activity inhibition” (McClelland, 1985), i.e. the 
use of available power to achieve institutional or social goals. The 
                                                                
45 
http://www.bgcentar.org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=358%3A
stavovi-prema-ratnim-zloinima-hakom-tribunalu-i-domaem-pravosuu-za-ratne-zloine-
&catid=125&Itemid=1 
46 Myth of Heavenly Serbia was created to explain the defeat of Serbian army in battle of 
Kosovo. Allegedly, the Serbs chose to save their souls instead of winning the battle.  
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higher the activity inhibition level, the more leaders are seen as 
trustworthy and self-sacrificing. Vojislav Šešelj stayed within the frame 
of Greater Serbia ideology which foresees the Serbian state constituted 
by all territories where Serbs are majority. He structured the attitude of 
constant defiance in the courtroom for the sake of spreading and 
preaching the idea of Greater Serbia. Similarly, Slobodan Milošević 
depicted that everything he did was for the sake of Serbia. Even during 
the trial he never tired of “patriotic discourse” stating that Serbia never 
participated in the war, but was just defending its national interests.  
More leaders’ goals are idealized and utopian; amount of 
charisma attributed to the leader grows (Conger, 1989). Conger 
describes idealized “vision” as mental image of desirable future that 
followers accept. Followers are more devoted to the leader who 
provides them with more meaningful goals and consequently, provides 
them with a deeper sense of purpose. In the former Yugoslavia, 
ambitious leaders saw their chance in fragile political structure and 
therefore reinforced nationalistic propaganda. Thus, almost 25 years 
after Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts published its 
Memorandum,47 ideas of a modern Serbian state of all Serbs still attracts 
considerable number of supporters.  
The next chapter tries to explain the mechanisms of charismatic 
relationship between leader and followers, applied to Milošević and 
Šešelj’s ICTY context. How is their “on-stage” behaviour influencing 
                                                                
47 Nationalistic tendencies in Serbia were explicitly revealed in 1986 Memorandum of the 
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art (SANU) signed by number of academics and 
culturally influential persons. Resentment centred on the federal system which the 
authors of the memorandum claimed had been devised to strip Serbia of its legitimate 
jurisdiction over Montenegro and much of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, there was also 
resentment in connection with the autonomous province of Kosovo. 
 112 
 
myth making? What are the team performances necessary for their long 
lasting charisma? And finally, what are the practical outcomes present 
in the society? 
This chapter deals with dynamic relationship between 
charismatic leaders and their followers, which is how their play is set 
up and performed. Socially constructed reality proposed by leaders 
and accepted by followers is the frame in which the act is realized. 
Milošević and Šešelj built their power on the streets, organizing mass 
rallies in search for the people’s support. Team performance aiming to 
mobilize the masses was persistent, carefully prepared event of 
“happening of the people”.48 Economic and political crisis that marked 
Milošević’s rise to the power helped him underline the importance of 
ethnic belonging and national tradition in the former Yugoslavia. A 
leader certainly has the choice whether to deal with the problems in a 
productive manner or to create fear and hate and direct major 
frustrations of his people against specific groups.  
The revival of national myths started with vast Serb 
processions with a high concentration of Serbian imaging and 
symbolism of domination. Nationalism found a fertile soil due to many 
historical reasons. Except for a period of the later Middle Ages, it was 
not until the late 19th and 20th centuries that Yugoslav countries 
became independent. Having missed the nation building that other 
societies experienced, Yugoslavs were always insecure in their cultural 
and political status and constantly compensating by insisting 
pathetically on their chosen superiority. Milošević succeeded in 
                                                                
48 “The happening of the people” was a term for protests organised by Milošević’s 
supporters. Its name was taken from a writer Milovan Vitezović’s speech during one of 
rallies.  
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disabling the transition from the post-communist society into the 
democratic one by reducing politics to the Serbian people’s striving for 
survival. Milošević left a legacy of political rule that was backed largely 
on use of mythology, history and political symbols in order to maintain 
power. Subsequent Serbian elites have failed to pursue policies that 
diverged significantly from the goals of their former leader. The 
political program that was proposed by the democratic opposition was 
never a real alternative to the Socialistic Party of Serbia. This was 
primarily because the opposition tried to beat Milošević on the national 
card, but without having an alternative national program. It was 
therefore predictable that Radical leader Vojislav Šešelj would have 
been the only serious rival to Milošević and the SPS, especially when 
the economic situation became the dominant theme in Serbian society.  
Milošević and Šešelj based their leadership on distancing 
themselves from other “politicians”,49 defined as such in the pejorative 
sense of the word. Their rhetoric was crafted on “national interests” 
and not on policies: Milošević converted the war into a great Serbian 
victory or neutralized it to a complete denial of atrocities committed by 
Serbian side, while Šešelj stood further on populist extreme right 
proposing the pursue of Greater Serbia dream. An interesting parallel 
could be drawn on national and personal level behaviour. Serbian 
politics under Milošević passed “secretly” from defensive nationalism 
centred on Kosovo Serbs under Kosovo Albanian communist 
administration, to an affirmation of aggressive nationalism. Contrarily, 
on a personal level, both Milošević and Šešelj, once transferred to the 
                                                                
49 Term “politician” acquired a negative connotation in public space 
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ICTY, have passed a long road from legitimizing the violence to auto-
victimization.  
Slobodan Milošević tried to transform the trial against him into 
an ideological discussion about responsibility for the outbreak of war 
and dissolution of Yugoslavia. Living the myth of martyr, his role was 
to depict the process as an accusation to his historical figure of the 
leader of Serbs. Unfortunately, the ICTY was neither ready nor willing 
to play a political game, but tried Milošević as individual, responsible 
not for the war intended as some kind of evil mystical product, but for 
very precise and concrete war crimes. Milošević was held individually 
responsible for the crimes alleged against him, and for the crimes or 
omissions of his subordinates. He was charged for the crimes 
committed in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity and violations of laws or customs of war. Moreover, 
he was not charged for ending up Yugoslavia, but for being a war 
criminal. Consequently, he avoided speaking at any cost about war 
crimes. Milošević stated that he had no intentions to deal with the “fake 
indictment”, or to communicate with “fake court”. On August 30th 2001 
he said the following: "I want to remind you, I'm not recognizing this 
tribunal, considering it completely illegitimate and illegal, so all those 
questions about counsels, about representations, are out of any 
question."50 
Vojislav Šešelj had same attitude matrix towards the ICTY. In 
his opening statement he declared to consider The Hague court “illegal 
and illegitimate” and founded upon “dictate of the United States of 
                                                                
50 Simon Jennings, Institute for war and peace reporting, Self representation under 
scrutiny, November 6th 2009 
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America.”51 He went further in accusing the ICTY by calling it anti-Serb 
Tribunal that falsified genocide in Srebrenica. Such extreme rhetoric 
was motivated furthermore by the problem Prosecutor was facing 
regarding Šešelj’s indictment. That is to say, Šešelj, unlike other 
indictees, never had any control of the army and formally, he did not 
take part in the government when the crimes were committed. Still, 
Šešelj is charged on the basis of individual criminal responsibility with 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, deportation, 
inhumane acts, murder, torture, cruel treatment and other violations of 
the laws or customs of war52. 
The apparent lack of communication between the accused and 
representatives of the ICTY was foreseeable and used in function of 
myth making. Nevertheless, modern martyrs, victims of imperialistic 
complots, despite a desire to seem extremely emotional and impulsive, 
calculated well their reactions. Milošević held long political speeches 
that supposed to convince the audience of his innocence. Šešelj’s 
hunger strike was the only possible communication he could perform 
in order to get from the Tribunal what he wanted, but at the same time 
contributed to his representation of victim.   
Former leaders’ tragedy was staged in a way it resembles a theatrical 
play. Every ICTY’s courtroom is disposed in semi circle with material 
separation between the audience and the stage. Costumes are chosen 
carefully: the ICTY representatives wear robes and occasionally wigs, 
while Milošević had always red tie as a sign of his socialist ideology. 
                                                                
51 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-
article.php?yyyy=2007&mm=11&dd=08&nav_id=45217 
52 http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/cis/en/cis_seselj_en.pdf 
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His behaviour was symbolic as well: to show how much he despised 
the Tribunal, Milošević refused to address the ICTY representatives in a 
proper way (he called the presiding judge of the Trial Chamber “Mister 
May”) and refused to stand up while talking.  
During his political career, Milošević could rely on his party, 
but also the entire communist heritage. He counted also on other forms 
of power such as army and police; however his success was made 
possible only by exercising a media monopoly. It was precisely the 
media that diffused the image of a victorious Serbia guided by the great 
leader. Another virtual reality was created, where every connection 
with real life was busted. Milošević continued playing in this parallel 
dimension in the courtroom as well. He symbolically refused to 
appoint an attorney, but his performance functioned on a larger, 
metaphorical level as well. Milošević was trying to change the past in 
order to regain the attention of the imagined future audiences that 
would contemplate the historical record of his trial.  
Šešelj’s performance was full of excessive statements that 
developed to a level of non ethical comedy. Leader of the Serbian 
Radical Party insulted many ICTY representatives, but almost never 
judge Antoinetti who was largely criticized of fulfilment of many of 
Šešelj’s absurd requests. Šešelj claimed that the right to self-
representation cannot be denied in the “civilized world”, although it is 
by no mean “an absolute right”.53 He succeeded in obtaining it only 
                                                                
53 By rules and procedures In accordance with Article 21 of the Statute, an accused person 
may elect to represent himself in person. While this right is not unlimited, in several 
ICTY cases, Chambers have recognised the right to self-representation and allowed the 
accused to conduct their own defence. In those cases, the Tribunal, through the Registrar, 
ensures the provision of adequate facilities to the self-represented accused, including the 
assignment of legal advisers and other support staff to assist the self-represented accused 
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after two months of hunger strike, but self-representation prolonged 
largely time spent in the courtroom. His long political rallies simply 
continued, depicting incredible Western complot against Serbian 
people that detained him, fervent fighter for justice, illegally. Šešelj 
included a myriad of his books as evidence exhibits, had inspiration to 
make jokes and generally, behaved as someone who is greatly amused. 
The atmosphere was frequently that of a football game, where Šešelj 
played against the ICTY and the audience “back home” was cheering 
for him. Vojislav Šešelj protested on several occasions against his 
indictment, calling it “extremely unserious”54 and accusing the ICTY 
for not having a fair trail because of the rather long process, 
additionally extended because the indictee conducted his own defence. 
Those statements contributed pretty much in creating an image of 
unlawfully detained victim that was imprisoned because of verbal 
offenses.  
The general impression regarding the ICTY trials is the missed 
opportunity to question impartially events from the past and to 
understand the consequences of the politics of the 1990s. 
Unfortunately, due to the detainees’ shows and performances, backed 
with the majority of media, a wider audience became convinced that 
the entire Serbian people were accused. Manipulation of the media was 
feasible because of the low interest of the population in case law and 
                                                                                                                                            
in the preparation of his case, privileged communication with certain categories of 
defence team members, photocopying and storage facilities. Furthermore, in line with an 
Appeals Chamber decision in one of the cases involving a self-represented accused, the 
Registrar adopted a special Remuneration Scheme for persons assisting indigent self-
represented accused. A provision was also made for the assignment of an investigator, a 
case manager and a language assistant where necessary, to assist with translation. 
54 http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/sudi-mi-nelegalni-i-nelegitimni-sud.html 
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the functioning of the Tribunal, and was additionally reinforced since 
the majority is politically illiterate. Still, for the ICTY to fulfil its broader 
mandate of contributing to peace and reconciliation it had to ensure 
that its “investigative and judicial work … [is] known and understood 
by the people in the region.”55 However, during the first six years of the 
ICTY’s functioning the lack of resonance within the affected 
communities due to non existence of an outreach section resulted in 
broad misconceptions and understanding of it. The fact that the 
Outreach programme is still not part of the main budget of the Tribunal 
shows that some people in the UN Headquarters in New York 
apparently still do not realize the importance of its task. 
The legal professionals took public relations either for granted 
or as not being their concern; they were also mainly interested in the 
development of International Humanitarian Law; that is in “the rules of 
the game” instead of “the actual content of the game”. Even ten years 
after creation of ICTY over 60% of the population in former Yugoslav 
Republics did not know what laws govern war crimes and 66% had not 
received any information about the kind of crimes for which one can be 
indicted (Cibelli, Kristen and Guberek, 2000). Therefore, even though 
interest in the Milošević trial was huge, people remained uninformed 
and biased. Milošević’s behaviour during the four year trial provoked a 
lack of confidence in Tribunal itself, in the fairness and efficacy of the 
processes. Vojislav Šešelj had and still has big support of followers of 
the SRS that actively promote his release. Still some university 
professors, politicians and public figures often diffuse false information 
                                                                
55 Judge McDonald, ‘Outreach Symposium Marks the First Successful Step in Campaign 
for Better Understanding of the ICTY in the Former Yugoslavia’, 1998 
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about the functioning of the ICTY and about the indictment issued 
against Šešelj.  
Justice, though, cannot be bargained for the truth, since both of 
them are relevant elements for facing the past. International 
humanitarian law through the ICTY is trying to lift the burden of 
collective guilt from the nations in whose names violations were 
carried out, by tying the violations to specific individuals who bear 
criminal responsibility. Still, a clear distinction between collective 
responsibility and collective guilt should be made. Every nation in the 
conflict bears collective responsibility for the acts its individuals 
committed in helping or not preventing them of doing so, while no 
nation can be named a “criminal nation”.56 All the criminals are 
individuals or were participating as a criminal group or organization.  
A noticeable shift in attitudes towards ICTY came only after the 
June 2005 showing of a video on Serbian television which implicated 
Serb paramilitaries in the Srebrenica atrocities. The showing set into 
motion an “avalanche” of diverse public reactions. Following the 
broadcast, some SRS deputies stepped up their attacks on media outlets 
and organizations they declared were “enemies of the people,” 
maintaining that the massacre photographs were an insult to the 
dignity of the Serbian people. Ever since the showing of the Srebrenica 
video, something has fundamentally changed in Serbia, the “wall of 
                                                                
56 “Zločinačkih naroda i nikada, baš nikada, ne može cijeli jedan narod biti odgovoran i 
kriv za ono što su počinili pojedini njegovi pripadnici, ili organizirane skupine – ma kako 
velike i brojne bile. Postoje individualni zločinci, postoje i zločinačke skupine i 
organizacije, ali – kažem još jednom – zločinačkih naroda nema”. Croatian President 
Mesić’s speach on 8th February 2007 
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denial… began to crack… [and] Serbs are becoming … more sober after 
being drunk all these years of wars.”57  
The denial of the crimes is structured in a very postmodern 
way. One can either believe that the ICTY’s facts about the war crimes 
are true or not. We speak about two different versions that one can 
chose or not. First one follows the myths created in the courtrooms, and 
closes eyes in front of evident proofs. Already in 1964 Radomir 
Konstantinović stated that the endurance of the nationalist myths 
cannot be adequately understood without recognizing the baleful role 
regressive provincialism plays in Yugoslavia. As far as we go away 
from the reality, there is more and more need for violence. Therefore, 
political myths created around individuals responsible for the grave 
breaches of the international law will not vanish once all the alleged 
perpetrators are brought before the face of justice. Increasingly present 
urban violence, illegal detentions and nationalistic movements have a 
lot in common with war criminals considered heroes. The current state 
of denial present in the society will persist as long as the past is not 
confronted in a serious way in order to know the truth.  
The lack of active charismatic leaders and the end of the era of 
strong “social bandits”, as Hobsbawsn called them, turns the ideals into 
absurd reality. Almost fifteen years after the end of war, general 
attention started to turn slowly towards real social problems, such as 
poverty and class injustice. General atmosphere in the society showed, 
to some extent, saturation with topics like “Heavenly Serbia” and other 
myths of “chosen people”. Šešelj and Nikolić, as well as Milošević and 
                                                                
57 Barry Wood, ‘Serbs Slowly Come to Terms with Srebrenica Massacre’, VOA News, 13 
July 2005 
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Dačić followed very similar ideological doctrine, but the later, actively 
present in Serbian political life, lack the charisma.  
Charismatic characters are likely to be created in the time of 
major crisis. If the contextual situation is favourable, i.e. audience is in a 
need for strong characters, the mechanism of charisma construction is 
triggered easily. Charisma construction was used as a main strategy for 
Vojislav Koštunica’s arrival on political scene as a key actor. Koštunica 
won the 2000 presidential elections against Slobodan Milošević. The 
democratic opposition he was representing had chosen him because he 
was relatively unknown to the wider public, and therefore they wanted 
to socially construct his charismatic identity during the electoral 
campaign. The main slogan used during the campaign was “Who can 
always look you in the eyes?” intended to depict Koštunica’s non 
corrupted and morally acceptable past, clean even from communist 
party membership. Following impression management, election 
posters showed only his eyes, which were described as magnetic and 
hypnotic. In public, the leader of Serbian Democratic Party (DSS), 
professor of law until he was removed from the faculty back in 1974 for 
opposing constitutional amendments, had a reputation of closed, 
serious and rigid politician. He represented a separate line within a 
wider Serbian democratic opposition parties as he was ready to 
compromises with Milošević and never rejected SPS’ legacy. Vojislav 
Koštunica succeeded Milošević not only within the time dimension, but 
he also continued prominence of illiberal, chauvinistic nationalism in 
Serbia. Nevertheless, his constructed charisma melted as a society was 
entering de facto democratic transition. His calls for any kind of 
mobilization were bland and unconvincing. 
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 The lack of openly nationalistic rhetoric led to absurd 
declarations nobody believed in. For example, in 2005, under strong 
pressure of European Union, the governing coalition partners guided 
by then Prime Minister Koštunica invited alleged war criminals at large 
to “be responsible and surrender”.58 His government was not willing 
and capable to deal with past, but was hiding at the same time behind 
“national interests” and “moral awareness”59 of Serbian people. 
Current Koštunica’s political ideas and rallies are following completely 
ideas left by Slobodan Milošević. Still, his party rapidly lost support of 
the wider electoral body and Koštunica himself is definitely deprived 
of any charisma. In 2008, when DSS turned out to be the loser of the 
parliamentary elections, Vojislav Koštunica had chosen campaign with 
important anti-European aptitude based solely on the slogan “Kosovo 
is Serbia”. But while in 1987 Slobodan Milošević started his political 
career calling for nationalism in Kosovo, twenty years later Koštunica 
was let down by new kind of nationalists who gave up on Kosovo for a 
pair of sneakers.60 
If there was to point out one person as the winner of Serbian 
parliamentary elections held on May 6th 2012 that would be Ivica Dačić, 
ex spokesman of Milošević’s Socialistic Party of Serbia. Only twelve 
years after the 5th October revolution that overthrown Milošević’s 
regime Ivica Dačić managed to recycle himself and the entire party he 
belonged to since its foundation. Surprisingly enough his victorious 
                                                                
58 International Crisis Group, Brifing za Evropu broj 39, 23,.05.2005.  
59 Milan Milošević, Ozbiljna kriza Kostunicine vlade, Vreme, broj 800. 04.05.2006. 
60 Protest against the Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence gathered small 
group of people that broke shop windows in Belgrade centre. One video filmed during 
the protest shows two young girls robbing sneakers from a non guarded shop 
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strategy was not focused on creation of charismatic leader, but rather 
on undermining any kind of distinction of distance and the common 
voters, “the people”.61 His political discourse focused on presenting his 
party as leftist, socialist, “on the side of those in need for social 
justice”.62 In order to erase any kind of resemblance of SPS lead by 
Milošević, Dačić openly admitted some of his previous errors when he 
apologised for “the mistakes from the 90s”.63 In addition, couple of 
politically incorrect statements depicted him as more human, prone to 
react as everybody else from the “audience”. Dačić used impression 
management techniques to underline his and his party continuity, 
dating back to Tito’s Communist League.64 He avoided skilfully to 
relate much to Milošević and preferred to use well known topos such as 
“October 5th” or “democratic changes” when speaking about the period 
when SPS lost the elections and power on the political scene.  
Tomislav Nikolić already had a long political experience within 
Serbian Radical Party when Šešelj was transferred to the ICTY in 2003. 
He was therefore chosen to lead the party. His early statements were in 
line with radical solution for Serbian question Šešelj was proposing; he 
pretended to protect the entire nation saying that “[n]o Serb or citizen 
of Serbia should ever be transferred to The Hague Tribunal”. 
Turbulence on the Serbian political scene caused by 2008 elections 
marked the need of SRS for modernization. Inner quarrels after the net 
defeat and lack of possibility to enter the government, provoked radical 
                                                                
61 Dačić used construct “the people” in every single rally of his, calling himself “the 
candidate of the people”  
62 Dačić: Jedino socijalisti na strain siromasnih, Dnevnik, 27.04.2012 
63 Ja se izvinjavam za greske iz devedesetih, Nedeljnik, 04.01.2012 
64 Dačić: Socijalisti su “nastavljaci Titove partije”, Politika, 23.04.2012 
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ideology “make-up”, necessary for the European future Serbia had 
chosen. Media supporting Nikolić rapidly “cancelled” his alleged war 
crimes past and “Greater Serbia” project. Once Vojislav Šešelj’s 
radicalism was judged incompatible with Serbia’s new image, Nikolić’s 
identity was socially constructed and “standardized”. He was 
presented as new (sic!) moderate current within Serbian Radical Party, 
with high moral principles.  Nikolić could not take over directly the 
party lead from Šešelj, thus he “recycled” himself in newly formed 
Serbian Progressive Party. Memory loss, symptomatic on the Serbian 
political scene, made the wider audience forget almost instantly 
Nikolić’s previous career as “Chetnik Duke”.  
Description of Koštunica’s and Nikolić attempt to “construct 
the charisma” inevitably demonstrates the failure of their intentions. 
According to the Gardner and Avolio’s theoretical framework 
charismatic leaders became such after interaction with the audience. In 
post war “democratic era” of Serbia, people, i.e. the electorate body, did 
not promote their leaders into charismatic ones. This statement leads us 
to a very important conclusion. It is not the genuine “lack of 
dramaturgical talent” that refused the attachment of charisma to 
Koštunica or Nikolić, but the lack of charismatic situation. Charisma is 
always strongly empowered by the crisis in the society, which in 
Milošević and Šešelj’s case was a decade of conflicts in Western 
Balkans. Nevertheless, none of them managed to be considered by any 
group “founding father of the nation”. Charisma was never 
“institutionalized”. Discourse about the nation and the state, despite 
being compelling, was never used by governing politicians in Serbia. In 
“democratic era” of Serbia, from 2000 elections onwards, Koštunica and 
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Nikolić had no power to mobilize the masses, which, on the other side, 
had no need to recognize their new saviours. Once the “scene 
decorations” were taken away from theatre and were replaced by the 
recognition of real life situations, charisma disappeared from the scene 
as well. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
DOMESTIC COURTS VS. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 
 
In recent years a number of analyses of so called transguidicial 
communication have been made, as the importance of comparative law 
grew steadily.  Relationship between different courts can be horizontal 
and vertical (De Vergottini, 2010). The former deals with tribunal of 
same level: i.e. relations between various state courts or supranational 
courts, while the latter studies relations between state and 
supranational courts. The conditionality established among compared 
court is subject to variations: we can speak about “direct dialogue” 
when a norm coming from supranational tribunal triggers a response at 
the domestic level, whereas De Vergottini names “indirect dialogue” 
the situation in which supranational tribunal causes reaction at 
domestic courts of various states. This research deals mainly with the 
indirect dialogue local courts in Croatia and Serbia have with the ICTY. 
Even though the judiciary of the cited states is of course independent, it 
is subject to influences from the ad hoc tribunal from The Hague. The 
international legal framework pushed national courts with a major 
responsibility to enforce norms of the international humanitarian and 
criminal law. In their research on Serbian War Crimes Chamber, Weill 
and Jovanović (2012) argue that “it has been hoped that the growing 
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practice of courts would gradually replace the political enforcement of 
international law”, i.e. that the international law would be incorporated 
into national legal orders which would serve primarily as agents of 
international legal system.  
In terms of readjustment of trials arriving at the national courts 
we trace two important steps: implementation of international norms 
and adaptation of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and 
legal reasoning for choosing older or more recent national Criminal 
Codes.  
 
5.1. READJUSTMENT ‘ICTY – DOMESTIC COURTS’ 
 
The ICTY, according to the Article 8 of its Statute, has the 
territorial jurisdiction over the territory of the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia for breaches of humanitarian law committed 
after January 1st 1991. In addition, Article 9 asserts that the ICTY and 
national courts have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute alleged war 
criminals, but it is The Hague tribunal who has primacy over national 
courts. It can request domestic jurisdiction to defer at any stage of the 
procedure if this proves to be in the interest of international justice. 
This fact, however, does not limit the competence of national courts in 
prosecuting individuals responsible for war crime, neither was it “the 
intention of the Security Council to preclude or prevent the exercise of 
jurisdiction by national courts.”65 In twenty years of existence, the ICTY 
has set new standard of human rights protection and dealing with 
                                                                
65 Report of the UN Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993)  
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violations of laws or customs of war, crimes against humanity and 
genocide. It traced the path for the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court and other ad hoc tribunals, but also set a new standard for 
domestic courts in the region of the former Yugoslavia.  
During the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and in the period of 
Milošević and Tudjman’s regimes, trials for war crimes in Croatia and 
Serbia happened very sporadically, ending almost unanimously in 
acquittals. The impunity backed by political power and unanswered 
question of responsibility for war crimes, created issues of double 
standards for guilt – that of “our” and “ their” individuals. In Croatia, 
even in the case of most severe violations of humanitarian law done by 
members of Croatian Army or other military formation, the 
perpetrators were rarely punished, whereas the trials against other 
warring party members were conduct mostly in absentia and without 
basic elements of right to fair trial. On the other hand, trials held in 
Serbia prior to the establishment of War Crimes Chamber were based 
on incomplete indictments, where acquittals resulted often from the 
lack of evidence. In both countries, legal standards were corrupted by 
the interference of other branches of government, generally legislative, 
and by the lack of competence for dealing with such severe judicial 
processes. After the war there was no systematic lustration process and 
thus many elements of the previous state structure were not clear and 
publically contemned, which resulted in poor investigation of the past 
war crimes.  
New democratic regimes established in Croatia and Serbia after 
the year 2000 traced the path towards more systematic and competent 
trials for war crimes. Political environment did permit the ICTY to act 
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according to the Rule 11bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and 
hand over certain number of cases to authorities of the Yugoslav 
successor states. This so called “back referral” strategy proved domestic 
ability – lege artis – to perform trials at local courts. In Serbia the 
establishment of the WCC was seen as a strengthening element of the 
government, mostly because the public attitude towards the ICTY was 
extremely negative, and the preferred strategy was the one of 
transferring trials back home. Similarly, transfer of trails in Croatia was 
considered to be some sort of political victory, as it reconfirmed 
successful transition and capacity of the judicial, but also moved the 
public sphere’s attention from the supposedly biased anti-Croatian 
Tribunal from The Hague. Once a case before the ICTY is judged to be 
transferred to the local courts, the War Crimes Prosecutor in Serbia or 
Croatia changes the indictment and adjusts it to a domestic legal 
system, accepting the evidence gathered at the ICTY. Moreover, the 
accusations presented before the ICTY are ultimately changed, mostly 
due to incompatibility of the case law; for example, crimes against the 
humanity and command responsibility, which did not exist in domestic 
Criminal Code prior to 1990s when those crimes were committed.  
 
5.2. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY  
 
The work of UN created ad hoc Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda has reaffirmed the status of international 
criminal law as customary law, recognized previously within the 
principles of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg. The mission of the ICTY is to persecute and judge 
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individuals accused of perpetrating war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 
1991.  
Currently, the ICTY is approaching the end of its mandate and 
has undertaken the completion strategy. After all, the ICTY will have 
adjudicated only a relatively small number of cases involving the most 
serious crimes by the time it ceases operating. All other war crimes 
cases, whether initiated domestically or referred back from the ICTY, 
are supposed to be tried by national courts in the states of the former 
Yugoslavia.  
This research focuses on the development of legal persecution 
of crimes against humanity – from its basic definition to the full 
implementation into judiciary systems of BiH, Croatia and Serbia. 
Topic seemed interesting to the author because of the “domestic 
element” of crimes against humanity, first transposed and described 
within the Nuremberg Charter under the section of “crimes against 
peace”, and then consequently “brought back” to national legal 
systems. Choice of analysed cases is not casual, as it was precisely the 
ICTY that gave the biggest contribution to the international criminal 
law in the field of crimes against humanity. Once places of war 
atrocities, Yugoslav successor states have finally started establishing 
the rule of law and reformed their Criminal Codes.  
Traumatic legacies from the past have to be dealt with in order 
to build a stable future; special attention should go to the needs and 
rights of people including in particular victims; and only a 
comprehensive approach will rebuild trust among citizens and 
between citizens and the state. So far, the focus has been on prosecution 
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of war crimes. Transition towards stable democracy and strengthening 
of the rule of law in all post-Yugoslav states was not possible without 
justice and accountability for the committed crimes. Accountability for 
crimes committed during armed conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia should 
lead to re-establishment of peace and prevention of future breaches of 
international humanitarian law, in addition to the impediment of 
revisionism and bringing justice to victims.   
 
5.2.1. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY – HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
Crimes against humanity are mass crimes committed against a 
civilian population. Most serious is the killing of entire groups of 
people, which is also characteristic of genocide. Crimes against 
humanity are broader than genocide: they need not target a specific 
group, but a civilian population in general. Thus they also include 
crimes against political or other groups. Also, unlike genocide, it is not 
necessary for the perpetrator to intend to destroy a group, as such, in 
whole or in part.  
The classical law foundations of crimes against humanity have 
the roots in the laws of war. Treaties like the Hague Conventions have 
been widely accepted by “all civilized nations” before exact definition 
of crimes against humanity and, thus, were by then part of the 
customary laws of war and binding on all parties.  
The term “crimes against humanity and civilization” was used 
for the first time in a 1915 declaration of Great Britain, France and 
Russia regarding Turkish massacres of Armenians.66 Nevertheless, it 
                                                                
66 http://www.armenian-
genocide.org/Affirmation.160/current_category.7/affirmation_detail.html 
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was not until the Nuremberg Charter and trials before International 
Military Tribunal for Germany that international law recognized and 
prosecuted crimes against humanity.  
The definition of crimes against humanity is particularly 
difficult to describe. Scholars, judges, and diplomats addressing this 
issue since 1945 have reached various conclusions regarding its 
required elements. International criminal justice requires the 
demarcation of a sphere of jurisdiction distinct from the domestic 
sphere. Most of the single crimes that are enclosed within the definition 
of crimes against humanity are punishable under the domestic law of 
“civilized” states. Their sovereignty to deal with crimes at inner level is 
revoked in the case of crimes against humanity because of the 
conviction that such crimes violate not only the individual victim but 
all of humanity. Crimes against humanity must therefore draw a clear 
distinction between an inhumane act of domestic concern and one that 
rises to the level of an international crime. Perpetrator’s knowledge of 
committing or participating in a widespread or systematic attack 
against civilians is the key element that transforms a domestic crime 
into crime against humanity.  
International criminal law protects “peace, security and well-
being of the world” as the fundamental values of the international 
community. International criminal law is thus based on a broad 
concept of peace, which means not only the absence of military conflict 
between states, but also the conditions within a state. Therefore, a 
threat to world peace can be presumed even as a result of massive 
violations of human rights within one state. Moreover, inflicting the 
punishment for crimes against humanity in not the only purpose 
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international criminal law is aware of.  The definition of crimes against 
humanity must include general goals of international criminal law such 
as the reaffirmation of international legal order and deterrence. By 
doing so, international legal system gives the voice to the victims and 
reassures the absence of impunity for high ranked perpetrators. Former 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan underlined the importance of 
international criminal law recognition: "There can be no global justice 
unless the worst of crime-crimes against humanity-are subject to the 
law."67 
Crimes against humanity were first explicitly formulated as a 
category of crimes in Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter. Article 6 of 
the Nuremberg Charter contains three types of crimes: crimes against 
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.68 While the 
                                                                
67 See United Nations Conference of Plenopotentiarieso n the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, http://www.un.org/icc 
68 ARTICLE 6 The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof 
for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries 
shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the 
European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations, 
committed any of the following crimes.  
 The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility: (a) Crimes against Peace: 
namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;  
(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war.  Such violations shall 
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for 
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of 
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation 
not justified by military necessity;  
(c) Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the 
war,14 or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in 
violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders, organizers, 
instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution  
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criminalization of war crimes serves to protect the rights of foreign 
citizens, crimes against humanity include offences against one’s own 
citizens if crimes in question systematically targeted a specific civilian 
population. This innovative aspect initiated debate regarding its 
conformity with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. The principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege is not an obstacle to grounding criminality in 
customary law. Customary international law exists if actual practice 
(consuetude) can be found, based on a sense of legal obligation (opinio 
juris). Lack of legal precedent for this provision was justified by the fact 
that it was firmly rooted in general principles of law and therefore did 
not violate the principle of legality. The general principles of law are 
usually used in the absence of specific legal provisions or of custom, 
and the Statute of the International Court of Justice stipulated that 'the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations' constitute one 
of the sources of international law.  
Domestic crimes against one state’s own citizens entered for the 
first time in the frame of international law. Thus, international criminal 
law extended its competence over crimes for which domestic laws did 
not prevent prosecution. During the proceedings before International 
Military Tribunal, French prosecutor stated that “body of crimes 
against humanity constitutes,…, nothing less than the perpetration for 
political ends and in a systematic manner, of common law crimes such 
as theft, looting, ill treatment, enslavement, murders, and 
                                                                                                                                            
of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible 
for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan. 
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assassinations, crimes that are provided for and punishable under the 
penal laws of all civilized states”. 69 
Second international legal instrument that included a provision 
concerning crimes against humanity was. 70 The Control Council Law 
No. 10 definition of crimes against humanity differs in some significant 
aspects from the one contained in the Nuremberg Charter. First, it adds 
imprisonment, torture, and rape to the enumerated inhumane acts. 
Nuremberg Charter left space for those crimes under the clause “other 
inhuman acts”. Moreover, Control Council Law No. 10 clarifies that the 
enumerated acts are exemplary and not exhaustive of the inhumane 
acts that qualify as crimes against humanity. The most important 
novelty is that Control Council Law No. 10 eliminates the requirement 
that the acts be connected with war. Later on, when the ICTY Statute 
states, in Article 5, that a crime must occur “in armed conflict, whether 
                                                                
69 International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
70 Article II 
1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime: 
(a) Crimes against Peace. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression 
in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or 
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.  
(b) War Crimes. Atrocities or offenses against persons or property constituting violations 
of the laws or customs of war, including but not limited to, murder, ill treatment or 
deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose, of civilian population from 
occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, 
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, 
towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.  
(c) Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, 
racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country 
where perpetrated.  
(d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by 
the International Military Tribunal.  
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international or internal in character,” it is simply drawing a connection 
in place and time to the Yugoslavia conflict. This is by no means a 
reintroduction of the long-abandoned supplementary requirement of 
the Nuremberg Charter.  
Legal sources of international criminal law, namely 
international treaties, customary international law and general 
principles of law recognized by the world’s major legal systems, were 
further developed by establishment of Geneva Conventions. Of 
particular importance were the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 and the four 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, including the two Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977. At this point it is important to outline the 
difference between crimes against humanity and genocide. The major 
difference is that genocide requires the specific "intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."71 
Accordingly, genocide is often considered a sub-set of crimes against 
humanity because acts of genocide also generally constitute crimes 
against humanity.  
During the Cold War legal instruments for prosecuting crimes 
against humanity were barely used. In the early nineties violent war in 
the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda moves UN Security Council to 
create two international criminal Tribunals as “subsidiary organs”, 
which legal basis was not an international treaty, but a resolution of the 
UNSC on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
                                                                
71 Article 2 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html 
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In Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, the Security Council decided, 
“for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be 
determined… to adopt the Statute of the International Tribunal.”72 
ICTY’s Statute and case law is a milestone for the further development 
of international criminal law. Greatest achievement from the legal point 
of view is the assimilation of the scope of criminal law applied in 
international and in non-international armed conflict. In the new legal 
order, characterized by a great number of human rights conventions, 
state borders became no longer judicially inviolable. ICTY Statute 
accepts the concurrent jurisdiction of national courts. Collisions are 
resolved according to the principle that international courts take 
precedence: “The International Tribunal shall have primacy over 
national courts. At any stage of the procedure, the International 
Tribunal may formally request national courts to defer to the 
competence of the International Tribunal.”73 
Human rights abuses occurring within sovereign states are 
now considered the legitimate concern of the international community. 
The human rights-protecting function of international criminal law is 
especially clear for crimes against humanity, which criminalize 
systematic attacks on fundamental human rights, such as rights to life 
and physical integrity, to freedom of movement and human dignity. 
Crimes against humanity represent attack on the fundamental human 
                                                                
72 Full text available at: 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_827_1993_en.pdf 
 
73 http://www.icty.org/sid/7610 
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rights of a civilian population. The idea of humanity as the foundation 
of human rights protection and international criminal law is visible 
here. At present protection under criminal law is limited to so-called 
first generation human rights.  
In addition, the ICTY has in many respects added precision to 
the definitions of crimes against humanity and genocide.74 The 
definition contained in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute does not require a 
connection between the enumerated acts and an international armed 
conflict, though it does require a nexus with some sort of armed 
conflict. Moreover, the ICTY definition clarifies that discriminatory 
intent is required only for persecution and not for other inhumane acts. 
On 17 July 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court was adopted in plenary session with 120 votes. The ICC Statute 
is the core document of international criminal law today. Although the 
ICC definition binds only that institution, it also represents convincing 
evidence of the customary international law of crimes against 
humanity.  
                                                                
74 Crimes against humanity are described in the Article 5 of ICTY Statute:  
Article 5 
Crimes against humanity 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the 
following crimes 
when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and 
directed against 
any civilian population: 
(a) murder; 
(b) extermination; 
(c) enslavement; 
(d) deportation; 
(e) imprisonment; 
(f) torture; 
(g) rape; 
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) other inhumane acts. 
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Article 7 of the ICC Statute enumerates crimes against 
humanity.75 ICC Article 7(1) describes individual acts that become 
crimes against humanity when they are committed in the course of the 
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. First 
important element is that crimes against humanity no longer contain 
any nexus with armed conflict, whether internal or international. The 
decision to reject a requirement of a nexus with armed conflict 
evidences the erosion of the traditional approach to state sovereignty.  
Gradual spreading of competences for prosecution of crimes 
against humanity demonstrates that the definition of crimes against 
humanity has evolved to include only two chapeau elements: 1) the 
existence of a widespread or systematic attack; 2) against a civilian 
population. Article 7(1) of the ICC Statute explicitly provides that the 
                                                                
75 ICC statute: Article 7 
Crimes against humanity 
1.         For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:  
(a)     Murder;  
(b)     Extermination;  
(c)     Enslavement;  
(d)     Deportation or forcible transfer of population;  
(e)     Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law;  
(f)     Torture;  
(g)     Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;  
(h)     Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds 
that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection 
with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court;  
(i)     Enforced disappearance of persons;  
(j)     The crime of apartheid;  
(k)     Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
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perpetrator must act “with knowledge” of the attack on the civilian 
population. This so called mental element de facto distinguishes acts of 
domestic criminal law domain from those punishable under 
international criminal law. Therefore the perpetrator must be aware 
that attack on a civilian population is taking place and that his action is 
part of this attack. The mental element requires intent and knowledge 
(Article 30 of ICC Statute) regarding the material elements of the crime, 
and including the contextual element. The crime thus affects not only 
the individual victim, but also international community as a whole. 76 
Contrary to the crime of genocide, not the entire population of 
a state or territory must be affected by the attack. Civilian character of 
the attacked population applies both in war and in peacetime. Most 
important in demonstrating membership in a civilian population is the 
victims’ need for protection. Hence present or former members of one’s 
own armed forces, in particular, who are not protected by international 
humanitarian law, can become direct objects of a crime against 
humanity (for example soldiers hors de combat).  
For crimes against humanity, one of the key elements such as 
context of organized violence consists of a widespread or systematic 
attack on a civilian population. The contextual element is formed from 
the sum of individual acts and attack itself is described as multiple 
commissions of acts of violence. The perpetrator does not need to act 
                                                                
76 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgment of October 1997, separate 
opinion of Judges Kirk McDonald and Vohrah, para. 21: “[R]ules proscribing crimes 
against humanity address the perpetrator’s conduct not only towards the immediate 
victim but also towards the whole of humankind… It is therefore the concept of 
humanity as a victim which essentially characterises crimes against humanity…Because 
of their heinousness and magnitude they constitute an egregious attack on human 
dignity, on the very notion of humaneness.” 
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repeatedly him or herself. A single act of intentional killing can 
constitute a crime against humanity if the single act fits within the 
overall context. 77 A military attack is not necessary nor is use of force 
against the civilian population, it is compulsory though to show its 
widespread or systematic character. “Widespread” describes 
quantitative element of attack. It can consist even of a single act, if a 
large number of civilians fall victim to it. The criterion of a “systematic” 
attack is qualitative in nature. It refers to “the organized nature of the 
acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence.” 78 
International criminal law is prosecuting individuals, but in the 
case of crimes against humanity the individual act follows a 
predetermined plan or policy. This provision was followed as well by 
the ad hoc Tribunals’ case law. Article 7(2)(a) of the ICC Statute 
requires that the attack on a civilian population be carried out 
“pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 
commit such attack.” Very important statement was made within the 
judgement in case Posecutor v. Tadic before ICTY’s Trial Chamber : 
“[S]uch a policy need not be formalized and can be deduced from the 
way in which the acts occur. Notably, if the acts occur on a widespread 
or systematic basis, that demonstrates a policy to commit those acts, 
whether formalized or not”.79 
                                                                
77 Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgment of 7 May 1997, para. 649: “[E]ven 
an isolated act can constitute a crime against humanity if it is the product of a political 
system based on terror or persecution.” 
78 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgment of 12 June 2002, para. 
94. 
78 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., ICTY (Appeals Chamber), judgment of 12 June 2002, para. 
94. 
 
79 Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), judgment of May 1997, para. 653.  
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Significant evidence for existence of plan to commit attack 
against civilians includes actual events, political platforms or writings, 
public statements or propaganda programs and the creation of political 
or administrative structures. The policy of a state or organization can 
consist of taking a leading role in commission of the crime, but also in 
actively promoting the crime or in merely tolerating it. The very act of a 
state looking away, refusing to take measures to protect the population, 
and failing to prosecute perpetrators can be effective tools in a policy of 
terror and extermination.  
Individual accountability makes it clear that it was not an 
abstract entity, such as state, that committed crimes under international 
law. But crimes under international law and wrongful acts by a state 
will often coincide. For example, the state-sponsored extermination of a 
group would justify both the criminal prosecution of the persons 
involved for genocide and the state’s duty to compensate the victims or 
their relatives. 
 In the territory of the former Yugoslavia, major part of the war 
crimes was committed by “next-door murderers”. The decisive motive 
for perpetrating the crime wasn’t individual conflict but belonging to a 
certain ethnic or religious group. Criminal accountability for crimes 
against humanity did not exist in the Criminal Code of Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Consequently, following the 
principle nullum crimen sin lege, individuals not tried before the ICTY 
could not be prosecuted for the crimes against humanity before 
domestic courts. Even though each of the signatories of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement committed itself to respect and cooperate with the 
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ICTY, the absence of laws that implement international criminal law 
created impunity gap. The punishment of the most serious crimes 
under international law should “make humankind conscious of the fact 
that international law is law and will be implemented against 
lawbreakers.”  The same should be considered also for domestic laws, 
especially of those countries that went through events that comprised 
massive breaches of humanitarian law. Next chapter deals with this 
specific issue and analyses new criminal codes of BiH, Croatia and 
Serbia.  
 
5.3. RULE 11BIS AND COMPLETION STRATEGY 
 
As explained in previous chapter, in the first ten years after the 
signing of Dayton Peace Agreement, individuals were tried for crimes 
against humanity committed during the wars in Croatia and BiH (1991-
1995) exclusively before the ICTY. Criminal codes of newly formed 
states did not have article that addressed crimes against humanity, as 
they all inherited SFRY ‘s Criminal Code from 1977.  
The prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide has been a hallmark of the past two decades of international 
law. However, the implementation of international law is still a delicate 
task essentially left to states. States together make the rules of 
international law and they implement international law within their 
own jurisdictions, demonstrating with their conduct that international 
law is effective. Prosecuting crimes against humanity at the local level, 
is of great importance, because this takes into consideration the broader 
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context in which such crimes were committed and the policies that 
motivated them. 
In general, national courts have a greater impact on the society 
and its values and benefits than international tribunals. Through 
national proceedings, societies more directly face their own problems 
and mistakes and learn from them. It has been argued that for example, 
national proceedings had a much stronger psychological and moral 
impact on population and contributed more to the denazification of the 
Germany than Nuremberg and other international trials.80 
 ICTY formulated officially its “Completion Strategy” in United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1503 (2003) and 1534 (2004). 
“Completion Strategy” is commonly understood as a transfer of 
intermediate or lower rank indicted persons from the ICTY to 
competent national jurisdictions. It is where the international 
community expects the former warring parties to demonstrate their 
membership of the group of democratic countries and their 
“capability” of acceding to the EU.81 At present, the ICTYs back referral 
is aimed at enhancing “the essential involvement of national 
governments in bringing reconciliation, justice and the rule of law in 
the region”.82 In order for the ICTY to refer proceedings it must be 
sufficiently assured of the domestic judiciary’s capability of conducting 
the proceedings fairly and adhere to internationally accepted 
                                                                
80 Ivan Šimonović, Dealing with the Legacy of Past War Crimes and Human Rights Abuses, 
2004 
81 Louis Aucoin and Eileen Babbitt, Transitional justice: Assessment Survey of conditions in 
the former Yugoslavia, June 2006   
82 Assessment and Report of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Provided to the Security Council Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of 
Security Council Resolution 1534 (2004), UN Doc. S/2005/343, 25 May 2005, para. 12. 
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standards. Simultaneously, recipient state should uphold the 
international rule of law, prevent impunity and share the ICTY’s 
institutional knowledge and jurisprudence.  
Rule 11bis of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
provides for the transfer of cases, by order of the Trial Chamber, to 
domestic jurisdictions. So far thirteen individuals indicted by ICTY 
were brought under the competence of national courts of BiH, Croatia 
and Serbia. Rule 11bis covers also files of so-called “second category” 
that deals with individuals for whom ICTY investigation remained 
unfinished.  
Moreover, the Tribunal has amended its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence to allow direct petition by local actors to modify 
protective measures and thereby receive confidential material from the 
Tribunal’s archives. Through these and other measures, the ICTY has 
adopted a strategy of “continued legacy building” in the region of the 
former Yugoslavia that will facilitate the growth of local institutional 
capacity to handle the numerous cases that remain to be prosecuted 
and tried effectively. Thus, in its essence, the “Completion Strategy” is 
an unprecedented attempt to contribute to the development of the rule 
of law, both in the region of the former Yugoslavia and beyond. 
   
5.3.1. SERBIA 
 
Until July 1st 2003, when Law on Organization and 
Competence of Government Authorities in War Crimes Proceedings 
was issued, on war crimes trials in Serbia only provisions from 
Criminal Code Procedure and FRY Criminal Code were applied. The 
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Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) issued a 
report in October 2003, where it concludes that “the national judiciary 
lacks full capacity to conduct war crimes trials in accordance with 
universally adopted standards".  
Republic of Serbia’s Parliament adopted Law on Organization 
and Competence of Government Authorities in War Crimes 
Proceedings on July 1st 2003 and amended it on December 21st 2004. 
This law represents a milestone in cooperation with the ICTY and gives 
the possibility for credible trials.  Special legal institutions were 
established: Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor and Special 
Department for Adjudicating in Trials against Perpetrators of War 
Crimes. Within Ministry of Inner Affairs Special services for revealing 
war crimes were founded. Special Department for Adjudicating in 
Trials against Perpetrators of War Crimes consists of six professional 
judges, while its president is incumbent president of Belgrade District 
Court. This solution gave good results so far, as the quality of trials for 
war crimes is highly improved.  
2003 Law is applied for prosecution of alleged perpetrators of 
war crimes defined in Chapter XVI of Basic Criminal Law (Crimes 
against humanity and international law)83 and for acts described in 
Article 5 of ICTY Statute (Crimes against humanity). The amendment 
made in 2004 created a possibility for War Crimes Department to use 
evidences presented before the ICTY or collected during its 
                                                                
83 “Official Gazette SFRY", no.44/76, 36/77 - amend. 34/84, 37/84, 74/87, 57/89, 3/90, 38/90, 
45/90 - amend. i 54/90 and "Official Gazette FRY", no. 35/92, 16/93, 31/93, 37/93, 41/93, 50/93, 
24/94, 61/2001 and  "Official Gazette RS", no. 39/2003 
It is important to outline the absence of specific definition of crimes against humanity, as the 
Chapter XVI describes war crimes and genocide. It was only in 2006 that Serbia included precise 
definition of crimes against humanity into its Criminal Code. 
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investigation. This amendment was made in the process of legal 
harmonisation with ICTY Statute and especially its Rule 11bis.  
In the case of referral, the Prosecutor for war crimes can issue 
indictment based on the ICTY’s indictment. He can also use evidences 
transferred by the International Tribunal, even in the absence of back 
referral like in the case of “Zvornik” trial.84  
Finally, domestic jurisprudence of Serbia included crimes 
against humanity as single act in its new Criminal code of Republic of 
Serbia that came into force on January 1st 2006. Article 371 states that 
“[w]hoever in violation of the rules of international law, as part of a 
wider and systematic attack against civilian population orders: murder; 
inflicts on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
complete or partial extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, 
rape; forcing to prostitution; forcing pregnancy or sterilisation aimed at 
changing the ethnic balance of the population; persecution on political, 
racial, national, ethical, sexual or other grounds, detention or abduction 
of persons without disclosing information on such acts in order to deny 
such person legal protection; oppression of a racial group or 
establishing domination or one group over another; or other similar 
inhumane acts that intentionally cause serious suffering or serious 
endangering of health, or whoever commits any of the above-
mentioned offences, shall be punished by imprisonment of minimum 
five years or imprisonment of thirty to forty years.” 
From the description of the Article 371 of the Criminal code of 
Republic of Serbia it is clear that the legislator accepted the approach 
                                                                
84 For more information about this trial, see 
http://okruznisudbg.rs/content/2005/zvornik/view?searchterm=zvornik OR зворник 
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expressed in the Statutes of ICTY and ICTR and “imported” 
international criminal law provisions into domestic jurisprudence.  
 
5.3.2. CROATIA  
 
Until the end of 1991, in the Republic of Croatia, the principal 
relevant legal source of internal law relating to punishment of war 
crimes or important for it was the 1977 Criminal Code of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  It was then taken over in 1993 into the 
Croatian legal system as a Croatian law and later amended in content 
and renamed the Basic Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia. The 
Basic Criminal Code as adopted in April 1993 contained the applicable 
substantive standards for prosecution of crimes against international 
humanitarian law committed during the 1991 to 1995 armed conflicts. 
The offences in Articles 119 to 132 of the Criminal Code include most 
parts of the major crimes against international humanitarian law. 
Genocide and war crimes in various forms were specifically prescribed 
by the Criminal Code, whereas crimes against humanity were not 
included in the Criminal Code. An explicit element of most domestic 
crimes is that the prohibited acts are committed “in violation of the 
rules of international law.” 
In 1996 Croatia, being a signatory of Dayton Peace Agreement, 
had an obligation to issue Constitutional Act on Co-operation of the 
Republic of Croatia with the ICTY.  In 2003 Act on Application of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and Prosecution of Criminal 
Offences against International Laws of War and International 
Humanitarian Law came into force and triggered process of legal 
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harmonisation. It is worth mentioning that the 2003 Act has specific 
provisions supplementing domestic legislation and pertaining to the 
prosecution of war crimes, independently of the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
These provisions are also applicable for the prosecution of perpetrators 
of crimes committed during the war. Therefore, certain solutions were 
purposely created to facilitate the conduct, and improve the efficiency 
of proceedings for crimes of that period, particularly those referred to 
the national judiciary by the ICTY.  
Croatia is also bound by all the most important international 
conventions relating to war and humanitarian law, accepted by 
succession after gaining independence, including the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions on the protection of war victims and their two 1977 
Additional Protocols, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the 1968 Convention on the 
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity. Moreover, Article 140 of Constitution of the 
Republic of Croatia confirms that International agreements ratified by 
the Parliament are directly incorporated into the Croatian legal system 
and are superior to other laws.85  
Nevertheless, it was only in 2004 that Croatian legislation 
system included a separate offence of crimes against humanity in its 
Criminal Code, in a way which almost entirely follows the Rome 
                                                                
85 “International agreements concluded and ratified in accordance with the Constitution 
and made public, and which are in force, shall be part of the internal legal order of the 
Republic of Croatia and shall be above law in terms of legal effects.” Such a formulation 
clearly indicates which international contracts form part of the internal legal system, but 
it also clearly (a contrario) excludes international customary law from direct application. 
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Statute definition. 86 Still, acts committed during the 1991 to 1995 
conflict can only be prosecuted under the substantive law in force at the 
time. Even if new war crime provisions were adopted by Parliament, 
                                                                
86 “A person who, violating the rules of international law within the context of a broad or 
systematic attack aimed 
against civilian population, knowing about that attack, issues an order to kill another 
person; to impose living 
conditions upon certain civilian population for the purpose of complete or partial 
extinction, which living 
conditions could lead to the annihilation of that population; to conduct trafficking against 
a person, primarily 
woman or a child or to enslave a person for sexual exploitation in such a manner as to 
perform particular or all 
powers stemming from the ownership right over that person; to forcibly remove other 
persons from the area in 
which they legally reside, by way of expulsions or other forcible measures; to illegally 
confine a person or 
deprive of freedom in other manner to torture a person who was deprived of freedom or 
who is under 
surveillance in such a manner as to intentionally inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering against 
him/her; to force to prostitution, to rape a person or perform some other form of sexual 
violence against that 
person or to keep a woman, who forcibly got pregnant, intentionally imprisoned in order 
to influence the ethnic 
composition of a particular population; to prosecute another person in such a manner as 
to intentionally, and to a 
large extent, deprive that person of his/her fundamental rights, because he/she belongs 
to a certain group or 
community; to deprive other persons of their reproductive ability without their consent 
and what is not justified 
by medical reasons, to arrest other persons, keep them imprisoned or kidnap them, on 
behalf of, or with 
permission, support or consent of the state or a political organization, without afterwards 
admitting that those 
persons were deprived of freedom or to deny the information about the destiny of those 
persons or the place in 
which they are kept, or that, within the framework of an institutionalized regime of 
systematic oppression and 
domination of one racial group over another racial group or groups, and with the 
intention of maintaining such a 
regime, a person commits an inhuman act described in this Article or an act similar to one 
of those acts (the 
crime of apartheid), or a person who commits some of the above mentioned acts, shall be 
punished with a prison 
sentence of at least five years or a long term imprisonment.” 
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they cannot be applied to conduct during the Homeland War87 to the 
extent that they are more severe than the pre-existing law. However, 
Article 7.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides as 
an exception to the general prohibition against the retroactive 
application of criminal law “the trial and punishment of any person for 
any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was 
criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations.”88 
As a result, not even one indictment that contained crimes 
against humanity was ever issued in Croatia. However, it is hard to 
imagine a situation in which some forms of conduct qualified in 
international law as a crime against humanity (especially those listed in 
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute) could not be considered as one of the 
forms of war crime in Croatian legislation.  
In November 2003, extra-territorial jurisdiction of the county 
courts in Rijeka, Split, Osijek and Zagreb in matter of war crimes was 
established in addition to courts otherwise competent pursuant to the 
Law on Criminal Procedure. Moreover, Croatian police formed special 
department for war crimes and Office of the State Prosecutor named 
State Prosecutor for war crimes. The ICC Law allows the Chief State 
Prosecutor to initiate new proceedings in one of these four courts or to 
move an ongoing case to one of the four courts if the President of the 
Supreme Court gives his consent. Similarly to the Serbian case, Rule 
11bis of the ICTY Statute allows issuing of direct indictment, i.e. “State 
Prosecutor can, in base of evidences collected by ICTY, issue an 
                                                                
87 In Croatia, 1991-1995 armed conflicts are called Homeland War (Domovinski rat) 
88 European convention on Human Rights: 
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Eur_Convention/euroconv3.html  
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indictment without previous investigation or acceptance of the 
investigation judge.”89  
Croatia has since 1991 undertaken large-scale prosecution of 
war crimes. The overwhelming majority of proceedings were against 
Serbs for crimes against Croats and the vast majority of convictions 
were obtained against in absentia Serb defendants. Special competence 
and more neutral setting of abovementioned four county courts 
enabled better safeguard of the fair trial rights of accused, improved 
interests of justice and encouraged witnesses participation.  
In 2006, the first transfer from the ICTY to a special court was 
granted. Indictments against Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac were 
different form the ones that ICTY issued, as the ICTY indictment 
alleges the crime against humanity of persecution of Serb civilians, 
while crimes against humanity were not part of the Criminal Code 
during the conflict and hence are not used for charging in the Croatian 
indictment in this or other war crimes cases. Nevertheless, they were 
tried for war crimes as acts described in new Croatian Criminal Code 
are punishable in accordance with customary law  and other 
international agreements that Croatia ratified in past.  
 
5.3.3. REGIONAL COOPERATION AND BEYOND  
 
A regional meeting in November 2004 in Palić, hosted by the 
OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, provided an early 
opportunity to begin defining mechanisms for improving regional 
judicial co-operation in war crimes proceedings. The process of 
                                                                
89 http://www.icty.org/sid/97  
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regional co-operation begun in Palić continued in 2005 with meetings 
in Brioni (Croatia) and Mostar (Bosnia and Herzegovina). The Brioni 
meeting was attended at the level of ministers and deputy ministers of 
the three participating states. Since the Palić process started, important 
steps were taken and results achieved. For example regular and 
unimpeded exchange of evidence, information and expertise in war 
crimes proceedings among the judiciaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia and Serbia became finally a reality. Other bilateral agreements 
provide for obtaining evidence in one country upon the request of the 
authorities of the other as well as trying individuals in one country for 
acts committed on the territory of the other.  
Despite these positive steps, BiH, Croatia and Serbia’s legal 
framework continues to significantly limit inter-state judicial co-
operation. In large number of cases related to grave breaches of 
humanitarian law on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, crime was 
committed in one and the perpetrators and/or testimonies are in other 
state. It thereby facilitates impunity for those who committed war 
crimes on one state’s territory but remain outside it. All three 
neighbour countries prohibit the extradition of nationals and the 
transfer of proceedings for serious crimes such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. In Croatia, extradition is prohibited 
by Constitution, while in BiH and Serbia such orders are stated in the 
criminal codes.  
 Regional cooperation showed to be of extreme importance, like 
in case “Lora”, held before Split county court in Croatia, where Serbian 
and Croatian office of Prosecutor collaborated intensively. Crucial 
element of regional agreements is the fact that their application will 
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contribute to stop the praxis of impunity, created by legal barriers. Still, 
harmonization and stabilization of the regional cooperation is a must 
for successful future functioning of domestic courts for war crimes.  
Nevertheless, rule of law reforms and war crime trials are not 
sufficient for moral renewal of the society. Other non-legal transitional 
justice mechanisms must be taken into account, especially truth seeking 
and naming and shaming. Political, legal and executive institutions 
should show will and promptness to take the responsibility for serious 
war crimes prosecution. Tihomir Blaškić, ex chief commander of 
Bosnian Croats, sentenced before the ICTY to 45 years imprisonment at 
the first instance and 9 in the appeal trial, underlined himself the 
importance of war crime trials: “It would be horrible if the ICTY was 
never established, because then we would have lived in conviction that 
mass crimes, for which nobody is accountable, are possible.”90 
 
5.4. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Principle of legality in criminal law, so called rule nullum 
crimen, nulla poena sine lege, defined by both Croatian and Serbian 
Constitution, limits the norms of international law in case that both a 
crime and a penalty were not defined in domestic law when crimes 
were perpetrated. Thus, some provisions of international law are 
impossible to apply directly, but treaties and customary law standards 
can be included and used in broad interpretations of Criminal Codes of 
Croatia and Serbia. While the international courts such as the ICTY or 
                                                                
90 Mirko Klarin, The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia, 
Oxford, 2009 
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the ICJ (International Court of Justice) issue indictments made on 
doctrinal level, local courts concentrate on fact-finding and direct 
evidences. (Weill, Jovanović: 2012) 
One of the most discussed provisions coming from the 
international humanitarian law is the doctrine of command 
responsibility. The Article 7 of the ICTY Statute and especially its 
paragraph 391 allows Tribunal to indict individuals holding military or 
political positions of power if they were knowledgeable of crimes 
committed by their subordinates but failed to prevent those acts. 
Command responsibility with an organisation, either military or 
political, requires the existence of a superior – subordinate relationship. 
Moreover, the knowledge of superior about commission of crime or 
about a plan for such deed is necessary, although differently from the 
joint criminal enterprise doctrine, the superior need not to plan the 
crime or actively take part in its commission. That is, the joint criminal 
enterprise requires a contribution in committing crime, whereas 
command responsibility is established even on the ground of omission.  
                                                                
91 Article 7  
Individual criminal responsibility  
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted 
in the planning, preparation or execution of  a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the 
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.  
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or 
as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal 
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.  
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was 
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he 
knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had 
done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.  
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a 
superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in 
mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal determines that justice so requires.  
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To sum up, the alleged perpetrator need to be in control over 
the subordinates and not to enable them to commit crimes. The mens 
rea, i.e. knowledge about the crime or a risk of its commission, plays a 
crucial role in command responsibility norm, as the person in 
command, having acted by norms of conduct in case of war, if ignorant 
of act committed by her subordinates is not hold responsible for cited 
crimes. Up to date the most complete definition of command 
responsibility is codified in the Article 28 of the International Criminal 
Code Statute92, where the superior is punished not only for the 
omission, but also for the crimes of his subordinates. Command 
responsibility role intended as a guarantor was drawn back in The 
                                                                
92 Article 28 
Responsibility of commanders and other superiors 
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes 
within the 
jurisdiction of the Court:  
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be 
criminally responsible for  crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by 
forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control 
as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such 
forces, where: 
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the 
time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such 
crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the 
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), 
a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of 
his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where: 
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly 
indicated, that the subordinates were committing or  about to commit such crimes;  
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and 
control of the superior; and  
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her 
power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities for investigation and prosecution. 
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Hague Convention of 190793 Geneva Convention III of 194994 and 
Additional Protocol I of Geneva Convention95 where the duties of the 
superior are enlisted. All the above mentioned provisions enter in 
practice rule of customary international humanitarian law regarding 
the command responsibility. Those rules were initially designed for the 
State Parties and not for the individuals, thus only with the Rome 
Statute they entered national legislation for countries signatories of the 
treaty.   
Interpretation of command responsibility in public space in 
Croatia and Serbia are often negative. Following negative attitude 
                                                                
93 Article 1(1) of the 1907 Hague Regulations lays down as a condition which an armed 
force must fulfil in order to be accorded the rights of belligerents “to be commanded by a 
person responsible for his subordinates” 
94 Article 4 (2) 
2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of 
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or 
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias 
or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following 
conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
95 Article 86(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides: 
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or this Protocol was committed by a 
subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as 
the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to 
conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to 
commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to 
prevent or repress the breach 
Article 87 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides: 
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require military 
commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command and 
other persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and 
report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol. 
… 
3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require any commander 
who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are going to commit or 
have committed a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as 
are necessary to prevent such violations of the Conventions or this Protocol, and, where 
appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof 
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towards the ICTY, a provision coming “from The Hague” is frequently 
considered to be directed against the entire nation; what is more, in the 
case of command responsibility that sentiment is even stronger, as the 
accused is not a direct perpetrator of the crime. Command 
responsibility and joint criminal enterprise faced strong resistance in 
the post-Yugoslav states, being those doctrines understood as highly 
politicized or even irrational in countries that lead defensive war like 
Croatia.  
Once Croatia and Serbia ratified the Rome Statute which 
defined jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, they have 
introduced command responsibility in domestic legal systems. 
However, those are future provisions, as for the past violations of 
humanitarian law no such norm was provided by the former 
Yugoslavia’s Criminal Code and thus by the rule of legality there is no 
retroactivity. The solution, i.e. more interpretative approach to 
legislation, was rather unusual, but permitted local courts to introduce 
the command responsibility related to crimes of omission. In following 
chapters actual cases are explained more in detail, and an analysis of 
the media representation is done in relation to war crime trials in 
question.  
Before the back referral procedure was established between the 
ICTY and Croatian judiciary, almost all indictments against Croatian 
nationals were issued against direct perpetrators of lower rank. The 
exceptions were high rank officers of Serbian nationality belonging to 
the Serbian or Yugoslav armed forces. Those trials were nevertheless 
held in absentia, which is rather controversial provision from the point 
of view of fair trial. In addition, many of the possible witnesses that 
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have left Croatia refused to give testimonies. Courts in Serbia, on the 
other hand, did not apply command responsibility provisions from 
Geneva Protocols, as the Constitutions from SFRY, FRY and also Serbia 
require that the criminal offence and applicable punishment must be 
provided in domestic legislation, i.e. Criminal Code. Domestic 
legislation introduced direct norm of command responsibility after the 
ICC Statute ratification and therefore application of command 
responsibility strictu sensu would have been a violation of the ex post 
facto clause of the Constitution.  
Once the ICTY’s Completion strategy did start, The Hague 
tribunal opted for the possibility of referring cases to national courts. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia were very much 
favourable of that practice, particularly because the international 
tribunal faced negative attitude in the region and because the political 
elites on power wanted to show their capacity in dealing with their 
own citizens’ misdeeds or with crimes committed at their territory. 
Two of the case studies in this research were subject to the Rule 11bis. 
In a trial against Mrkšić, Šljivančanin and Radić, the so called Vukovar 
Three case, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) filled a motion to the 
Tribunal to refer the trial to a local court. However, Croatia demanded 
the accused to be tried in the country where the crimes were 
committed, i.e. Croatia, while Serbia wanted to get the case on the basis 
of accused nationality and because the extradition of Serbian citizens to 
the third countries was unconstitutional. The problem was solved by 
holding the trial at the ICTY, but the ICTY transferred to War Crimes 
Chamber in Belgrade enough material to open a trial against direct 
perpetrators at the agriculture farm Ovčara near Vukovar. Vukovar 
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three and Ovčara trials were held almost simultaneously and are 
subject of our analysis in the coming chapters. The second case study 
from this research was also subject to back referral strategy. The 
process against the Croatian generals Ademi and Norac for crimes 
committed in Medak pocket was proposed to the Croatian judiciary. 
The eventual acceptance of the referral showed the confidence in 
Croatian legal system in relation to trails of its own nationals for the 
crimes committed against Serbian population in Medak. The main 
problem posed before the ICTY was the capacity of Croatian judiciary 
to transform the indictment issued for crimes committed under Article 
7(3) command responsibility. Eventually amici curiae96 judged it 
possible with a “creative interpretation of the existing legislation”97. As 
in Serbia, the main by-pass is via crime of omission, i.e. that the 
guarantor filed to take necessary measures to prevent a crime or punish 
its perpetrators. In Ademi and Norac case command responsibility was 
proven on the basis of Articles 120, 122 and 128 of the Croatian 
Criminal Code, namely war crimes against civilians, prisoners of war 
and ill treatment of wounded, sick and prisoners of war. Detailed 
analysis of that case is given in a later chapter.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                
96 Rule 74 - Amicus Curiae (Adopted 11 Feb 1994)  
A Chamber may, if it considers it desirable for the proper determination of the case, 
invite or grant leave to a State, organization or person to appear before it and make 
submissions on any issue specified by the Chamber.  
97 Transcrip available in the icty judcial database 
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5.5. READJUSTIMENT – CRIMINAL CODES 
 
The readjustment on the axis international humanitarian law – 
domestic law is explained above, but it represents only one side of the 
problem to be solved before organising fair trials for war crimes in 
Croatia and Serbia. Domestic courts face also temporal readjustment, 
namely the application of Criminal Code adequate for processing war 
crime trials happened between 1991 and 1995. In the Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia national statutory laws were the 
only direct source of criminal law. Criminal Code of 1977 was in power 
when most of the crimes during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia 
happened. In addition the content of the Constitution of 1974 
acknowledged the state to respect norms of international law and to 
apply them directly.  
Nevertheless, there are two principles to observe from the 
point of view of applicability of one legal tool or another: 1) principle of 
legality - nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, and 2) principle of tempus 
regit actum with in dubio mitius exception. The principle of legality in the 
SFRY was regulated in its Constitution, under the Article 3: “No 
punishment or other criminal sanction may be imposed on anyone for 
an act which, prior to being committed, was not defined by law as a 
criminal act, and for which a punishment has not been prescribed by 
statute”. In Croatia, the principle of legality is included in the Article 31 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia: “No one may be 
punished for an act which, prior to its commission, was not defined as 
a punishable offence by domestic or international law, nor may such 
individual be sentenced to a penalty which was not then defined by 
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law. If a less severe penalty is determined by law after the commission 
of said act, such penalty shall be imposed”. Article 34 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia concludes in similar manner: 
“No person may be held guilty for any act which did not constitute a 
criminal offence under law or any other regulation based on the law at 
the time when it was committed, nor shall a penalty be imposed which 
was not prescribed for this act. The penalties shall be determined 
pursuant to a regulation in force at the time when the act was 
committed, save when subsequent regulation is more lenient for the 
perpetrator. Criminal offences and penalties shall be laid down by the 
law.”  
Provisions of Criminal Codes of SFRY and its successor states 
are very similar in nature and content. Thus, there is no need for such 
broad interpretation explained in previous chapter where some 
provisions of the ICTY Statute were not present in the former 
Yugoslavia’s legal system. Major differences are in the length of 
punishment. For example, the 1977 SFRY Criminal Code permitted the 
death penalty, although only for the most serious crimes, otherwise the 
length of the punishment varied from fifteen days to fifteen years, and 
in particularly serious crimes could rise to twenty years of 
imprisonment.  
 All Criminal Codes ranging from 1977 one to the Serbian 2006 
one respect the rule of tempus regit actum which states that the law that 
was in force when the criminal act was perpetrated shall be applied. 
Still if the law has been changed or amended after the commission of 
the crime, a less severe law for the alleged criminal would be applied. 
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This rule is known also as in dubio mitius. To conclude, the chosen law 
has to be less severe in relation to the offender, not in general terms.  
 
CHAPTER 6 
THE “OVČARA” TRIAL 
 
On December 4th 2003, War Crimes Council of the Belgrade 
District Court98 issued its first indictment against eight alleged 
perpetrators of war crimes committed at farm building Ovčara, close to 
Vukovar, Croatia. Based on documentation ceded to the Serbian 
Authorities by the ICTY, the indictment accused members of Territorial 
defense of Vukovar (TO Vukovar) and paramilitary formation “Leva 
Supoderica” for the crimes against prisoners of war, according to the 
Third Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Treatment of War Prisoners 
and Geneva Convention Annexed Protocol on Protection of Victims in 
Non-international Armed Conflicts. In particular, indictees were 
accused of violence, murder, cruel treatment and torture, as well as 
outrages upon personal dignity, humiliating and degrading treatment. 
The events described regard execution of at least 200 war prisoners at 
Ovčara farm, transferred from Vukovar hospital to Yugoslav People’s 
Army (JNA) barracks.  
Almost simultaneously, in The Hague, before the ICTY, three 
former JNA high officers were tried for the same crimes. The 
indictment issued by the ICTY against Mrkšić, Radić and Šljivančanin99 
                                                                
98  After the judicial reform Belgrade District Court became High Court, therefore 
we will use hereinafter its commonly widespread name: Special Court for War Crimes 
99  The initial indictment was confirmed on 7 November 1995, was later amended 
to include Slavko Dokmanovic, mayor of wartime Vukovar. Following the death of the 
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describes events dating from the beginning of siege of Vukovar in Late 
August 1991, fall of the city to Serb forces, forced removal of about 400 
non-Serbs from the Vukovar hospital and killing of at least 264 Croats 
and other non-Serbs. JNA generals are accused of participation in so 
called Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) with aim of persecution of 
“Croats and other non-Serbs present at Vukovar hospital after the fall 
of the city, through the commission of murder, torture, cruel treatment, 
extermination and inhumane acts”. The international tribunal’s 
indictment also differs in the nature of crimes and in criminal 
procedure undertaken in order to prove those crimes. Namely, the 
“Vukovar three” were accused for crimes against humanity and 
violations of the laws or customs of war according to the Statute of the 
ICTY; therefore victims are presumed to be also civilians and not only 
prisoners of war100. Moreover, they are charged on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                            
fourth indictee, the indictment was changed three more times and was finalised on 15 
November 2004  
100  According to the Third Geneva convention from 1949 prisoners of war are 
described in the Article 4: 
 Art 4. A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons 
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the 
enemy:  
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias 
or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of 
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or 
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias 
or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following 
conditions:[ 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an 
authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. 
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, 
such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply 
contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the 
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individual criminal responsibility and superior criminal responsibility, 
whereas the Serbian indictment deals only with direct executors and 
thus prosecutes exclusively individual responsibility. The detainees 
were transferred to Ovčara from JNA barracks, but the indictment 
issued by the War Crimes Prosecutor in Belgrade did not include any of 
the events before the arrival on Ovčara farm, and accordingly did not 
question responsibility of various army officers that allegedly agreed to 
render the prisoners to the TO and paramilitary. Consequently, such a 
selective indictment cleared a priori any involvement in the crime of the 
state institutions such as army or military police. However, both the 
indictment and the judgement agree on Vukovar TO and paramilitary 
unit Leva Supoderica being components of the then JNA.  
                                                                                                                                            
armed forces, provided that they have received authorization, from the armed forces 
which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card 
similar to the annexed model. 
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine 
and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more 
favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law. 
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy 
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to 
form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect 
the laws and customs of war. 
 On the other hand, Article 5 of the ICTY statute defines crimes against 
humanity in the following way: 
 The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether 
international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population:  
 (a) murder;  
 (b) extermination;  
 (c) enslavement;  
 (d) deportation;  
 (e) imprisonment;  
 (f) torture;  
 (g) rape;  
 (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;  
 (i) other inhumane acts. 
 165 
 
Punishment for the offence described by the Serbian indictment 
is regulated by the Article 144 of Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Hence the rule of tempus regit actum, i.e. 
that the law that was in force at the time a criminal act was committed 
shall be applied to the perpetrator of the criminal act. Yet, when trying 
war crimes committed during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, as 
a general rule, the Serbian courts apply the 1993 FRY Criminal Code as 
the law more favourable to the accused. The reason behind is that if 
after the perpetration of an act a less severe punishment is determined 
by law, such punishment shall be imposed. In case of Article 144 (war 
crime against prisoners of war) of the SFRY Criminal Code, the 
maximum punishment was death penalty, whereas in the SRJ Criminal 
Code the maximum punishment was twenty years of imprisonment.  
 
6.1. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN SERBIA AND CROATIA 
 
Three domestic trials addressed by the War Crimes 
Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade for the war crimes committed at Ovčara 
farm near Vukovar have been resolved by final judgements. This 
research focuses on the case Ovčara I – Vujović et al., started before the 
Special Court for War Crimes in Belgrade on March 9th 2004. First 
instance judgement was rendered on December 12th 2005, but was 
reversed by the Serbian Supreme Court a year later and the case was 
put back on trial due to “procedural mistakes”. New first-instance 
judgement was rendered by the District Court’s War Crimes Chamber 
on March 12th 2009. On September 14th 2010 the Appellate Court in 
Belgrade has confirmed the first instance judgement. 
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Length of the trial as well as specific circumstances such as the 
opening trial for newly founded Special Court and controversial 
decision of Supreme Court or even the simultaneity of the ICTY case 
Vukovar hospital secured relatively good media coverage in both 
Serbia and Croatia. In Serbia, differently from the reports concerning 
trials held before the ICTY, the tone of the articles describing Ovčara 
case tried to get an impartial, almost indifferent quality. On the other 
hand, Croatian press mainly showed scepticism, being the case 
processed in Serbia and not in the country were it was perpetrated, 
Croatia. Croatian media remained victim oriented, but at the same time 
insisted on relationship of Ovčara crimes within general frame of 
Serbian aggression led by the JNA forces. 
The choice of the indictment to bring charges against the 
alleged perpetrators for criminal offence of war crimes against 
prisoners of war avoided discussion about background situation in 
which the crime was committed. Instead, the case held before the ICTY, 
brought charges for crimes against humanity. For persecutions on 
political, racial, and religious grounds, extermination; murder, torture, 
inhumane acts the court has to prove that the perpetrator has 
knowledge, either actual or constructive, that these acts were occurring 
on a widespread or systematic basis and does not commit his acts for 
purely personal motives completely unrelated to the attack on the 
civilian population. Therefore the perpetrator must know that there is 
an attack on the civilian population, know that his act fits in with the 
attack and the act must not be taken for purely personal reasons 
unrelated to the armed conflict. The role of context is therefore crucial 
in trials of crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, the presence of 
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official historical narratives about the causes of war could be noticed in 
sometimes free interpretation of legal material exposed in the 
courtroom.  
In Serbia, in 2003 there were about 70 newspapers articles 
dealing with the investigation process and later indictment for crimes 
committed at Ovčara. News were usually short and regarded 
investigatory work before the indictment was issued. Therefore, very 
often headlines are main sources of information, as most of the 
newspapers used agency news in articles’ body of text. All the accused 
were caught during police operation “Sablja” in the immediate 
aftermath of ex Prime Minister Djindjic's murder. Therefore, most of 
the articles depicts political will to deal with the past atrocities, but at 
the same time recalls constantly that the accused were members of 
paramilitary units or Serbs from Vukovar attached to the TO.  Croatian 
media also paid little attention to the issue of indictment. This is quite 
predictable, considering how unsuccessful were other attempts to 
coming to terms with the past, for example show trials set up 
throughout the region or Truth commission formed by the Government 
of Serbia and Montenegro in 2001 and faded away in 2003.  
Once the start of the trial has approached, it gained much more 
attention in the media. Serbian newspapers had headlines mostly 
related to the start of the trial, but also some of them underlined the 
fact that the accused were members of TO (for example Dnevnik -For 
“Ovčara” eight accused from the TO Vukovar, Blic – The Duke 
surrened, Glas javnosti - Chetnik duke voluntarily at court), or that the 
crime has been committed (Večernje novosti – The injured were also 
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executed, Večernje novosti – 192 war prisoners killed, Danas  – Guilty for 
murder of 192 war prisoners).  
On March 10th 2009 many newspapers in Serbia cited first 
defendant's initial statement already in the title. Vujović accused some 
JNA officials for ordering massacre and therefore triggered debate 
about the role of the JNA and consequently Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in war in Croatia: Balkan – Defendant demands the arrest of 
Aca Vasiljević, ex chief of KOS (Counter-intelligence service), Blic – 
General Vasiljević knows who ordered massacre of civilians, Glas 
javnosti – General Vasiljević keeps the secret of Ovčara, Politika – 
Indictee accuses general Vasiljević. Others opted for the historical 
moment of the trial: Politika – Historical event for the judiciary, Politika 
– From Zvornik to Ovčara, Blic- Turning point for Serbia, Večernje 
novosti – Test for Belgrade, Danas – History in the courtroom, Dnevnik – 
Ovčara trial – test for Serbian judiciary. 
Croatian newspapers reported with great interest the 
beginning of the Belgrade trial. They concentrated on the fact that the 
victims were mostly Croatian nationals. Unlike Serbian media who 
gave attention to defendants' statements, Croatian ones looked first on 
the crime itself. On the visual plan there are also significant differences: 
while in Serbian papers the photos are depicting mostly the courtroom 
of new modern tribunal the Serbian state should be proud of, the 
Croatian ones have chosen photos of the monuments in Vukovar or 
portraits of victims' families. Main headlines announcing the beginning 
of the trial were: Jutarnji list – Death squad at Ovčara was killing Croats 
for seven hours, Večernji list – 50 witnesses to testimony for Ovčara 
crimes, Vjesnik – Only Perić admitted killing of prisoners at Ovčara.  
 169 
 
As already mentioned in the introduction, this research is 
trying to operationalise how certain statements appear in the discourse, 
legal and media, rather than another. We explore the circumstances 
that made possible certain kinds of definitions regarding several key 
concepts present in war crime trials reporting in Serbia and Croatia: 1) 
number of victims; 2) who were the victims: prisoners of war, civilians 
or wounded; 3) nation labelling; 4) role of the JNA; 5) use of history; 6) 
what happened in Vukovar beforehand?  
The indictment issued by the War Crimes Prosecutor in 
Belgrade named at least 192 victims (200 after amendment), differently 
from the ICTY one that based its case on 261 victims (around 60 are still 
treated as missing). Even though judicial truth differs from history or 
official narrative about the war, some of the media, mostly Croatian101, 
insisted on the facts provided by The Hague tribunal. Numbers are 
particularly important when it comes to the penalties. On December 
12th 2005 Special Court for War Crimes rendered judgement in Ovčara 
case. Eight persons were sentenced to 20 years imprisonment 
(maximum penalty), three to 15, one to 12, one to 9 and one to 5 years. 
Two were released due to the lack of evidence. Večernji list highlights 
“Only a year for each killed at Ovčara” and “Murderers at Ovčara 
(punished) as for thief of mobile phone” (March 12th 2007) and gives a 
short survey in which everybody asked more severe punishments. 
Jutarnji list announces “20 years of imprisonment for eight worst 
executors from Ovčara”, and Vjesnik also quotes “Criminals from 
Ovčara got from 5 to 20 years”. Serbian newspapers Glas javnosti, 
                                                                
101 Glas Slavonije – Pokajnik Stuka imenovao zlocince koji su 1991. strijeljali 260 
Hrvata na Ovcari; Jutarnji list – Pokajnik s Ovcare […] ispitivan o masakru 260 Hrvata 
pokraj Vukovara 
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Danas, Blic, Politika, Dnevnik report mainly by stating overall number of 
prison years, 231, which definitely makes sentencing look severe and 
adequate. Večernje novosti and Kurir underline maximum punishment. 
When in March 2009 Special Court diminished punishments to some of 
the previously convicted war criminals, in Serbia only Politika daily 
reported that fact already in the headline. Belgrade's strategy was again 
to announce overall years of imprisonment for the crimes committed. 
Croatian dailies remembered that the sentence was lighter and, even 
though articles were shorter than couple of years ago, assumed more 
emotional comments about “shame” (Večernji list) , “difference between 
sentence and punishment” (Jutarnji list), “(ir)responsibility” (Vjesnik).  
Second problem analysed in media material is labelling of the 
victims. Croatian newspapers keep on underlining that nearly 200 
victims were “Croats” or “Croatian prisoners” (Jutarnji list, Vjesnik, Glas 
Slavonije, Vukovarske novine), whereas Večernji list calls them “defenders, 
civilians and wounded”. Only one article from Vukovarske novine ever 
mentioned “Croatian war prisoners”. This omission is very important 
as it is absolutely necessary in order to explain the indictment. 
Moreover, this is precisely the point in which the ICTY and Special 
Court legal arguments differ. As for reports of Serbian media the 
situation turns out to be more complex. Usually prisoners' nationality is 
never mentioned, they are mainly labelled as “prisoners of war”. Danas 
varies largely in labelling the victims: it mentioned on March 9th 2004 
that 192 members of Croatian army were killed, two days later that 
„prisoners of war, civilians and army members” were executed, and in 
2005 calls them „civilians taken from Vukovar hospital”. Most alarming 
is the case of Politika that on March 11th 2004 analyses „Croatian view 
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point on trial” in the article entitled „Victims without nationality”. 
While the author claims that media outlined that the victims were 
„civilians, wounded and hospital staff”, mainly „Croats and other non-
Serbs”, it comments that „this statement is partially true, because 
among executed victims there were Serbs as well” [emphasise added]. 
Nevertheless, just couple of lines afterwards the author mentions „trials 
in Split where the accused were Croatian army militiamen for crimes 
against Serbian prisoners”. [emphasise added] However, the War 
Crimes Chamber noted the accused’s knowledge that victims were 
protected:  
[t]he fact that among the prisoners there were wounded and 
civilians, as well as the Serbs belonging to the “opposing side” […] is 
beyond doubt. However, this Court believes […] that the awareness of 
the accused and their intent point to the fact that those were perceived 
as the members of the opposing party, prisoners of war (as all those 
who do not acknowledge the perpetration of the offence, as well as 
witnesses heard and witnesses-collaborators used the term “prisoners” 
in relation to the injured parties). Hence, bearing also in mind such 
awareness of the accused, the Court qualified the act as the offence 
from Article 144 FRY CC. 
Serbian newspapers carefully avoided defendants' nationality, 
whereas Croatian one insisted on it. Even if there is a hint about it, it is 
usually put in a form of witness statement, as in article published by 
Blic on September 15th 2005 “Witness: Serbs were killing imprisoned 
Croatians at Ovčara”. For the Serbian media the nationality becomes 
important issue once accused half Serbian – half Croat Ivan 
Atanasijević admits shooting at the prisoners. Titles like “Admits to 
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have shot Croatian prisoner” (Danas) in perspective of Atanasijevic 
being a Croat is not a problem, because it still leaves “clear” the Serbian 
side. Moreover, when the 2005 sentence was revoked suddenly “Croats 
were not satisfied” (Gradjanski list), “Ovčara case made Croats angry” 
(Blic).  
Even though the Ovčara case was put back on trial, overall 
impression is that the Trial Chamber with presiding Vesko Krstajić 
contributed greatly to dismantle ideological narratives about the events 
in Vukovar. Unfortunately, the indictment did not include JNA 
commanders not soldiers, but the court was satisfied that the army 
“deliberately left prisoners to the members of TO and paramilitary”. 
This trial triggered precisely the debate over the role of Belgrade in 
controlling the JNA. Almost simultaneously with the beginning of the 
trial in Belgrade and The Hague charges were pressed at Croatian 
district court, involving some of the JNA ex officials. During the trial all 
defendants accused the JNA for organising massacre at Ovčara and 
described that it was the army that commanded over TO. Croatian 
media accused JNA officers for exercising “Milošević's concept based 
on mass killings and ethnic cleansing” (Vjesnik March 9th). Večernji list 
also remembers on various occasions the JNA General Staff that 
“initiated formation of paramilitary units and let them make war in 
Vukovar”. Jutarnji list as well underlines that “a number of very high 
officers that appeared on court as witnesses are clearly responsible for 
what happened” in Vukovar. Some Serbian newspapers underlined 
that the Ovčara trial was the “first time that direct responsibility of JNA 
was transferred to the Serbian forces in Vukovar” (Dnevnik). The 
sentence established that the regular army of JNA did not take part in 
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the crime at Ovčara and that its members did not know that colonel 
Mrkšić decided to  render prisoners of war to the TO. To sum up, 
anonymous members of TO were convicted, JNA's responsibility 
managed to disappear and the state continued to escape broader public 
debate about responsibility in the war.  
Finally, is there a possibility to reach some kind of ideal truth 
and factual history? “We will not talk about the causes of war, this 
should be left to the course of history”, underlined judge Krstajić at the 
end of trial, “what is indisputable is the fact that crimes happened at 
Ovčara”. Nevertheless, this trial marks the process of alienation from 
long-time official version of “liberation” of Vukovar, to “Vukovar 
conflict”, “operation” and finally “fall of the city”. Even though the 
indictment for Ovčara crime was really narrow, some background 
information regarding the role of the army and the FRY state were 
indisputably proven. Dismantling of the old ideologies related to the 
war in Serbia was perhaps best described by defendant Predrag 
Dragović's statement: “I feel sorry for the victims and for the Serbian 
history”.  
 
The innovative element this project is dealing with is the 
impact of domestic tribunals for war crimes on creation of historical 
narratives. In addition it gave a comparative perspective on Croatian 
and Serbian media reporting on war crime trials. The problem of 
judicial responsibility is tackled on two levels: international and 
domestic. International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
provided full compliance of both Serbia and Croatia, but the 
cooperation was made possible only by judicial conditionality 
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performed by the international community, mainly the EU. Domestic 
trials for war crimes offered a very challenging framework in which the 
main aims of transitional justice were set apart and political strategies 
of denial were put in action. Different ways to deal with proceeding for 
serious breaches of humanitarian law are analysed in depth.  
This research tracks the process of domesticating of the war 
crimes trials. Crimes described in detail during ICTY trial Vukovar 
hospital were referred to local courts: in Ovčara trial part of the 
material gathered during the investigation process war used to indict 
lower ranked perpetrators. According to the Statute of the ICTY the 
indictees can be accused of crimes against humanity, violations of the 
laws and customs of war, genocide and breaches of the Geneva 
Convention. Consequently, the ICTY gave broader political and 
historical context of the war situation as the Tribunal builds its cases 
around the practice of proving Joint Criminal Enterprise and command 
responsibility. War Crimes Chamber in Belgrade cannot prosecute 
crimes that were not included in the legislation at the time the crimes 
were committed. At the domestic level, Prosecutions have no incentive 
to examine the context as they do not need to prove systematic 
violations of humanitarian law, but concentrate on separately on each 
single crime. In those circumstances, the truth-telling capacity of the 
domestic war crimes trials is extremely limited. 
This research compares notions of collective and individual 
responsibility, guilt and accountability and their relation with new 
political ideologies. Even though the ICTY’s jurisprudence can establish 
only individual guilt, the defendants rather insist on collective guilt 
when accusing The Hague Tribunal. The reasoning again derives from 
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the attempt to discredit international humanitarian law's possibility to 
pursue command responsibility and by extension, general 
responsibility. On the other hand, accused at domestic courts carry no 
political weight and belong mostly to paramilitary formations outside 
the official army. Nevertheless, recent trials for war crimes in both 
Serbia and Croatia see former military officers accused for 
wrongdoings and there is a change in tone of the reports thought time. 
Ostojić argues that it is “the pacification of the domestic 
political scene and the strengthening of democratic institutions that 
gradually improved prospects for establishing accountability” (Ostojić, 
2011). This research support the hypothesis that post-conflict societies 
accepted consequences of past atrocities, but still did not take full 
responsibility for the crimes committed. Instead, twenty years of 
instrumental denial and subsequently little or no interest for dealing 
with the past “cleared” the terrain for more objective and fair trials. In 
addition, historical knowledge and continuity with the past is broken in 
attempt to create a new political community, cleared of past 
wrongdoings. 
In Serbia, war crime trials pertain to be a minor topic in the 
public sphere. There is a great deal of silencing and auto-censure about 
the nature of the war itself that balances between “possible 
responsibility for war” and “responsibility of the other party” and 
therefore trails are represented mostly in a very technical, seemingly 
objective manner. On the other hand, Croatian identity is strongly 
connected to the Homeland war and crimes are understood mostly as 
legitimate defence. Scholars like Peskin and Subotić explain the scarce 
response to transitional justice mechanisms by power balance between 
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nationalistic and liberal political elites and model their identity and 
behaviour. This research’s thesis is that instead of triggering truth 
seeking and truth telling processes that would lead to reconciliation, 
the focus on war crimes has multiplied the mutually exclusive 
historical narratives that are increasingly determining national 
collective identities. Politics of interpretative denial does not deny “the 
raw facts; rather, they are given a different meaning from seems 
apparent to others” (Cohen, 2001). War crimes and legal heritage hence 
become consciously distant. In addition, general argument for not 
dealing with the past is fragility of newly established democracy of 
countries in transition from conflict. 
Artificially isolated question of transitional justice and 
democratic transition justified no apparent need for systematic dealing 
with the past. The ICTY trials have lifted away any kind of denial of 
committed crimes. Nevertheless, there is little public interest in 
domestic war crime trials due to the fact that the democratic transition 
was conducted separately and with no mean of connecting issues of 
dealing with past wrongdoings with the regime transition. Still, 
transitional justice helped judicial reform and rule of law practices, but 
only once the democratic consolidation process has already started. 
Compliance with the ICTY was managed with great democratic deficit 
as political elites acted upon conditionality dictate. Nevertheless, the 
continuous process of collecting “judicial truths” through domestic war 
crime trials might overcome political and institutional influence courts 
are dealing with. 
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CHAPTER 7 
“MEDAK POCKET” TRIAL  
 
On November 1st 2005 the ICTY transferred a case to Croatia 
under the Rule 11bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the 
first and so far the only time. Impending closure of this ad hoc tribunal 
under completion strategy and a growing confidence in Croatian 
judiciary concluded in handing over of the “Medak Pocket” case to 
local judicial institution. General Rahim Ademi was indicted on June 8th 
2001 before the ICTY for “persecutions on political, racial and religious 
grounds; murder; [crimes against humanity] plunder of public or 
private property; wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages 
[violations of laws and customs of war]”102 under command 
responsibility while he was acting commander of the Gospić District 
during military operation in Medak Pocket from September 9th to 
September 17th 1993. General Norac was indicted three years later, on 
May 20th 2004, for the same criminal acts and their cases were joined 
and indictments consolidated. Ademi and Norac were accused of 
having “planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided 
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of persecutions of 
Serb civilians of the Medak Pocket on racial or religious grounds”. The 
indictments charged two generals on the basis of their individual 
criminal responsibility according to the Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute 
and on the basis of command responsibility according to the Article 
7(3) of the same Statute.  
                                                                
102 Case information sheet accessed on the icty’s web page: 
http://icty.org/x/cases/ademi/cis/en/cis_ademi_norac.pdf 
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In 2006 State Attorney’s Office issued a direct indictment 
against Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac. As we already explain in 
Chapter 3, until it was introduced in 2004 in Criminal Code, command 
responsibility was unknown to local judiciary. Moreover, the rule of 
legality - nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege – turns unconstitutional 
any decision to retroactively take use of provisions non existent at the 
time of commission of the crime. Consequently this trial was important 
because it set the standard of legal practice in cases dealing with the 
superior criminal responsibility.  
Norac and Ademi were accused for criminal acts under Article 
120, par. 1103 of 1993 Basic Criminal Code of Republic of Croatia, i.e. 
war crimes against civilians, and under Article 122104 of 1993 Basic 
                                                                
103 Ratni zločin protiv civilnog stanovništva  
Članak 120.  
(1) Tko kršeći pravila međunarodnoga prava za vrijeme rata, oružanoga sukoba ili 
okupacije naredi da se izvrši napad na civilno stanovništvo, naselje, pojedine civilne 
osobe ili osobe onesposobljene za borbu, kojega je posljedica smrt, teška tjelesna ozljeda 
ili teško narušavanje zdravlja ljudi, napad bez izbora cilja kojim se pogađa civilno 
stanovništvo, da se civilno stanovništvo ubija, muči ili da se nečovječno postupa prema 
njemu, ili da se nad njim obavljaju biološki, medicinski ili drugi znanstveni pokusi. da se 
uzimaju tkiva ili organi radi transplantacije, ili da mu se nanose velike patnje ili ozljede 
tjelesnoga integriteta. ili zdravlja, da se provodi raseljavanje ili preseljavanje ili prinudno 
odnarodnjivanje ili prevođenje na drugu vjeru, prinuđivanje na prostituciju ili silovanje 
da se primjenjuju mjere zastrašivanja i terora, uzimaju taoci, primjenjuje kolektivno 
kažnjavanje, protuzakonito odvođenje u koncentracione logore i druga protuzakonita 
zatvaranja, će se provodi lišavanje prava na propisno i nepristrano suđenje, prinuđivanje 
na službu u oružanim snagama neprijateljske sile ili u njezinoj obavještajnoj službi ili 
administraciji, da se prinuđuje na prinudni rad, izgladnjuje stanovništvo, provodi 
konfiskacija imovine, da se pljačka imovina stanovništva, protuzakonito i samovoljno 
uništava ili prisvaja u velikim razmjerima imovinu što nije opravdano vojnim potrebama, 
uzima nezakonite i nerazmjerno velike kontribucije i rekvizicije, smanjuje vrijednost 
domaćega novca ili protuzakonito izdaje novac, ili tko počini neko od navedenih djela, 
kaznit će se zatvorom najmanje pet godina ili kaznom zatvora od dvadeset godina.  
 
104 Ratni zločin protiv ratnih zarobljenika 
Članak 122.  
Tko kršeći pravila međunarodnoga prava naredi da se ratni zarobljenici ubijaju, muče ili 
da se prema njima nečovječno postupa, nad njima obavljaju biološki, medicinski ili drugi 
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Criminal Code of Republic of Croatia – war crimes against prisoners of 
war, both in relation to the Article 28105 of the same Criminal Code – 
modalities of committing a crime. Although superior and command 
responsibility is not explicitly recognized in none of those articles, 
putting them in relation to Article 28 which states that the criminal act 
may be committed by commission or omission resulted in following 
interpretation: the accused knew about the crimes perpetrated by his 
subordinates, but did not act to prevent them, thus he is responsible for 
those crimes on command responsibility ground. Omission is possible 
only when the perpetrator has failed to perform the act which he was 
obliged to – in this case to respect Geneva Conventions on Civilians 
and Prisoners of War and Additional Protocol I. Article 120, par 1 
describes crimes against civilians as stipulated by international law and 
prescribes punishment from five to twenty years of imprisonment. 
Article 122 in similar vein describes crimes against prisoners of war 
and prescribes equally severe punishment.  
On May 30th 2008, the Zagreb District Court sentenced general 
Norac to seven years’ imprisonment and acquitted general Ademi of all 
charges. Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia confirmed trial 
judgment as it established requisite of mens rea for Norac who 
                                                                                                                                            
znanstveni pokusi, da se uzimaju tkiva ili organi radi transplantacije, da im se nanose 
velike patnje ili ozljede tjelesnoga integriteta ili zdravlja, da se prinuđuju na obavljanje 
službe u neprijateljskim oruenim snagama, ili da se lišavaju prava na propisano i 
nepristrano suđenje, ili tko počini neko od navedenih djela, kaznit če se zatvorom 
najmanje pet godina ili kaznom zatvora od dvadeset godina. 
 
105 Način izvršenja krivlčnog djela  
Članak 28.  
(1) Krivično se djelo može počiniti činjenjem ili nečinjenjem.  
(2) Krivično djelo može biti počinjeno nečinjenjem samo kad počinitelj propusti činjenje 
koje je bio duzan izvršiti. 
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committed a crime by omission as he, in the capacity of guarantee, did 
not do anything to prevent the direct perpetrators from committing 
crimes. However, the Supreme Court found that, even though the trial 
confirmed his guilty of knowing, Mirko Norac could not be criminally 
liable for the crimes which were committed by the units under his 
command on the first day of the military operation “Medak Pocket” 
because he could not have prevented them until he learnt that those 
crimes took place. The Basic Criminal Code did not have de facto 
command responsibility provision and thus no causal links between 
subordinate and superior actions were defined. The only possible norm 
to use was the Article 176 of the Criminal Code of 1993, which 
penalizes failure to report a crime, but it went into absolute 
prescription as the double time lapse of maximal punishment for that 
crime has passed. Still, at the time of commission of crimes Croatia was 
a signatory of international treaties, which in judicial hierarchy were 
under Constitution but above statutory laws. Therefore according to 
the rules of customary law Articles 86 and 87106 of the Additional 
                                                                
106 Article 86 - Failure to act 
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress grave 
breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions 
or of this Protocol which result from a failure to act when under a duty to do so. 
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a 
subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as 
the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to 
conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to 
commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to 
prevent or repress the breach. 
Article 87 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions sets out the duty of 
commanders 
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require military 
commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command and 
other persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to 
report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol[....] 
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Protocol I could have been used. In that case new Criminal Code 
prevails following the in dubio mitius rule.  
This trial brought many pioneer steps into Croatian legal 
practice. The case law for command responsibility war the wars of 
1990s is established as an important precedent for the future. 
Nevertheless, during the presentation of evidence many witnesses 
confirmed the existence of a parallel chain of command led by the 
Special units of the Ministry of Interior, but no other indictment has 
been issued for crimes perpetrated in Medak Pocket. Moreover, no 
investigation took place which included officers in charge of the area 
holding higher positions than Ademi and Norac.  
Finally, Norac was charged with the least severe punishment 
prescribed by Articles 120 and 122 of the Basic Criminal Code of 1993. 
In addition, at the end of 2011 Norac was granted early release one year 
before serving entire sentence even though he never publicly expressed 
regretting the victims. The complexity of the trial reasoning combined 
with the apparent “light” sentence and political crisis caused by general 
Norac’s arrest in 2001, made this legal narrative easily manageable in 
media discourse.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require any commander 
who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are going to commit or 
have committed a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as 
are necessary to prevent such violations of the Conventions or this Protocol, and, where 
appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof. 
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7.1. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN SERBIA AND CROATIA 
 
After the death of Croatian president Franjo Tudjman in 1999 
parliamentary elections saw the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 
government replaced by a centre-left coalition with Ivica Račan elected 
prime minister. The new government amended the Constitution 
changing the political system from a presidential system to a 
parliamentary system which enabled democratic transition of this 
Western Balkan country. Račan’s government faced with obligations 
towards ICTY. Domestic politics of cooperation dealt with several war 
crimes indictments against high ranked military officers: Mirko Norac 
indictment in early 2001, the Ante Gotovina and Rahim Ademi 
indictments in mid-2001, and the Janko Bobetko indictment in the 
autumn of 2002.  
The decisive electoral victory that swept democratic leaders 
into power in 2000 did not remove the nationalist right-wing parties 
from the political landscape. Nor did it undercut the right wing's ability 
to mobilise around defending the sanctity of Croatia's war of 
succession by protesting against the ICTY's indictments of several 
Croatian generals who have become national heroes for their role in 
this war. Croatia had a very special position during the war. Country’s 
national identity is built on the myth of the Homeland war 
(Domovinski rat) and any arguing about the acts and eventual war 
crimes committed by Croatian army is a direct attack on the Croatian 
state itself. Croatia has a status of both victor and victim, as in 1991 was 
obviously attacked by Serbian forces, but exercised aggression on 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore questions related to the 
perpetration of war crimes in Croatia are particularly sensitive. 
On 8 February 2001 State Attorney’s Office issued an arrest 
warrant for war crimes committed in Gospić area. Ex General Mirko 
Norac went into hiding the following day as he feared transfer to the 
ICTY and wanted a guaranty of facing the process in Croatia and not in 
The Hague. The arrest warrant accusing Norac of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes against civilians was the first of a kind issued 
for a Croatia general. This situation provoked outrage in the public 
space and gathered as many as 100 000 protesters in Split expressing 
their solidarity for the fugitive. So called Committee for the Protection 
of Homeland War, backed heavily by the HDZ, threatened already 
fragile political power centre-left “coalition of six” and provoked a 
major crisis in the country. Main idea behind “We are all Mirko Norac” 
protests slogan was that of “paradox” of trying generals of the winning 
party in the war. In this research we abstained from analyzing this case 
because of the strong political connotation it was bearing along. 
Moreover, domestic trials for war crimes were at the very low judicial 
quality level at the time, especially in the matter of fair trial and bias 
towards non-Croatian nationals. It was only with extreme personal 
ethic and skill that the judge Ika Šarić managed to conduct professional 
trial. In addition, the media were more concentrated on the personality 
of Norac and political games happening around this trial. Nevertheless, 
it is worth noting that, unlike two years before when massive protests 
occurred, the day the sentence was pronounced in March 2003 only 
couple of thousands of people gathered to express their disagreement. 
When the judicially proven fact of general Norac shooting an old lady 
 184 
 
and being responsible for other people’s executions reached the public 
sphere, the consequence was visible and transformative. Mirko Norac 
was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment for planning and organizing 
killing of about 50 civilians of mainly Serbian nationality.  
As early as June 2001 the ICTY made public the indictment 
against General Rahim Ademi for crimes committed during the 
military operation “Medak pocket”. On 20 September 2002 another 
indictment was issued for the ex Chief of the Main Stuff of Croatian 
Army Janko Bobetko who deceased before the beginning of the trial 
proceedings.  Finally, in May 2004 the ICTY issued the indictment 
against ex General Mirko Norac and his case was joined with Ademi’s 
one.  
As we already stressed in the first part of this chapter the ICTY 
decided to transfer this case to the Croatian judiciary under the Rule 
11bis and therefore the indictment itself needed to be readjusted with 
the domestic Criminal Code. One of the main sources of media 
manipulation is precisely based on different indictments, definition of 
the operation itself or severity of the crimes. Therefore, the news frame 
built around the nature of the operation and to larger extent is our first 
point of analysis. Moreover, the qualifications of two Generals vary 
from country to country, from newspaper to newspaper. In addition, 
the exact number of victims and the question whether they were 
civilians or not is another source of the debate and framed “victims’ 
ideologies” or “victors’ narrative”. We also follow twisted 
interpretations of the legal documents and norms, whether they were 
done on purpose and what strategy, if there is any, is used. Another 
important aspect is the “mirror” image one nation has of the other, and 
 185 
 
how do media report on “their” representations of “us”, i.e. what is the 
representation of the representation. Finally, we analyse the media 
space given to the voices of victims.  
When in 2004 the ICTY issued consolidated indictment against 
Croatian generals Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac for war crimes in 
Medak Pocket the first reactions sparked the debate whether the trial is 
going to be hold before the local court in Croatia. It was not the severity 
of heinous crimes that drew attention of the media both in Croatia and 
in Serbia, but the possible transfer of the case to the Croatian judiciary. 
Croatian public remembered well the political crisis provoked in 2001 
when Norac refused to be tried before The Hague tribunal and went 
into hiding when the indictment for Gospić group was issued. He was 
then reassured by the Government that he will not be transferred to 
The Hague and therefore the main topic three years later lead 
inevitably to the same problem. Ten years after the war, a public debate 
concerning the role of the Croatia in Homeland war did not happen 
and the majority supported the idea that the army leading just, 
defensive war could be responsible for war crimes. Nevertheless, 
Croatian judiciary had to demonstrate its capacity to try its own 
nationals on the basis of just and fair trial.   
On the 26 May 2004, one day after the indictment became 
public, the news made headlines in all Croatian newspapers. Vjesnik 
put on its front page a big picture of Norac took at the courtroom 
during his previous trial for war crimes with a headline “Norac 
indicted for “Medak Pocket”, trial in Croatia”. Besides listing the 
counts of indictment the major attention was given to the fact that the 
trial would most definitely take place in Croatia. Incumbent Minister of 
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Justice Vesna Škare-Ožbolt argued that it “is important that the 
indictment against Norac does not contain the arrest warrant and his 
surrender to The Hague”. Second article dealing with the matter was 
extremely emotionally coloured as it represented some kind of vox 
populi of Sinj, hometown of Norac. Inhabitants expressed their shock 
and disbelief; some argued that “he would have faced more fair trial in 
The Hague”, that “they want to destroy us as nation, make us fight 
each other and extinguish our Croatian seed”. Norac was also called 
“Croatian saint” who “went to war with his heart and because of his 
love for homeland”. In article titled „First trial in Croatia based on 
command responsibility” Vjesnik than concentrates on more legal 
issues guessing who else could be indicted for crimes in Medak Pocket 
area and quotes the text of the indictment. They proceed with the 
critique of the tribunal saying that it “has already raised a lot of distrust 
both in Croatia and in some expert circles in the West, because of the 
common law system practice, frequent discontinuities in workload, 
political prejudices of some of its high officials and outrageous 
constructions that equal roles of the aggressor with the victim.” Once 
again, apart from the incorrect information about the ICTY being based 
on common law, the newspaper assumes again the thesis that the 
victim, which in the Homeland war is Croatia according to the already 
mentioned Declaration on Homeland war,  cannot be responsible for 
the war crimes, otherwise her role would be levelled with the role of 
the aggressor. Vjesnik then reports on war veterans’ organisation from 
Sinj which said to be ready to protest if the Government does not 
respect Declaration on Homeland War and does not protect the dignity 
of heroes of the Homeland war”. Jutarnji list titled the headline news 
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“The Hague indicted Norac, trial in Croatia” and collected mainly 
reaction of the politicians, but gave also an emotional statement of 
Norac’s mother who was “convinced that he would never raise his 
hand against anybody”. Večernji list opened with “New indictment 
against Norac”, and put his mother’s statement “This is betrayal!” 
already on the front page. The newspaper analysed what are the 
benefits of holding a trial in Croatia, for example maximal punishment 
of 20 years of imprisonment. Twenty years sentence is also maximal 
punishment for most of the war crimes before the Belgrade War Crimes 
Chamber. Nevertheless, no comparative analysis of Serbian and 
Croatian legal system is done by the media and the “other’s” sentences 
are always judged to be too mild.  
Serbian newspapers published the news with much less 
attention. They also dealt with the fact that the trial would be referred 
to Croatia and expressed doubt in fair trial and accused the ICTY once 
again of being anti-Serb. Politika argued that “Croatian judiciary does 
not consider command responsibility for establishing criminal 
responsibility for war crimes, except when the accused are Serbian 
nationals”. Danas “forgot” to put that Norac is “accused of” but 
presented the following as wide-known fact: “During the operation 
done by the Croatian Army, Mirko Norac, together with general Janko 
Bobetko and Rahim Ademi, planned, ordered and organised killing of 
Serbian civilians in Medak Pocket.” Glas javnosti accused the ICTY of 
being “too busy so that the responsibles for “Medak Pocket” will face 
the trial before Croatian court”. Večernje novosti assumed that “Croatian 
general Mirko Norac will finally have to go to The Hague”.   
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When the case was referred to Croatian authorities, the 
indictment had to be readjusted according to the local Criminal Code. 
Once it was issued at the beginning of the 2007 reactions it sparked in 
both Croatia and Serbia were completely not grounded. Many 
newspapers argued that the original indictment had the clause of “joint 
criminal enterprise”, while it had only the one for command 
responsibility. The difference of these two provisions is huge as the JCE 
requires active planning of the crime, while the command 
responsibility can be attributed to a person that did not plan crimes, but 
failed to prevent them. Moreover, JCE is very complex and difficult 
issue to prove and thus is used mainly for very vast scale programming 
of crimes. When Dnevnik published article “Croatian indictment less 
severe from The Hague one” it explained that “Croatian State 
Attorney’s Office pointed out that, differently from The Hague 
indictment accusing Ademi and Norac of participating to JCE aimed at 
prosecution and ethnic cleansing of the Serbian population, new 
Croatian for “Medak Pocket” describes it as legitimate military 
operation and liberation of the occupied territory.” It is really 
incredible to think that the Croatian State Attorney could give such 
information. Many other newspapers reported in the same manner. 
Večernje novosti from January 12th 2007 point out that the accused “are 
not charged for criminal enterprise”. Politka reports in an article titled 
“Milder indictment against Norac and Ademi” even falsely “quotes” 
the Prosecutor saying that the JCE practice is not implemented because 
of the lack of legal capacity in the Criminal Code. Finally, Glas javnosti 
brought the news with the title “They forgot about the JCE”.  
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The beginning of the trial on June 18th 2007 attracted lot of 
attention, especially in the Croatian media. Jutarnji list opened with 
“Trial against Ademi and Norac will be monitored by the OSCE” 
reminding once again the need to conduct a fair trial as a “test of 
readiness of Croatian judiciary to put Croatian nationals on trial”. 
Many media underlined the fact that Norac is transferred from prison 
to attend the trial, while Ademi was not in the custody. Content of 
indictment is judged to be the same as the ICTY’s one, which is 
followed by description of counts, but without mentioning the nature 
of crimes. Večernji list also gave the information about the process, for 
example technical information regarding the look of the courtroom, 
and finishes with the interviews to family members of accused. 
Ademi’s wife saw him as regime’s scapegoat, while Norac is reminded 
that not only relatives think of him, but inhabitant of Otok, region of 
Cetina and further more. The next day while describing the initial 
appearance of two generals before the court Jutarnji list mentions 
“horrible details” without going more in detail of crimes. Vjesnik opens 
with “We are not guilty!” and similarly also Večernji list with “We are 
not guilty for Medak crimes”. Večernji list added that names of thirty 
three victims, mostly civilians, were listed, and that some of them were 
“allegedly” brutally tortured. For the first and only time we get to 
know that victims had their representatives in the courtroom and that 
they still haven’t declared whether they would ask for reparations. 
Already on the second day of the trial a clash between Ademi and 
Norac broke out. Jutarnji list explains in the article “Ademi denounced 
Norac to The Hague Tribunal” how the ICTY started investigation 
against Norac after the information given by Ademi. Večernji list also 
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reports that Norac was indicted because of Ademi’s statement before 
the ICTY.  
In this research, we concentrated on a number of themes – 
leitmotivs, which help us explain better the representations of legal 
narratives and master framework of nationalism. Those are: 1) 
representation of the accused, 2) definition of the military operation 
and the underlying conflict, 3) representation of the victims and their 
numbers.  
Mirko Norac was one of the youngest members of the Croatian 
Army to reach a very high military rank. He was a protégé of the first 
Croatian Minister of Defence Gojko Šušak and, as was shown during 
the trial, enjoyed confidence of then Head of Main Staff Janko Bobetko. 
When the 2001 indictment for crimes in Gospić was issued he fled and 
gained charismatic popularity like general Ante Gotovina. He was 
promoted to general by the late president Franjo Tudjman and became 
Duke of Alcari with his blessing. However, in an open letter signed in 
2000 together with other eleven active or retired generals, he criticised 
the government for opening investigations about war crimes 
committed during the Homeland War and improved cooperation with 
the ICTY. They expressed concern about description of the Croatian 
War of Independence as “something bad, problematic, even shameful, 
while in fact it was the foundation of Croatia's freedom, independence 
and sovereignty.” President of Croatia Stipe Mesić sent them 
immediately to force retirement, but the letter put more visibility on 
Norac and made him even more popular. In media representations 
concerning trial for Medak Pocket, Norac was never described as a war 
criminal (he was serving the other sentence for war crimes), but as an 
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individual extremely devoted to his homeland. When Norac was sent 
to The Hague to plead on his guilt before the court, Jutarnji list 
described the moment of the decision of Trial Chambers to transfer 
Norac back to Croatia as one that “entice him to smile” (July 9th 2004.) 
On the other hand, almost all Serbian media called him “retired 
general” except tabloids that used words like “butcher”, “murderer” or 
similar.  
Rahim Ademi is of Albanian nationality, originally from 
Kosovo and was regarded with far less sympathy than Norac. He was 
dismissed of duty after Medak Pocket operation, being officially the 
highest ranked officer in the area and was treated as lower category 
general. Newspapers often reminded of his Albanian origin, reporting 
that he for example refused the translation in Croatian during the trial. 
But his biggest “misfortune” was that he was confronted to Norac 
during the process. He was labelled whistleblower right from the start, 
as additionally he reported Norac to the ICTY’s investigators. Already 
from the beginning of the trial there were allegations about so called 
parallel chain of command which excluded Ademi and put Norac into 
the position of high responsibility over army forces and special police. 
Finally, the court confirmed the existence of such strategy and shed 
new light on the events in Medak Pocket, which description were 
ranging from Serbian armed civilians insurgent to Canadian 
UNPROFOR battalion fighting against Croatian army. Instead of 
regular official military hierarchy, Norac had the effective command 
over newly formed “Sector 1” that excluded Ademi (superior to Norac) 
and put special police forces under general Norac’s command.  
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One of the central narratives is certainly the one regarding the 
nature of the operation Medak Pocket and, on the larger scale, the war 
itself. Already its location is subject of controversy, being part of 
Republic of Serbian Krajina, self proclaimed Serb state within the 
territory of Republic of Croatia. Therefore, in Croatian newspaper, is it 
always described as “so called” or directly put into quotation mark. 
Serbian media call it often Republic of Serbian Krajina, even those 
happening to be more progressive. Moreover, Serbian media 
uncritically diffused the communication of the Organisation of families 
of missing persons from Krajina which regularly conveys 
commemorations for “murdered and missing persons during Croatian 
aggression on Republic of Serbian Krajina” (Večernje novosti, 
September 10th 2005.) Politika stated that the UN report made after the 
Medak Pocket operation explains bloody action of Croatian army 
(October 31st 2007.) In the same article, Politika expressed consternation 
because only Ademi and Norac have to respond for this “bloody feast 
of Croatian army”. In another article Politika notes that the text of the 
ICTY’s indictment states that the Medak Pocket operation was planned 
and implement aiming to prosecute Serbian population, whereas in 
Croatian indictment this was changed into “liberation of occupied 
territory”.  
For Croatian media there was never a shadow of doubt that the 
operation was liberation of occupied territory. There were also political 
proposals to establish a medal for those particularly meritorious during 
the action. Still, when the ICTY indictment was rendered public, for 
example Vjesnik reported that the tribunal wanted to “change the sense 
of the military, liberating action” and warns that “The Hague wants to 
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demonstrate on small scale action with big crimes the same criminal 
behaviour found in the indictments for operations Flash and 
Storm.”(May 28th 2004.) Voices were given to HVIDRA veterans’ 
association who ask the government and Ministry of Justice to deny 
“very heavy and false indictment against general Norac, and 
consequently entire Croatian nation.” 
Another important aspect related to any war event is the actual 
number of victims. Serbian rather controversial NGO Veritas has been 
collecting the lists with the names and details about killed and missing 
persons, but was not invited to the trial in Zagreb to testify. They 
estimated that around Gospić area about one hundred Serbs were 
killed, while some fifteen villages with three hundred houses were 
destroyed and only four persons live there now (Politika Julz 4th 2004.) 
In an article describing commemoration of Medak Pocket operation, 
Dnevnik wrote that “Croatia marked twelve years of military operation 
“Medak Pocket”, remembering members of the army and police who 
died. Nobody remembered hundreds of killed Serbs.” (September 10th 
2005.) The ICTY indictment mentioned thirty four victims, whereas the 
Croatian one was described killing at least twenty three civilians and 
five war prisoners. Politika reported this numbers by noting that 
“murdered were many more”. (May 31st 2008.)  
While analysing media articles about the trial, the striking 
element is almost total absence of the voices of the victims. The only 
person that sporadically appears in the reports is the leader of Veritas 
Savo Štrbac, “a declared enemy of Croatia” as Norac’s Attorney called 
him. Nevertheless, apart from one sentence from Večernji list saying 
that in the courtroom families of the victims assisted a trial, those 
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persons were always absent from the narrative. The only person that 
was interviewed by the Serbian media was again Štrbac. Even the 
question whether the victims were just the elderly persons not wanting 
to flee from their homes was question couple of times. There was an 
attempt to use recording of a certain woman holding a rifle as 
suggestion that all civilians in Medak Pocket were armed, but the Trial 
Chambers found it incongruous. First Croatian Minister of Interior Ivan 
Jarnjak was invited as witness and stated that “civilians were not killed, 
because entire local Serb population war armed during the Croatian 
military action in Medak area”. (Danas, July 17th 2007). Finally, reports 
called victims simply “the Serbs”, and not Serbian civilian population, 
“as if all of them served paramilitary units”. (Danas, March 28th 2003.)  
The last phenomenon this research is dealing with are the 
discourse strategies used in Serbian and Croatian media aiming to 
distract, shock or scandalise the reader. As already stressed, in Serbian 
newspapers this trial was followed much less than in Croatia, 
especially as the political elite was not interested in giving the space or 
much of a concern to the victims. Therefore, the trial was much more 
followed in tabloid newspapers like Kurir or openly nationalistic like 
Večernje novosti, as they could attract the audience with disturbing 
titles or aggressive tone of reporting. Titles like “Remembering bloody 
feast of the Croatian army of 13 years ago” (Glas javnosti, September 
15th 2006.), “Sick mind” (Kurir, September 23rd 2007.), “They burned the 
Serbs alive” (Večernje novosti January 18th 2008.), “Serb on trial against 
Ademi and Norac: My wife was impaled alive” (Jutarnji list September 
27th  2007), “Croats impaling Serbs!” (Press September 27th 2007.), 
“Ethnic cleansing!” (Glas javnosti, October 30th 2007) are just some 
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examples of that strategy. Strangely enough, the rest of the article 
might be just newspapers agency news, but the shocking title serves to 
influence the audience. We are not denying that some of the articles 
follow this strategy in their integrity, but their number is much smaller 
than expected. Almost all the titles in Serbia were not shown as quotes; 
even if in many cases it appeared to be the topic of the witness’ 
statements, whereas in Croatia strong titles were always used as direct 
quotes, usually for very short articles. Another strategy was 
generalisation, especially in the title, where the axes Croatian-Serbian 
were well manipulated. Titles like “Croatian court about burning down 
of Serbian houses” (Dnevnik March 18th 2004), “Croatian colonel: Serbs 
were tortured” (Blic September 28th 2007.) are extremely reductionist, 
do not give information if the victims were civilians, but simply serve 
to underline the difference, the border between “us” and “them”. On 
the other hand, in Croatia many articles were packed with irrelevant or 
purely technical information. Therefore, often family members or the 
accused were interviewed in relation to their love story and happy life 
(“Behind us is our most beautiful white night”, Jutarnji list July 10th 
2008.), marriage, children, then there were technical description of 
flying to The Hague, comparison of Sheveningen prison to the local 
one, etc. Finally, often selected news from the “other” was transmitted 
in “our” newspapers in order to give an impression of multiple voices, 
but the choice was made only when confirming “our” narrative.  
Final remark should be given for reporting of the judgment in 
Medak Pocket case. Serbian media usually agency news about the 
sentence, but an interesting article was found in Danas where an 
interview was made with the Prosecutor’s Office PR. Bruno Vekarić 
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argued that the punishment given in this judgment was very mild and 
wondered whether war crime trials would be done only to please the 
international community.  Jutarnji list opted for political elite’s 
comments, but the incumbent Prime Minister Kosor replied that “the 
government does not comment on trials”. Večernji list depicted the trial 
as “marked by conflict between ex combatants”, as if the severity of the 
crimes or pioneer judgment of Croatian judiciary in the matter of 
command responsibility just did not attract much attention.  
Emotional scene from the courtroom was also described and a survey 
was done in Norac’s hometown. Only Jutarnji list reminded that “four 
new names of direct perpetrators were revealed during the trial”. Still, 
it was only after the confirmation of the judgement by the Supreme 
Court of Croatia that Norac was deprived from his medals earned 
during the war. Mirko Norac was sent to serve unique sentence of 15 
years because of the crimes committed in Gospić and Medak, but at the 
end of 2011, four years prior to the end of punishment, was granted 
early release.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis analysed challenges and changes of national 
identity by exploring the impact of legal discourses and media 
representations of war crimes trials on historical master narratives. We 
assumed that a sense of shared history is one of the main elements of 
nation building and sought to find a shift in historical narratives 
resulting from domestic trials for war crimes. In this research we 
concentrated on domestic war crimes trials, as they are to lesser extent 
conditioned or constrained by the international community. Still, 
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domestic trials for war crimes would have not been possible without 
the previous judicial intervention of external factors. By supporting the 
capacity of judiciary and transferring evidence gathered during 
investigation process, the ICTY contributed in helping states in 
transition like Croatia and Serbia to establish the rule of law. Domestic 
institutions managed to inform the public about the atrocities 
committed during the war by their own nationals, but could not 
influence much the process of reconciliation.  
The main reason is the reluctance of change in master historical 
narrative about the war. In Chapter 3 we describe main finding leading 
to creating of specific historical master narrative. In case of Croatia, the 
Homeland war narrative is embedded in almost every aspect of 
everyday life. Thus this narrative “is easier to make irrelevant and to 
ignore than to openly challenge” (Jovic, 2012). Moreover, the fact that 
the ICTY’s Prosecutors’ long time strategy of proving the joint criminal 
enterprise in milestone operation Storm was rejected, only 
strengthened the narrative about the Homeland war as just and 
defensive. On the other hand, official narrative of Serbia in the past war 
is not even well defined, because it is rarely the topic of any public 
debate. Even though the involvement of each state’s nationals in 
serious breaches of humanitarian law is not refused unconditionally, it 
is still considered to be isolated action undertaken by paramilitary units 
or individuals not behaving according to issued commands. This 
problem is also due to a so called “impunity gap” between high 
ranking officials brought before the international tribunal and the 
lowest ranked alleged criminals tried at domestic courts.  
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Chapter 4 analyses the representations of the ICTY and creation 
of new political myths about leaders defending and scarifying 
themselves as martyrs for the sake of patria. We track the process of 
rise and fall of new national leaders and heroes in Yugoslav post-war 
states. Following Gradner and Avolio’s theatrical approach in 
explaining charisma, the author identifies causes and consequences of 
society’s need for “extreme” characters. Image of political leaders in 
role of saviours and martyrs of the nation was substituted by real social 
problems. Pattern of state transition to democracy can be traced 
through case studies of leader pairs that differ almost exclusively in 
existence or absence of charisma. 
Differently from the ICTY, where for serious violations of 
humanitarian law contest is important element as it can determine mens 
rea aspect, at the domestic level, judicial processes do not deal with the 
causes of war itself but with jus ad bellum aspects. Therefore legal 
documents describe only the context of war and represent historical 
material that is easily manipulated. In addition, the very understanding 
of the tribunals’ legacies is not necessarily fixed, but may change over 
time as the domestic perceptions of the past and the domestic politics 
of the present change. 
In a situation like this already the political will and judicial 
capacity to organise fair and just trial seems an achievement. In 
Chapters 6 and 7 we analyse two cases held at the local level. Trials for 
Ovčara and Medak Pocket raised awareness of the public about crimes 
committed by their own nationals. Still, the decisive factor leading to 
reconciliation is certainly giving the voice to the victims. Transitional 
justice process in Croatia and Serbia has been limited so far only to war 
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crime trial if we exclude miserable attempt of the Serbian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission failed before it even published one report. 
Limiting such an important process only to criminal persecution is not 
enough. Voices of victims were not heard in the courtroom and 
certainly not outside of it. Victims of different nationalities are not 
equally treated in the same country. Even when appearing in role of 
witness, a victim cannot freely tell her own story – she serves only to 
describe the consequences leading to a crime. Likewise, victims’ 
narrative disappear from the public discourse once the official narrative 
meets the judicial one, as it was the case with some acquittal judgments 
before the ICTY. For example, when the Storm operation was 
confirmed to be a libratory one with no intent of a joint criminal 
enterprise behind it, members of political elite and the media reported 
that some crimes nevertheless happened and that at least direct 
perpetrators should respond. It all ended up in words.  
Furthermore, local judiciaries suffer a considerable amount of 
pressure from the political actors. Not rarely the indictments abstain 
from taking “broader picture” of the crime and are filled only against 
direct perpetrators. Even when it is possible to trace mid rank or high 
rank officials’ involvement in crimes, they remain left out of the legal 
narrative and gain “amnesty” and broader political discretion. In such 
circumstances, the potential of domestic trials for bringing perpetrators 
to justice and challenging dominant frameworks for interpreting the 
past is inherently limited. What happened more often is that certain 
judicial facts became official “truths” depending whether they do not 
contradict the dominant master narrative about the war. To conclude 
we argue that transitional justice, instead of triggering truth seeking 
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and truth telling processes that would lead to reconciliation, multiplied 
mutually exclusive historical narratives that determined national 
collective identities. Therefore, a holistic approach to transitional justice 
process in very much needed in the region. Main objective of 
reconstruction of post-conflict societies is a creation of just and durable 
peace. It should be implemented jointly by international and local 
actors, by using systematic, persistent, long-lasting confrontation with 
past in order to create a democratic environment for the future. 
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